"Paul J. Adam" wrote:

In message , "Doug \"Woody\" and
Erin Beal" writes
On 2/28/04 1:54 PM, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" wrote:
The groundpounder who wants responsive CAS available *immediately*
throughout an operation would differ with you as to whether having an asset
capable of hitting a FARP and returning quickly to station is just "nice to
have".

CAS is available immediately because it is capping nearby--not because it is
on some Harrier or STOVL F-35 that's on a mesh field getting fueled and
loaded. It is a function of proper planning, sufficient numbers of
aircraft, and a good DASC.

And the equation for "time on station" includes time to and from home
base, and time to turn the aircraft around. For a given force size, the
nearer your bases for refuelling and rearming, the more aircraft in the
cabrank and the fewer in transit to and from. Tankers are useful
extenders, but only if fuel is the limiting factor: we're not yet able
to do air-to-air rearming.

Again, HMS Sheathbill in 1982 is instructive for the extension in cover
it allowed.

To be precise, prior to HMS Sheathbill (the Harrier FARP) going operational, on an
avg. 1 hour and 15 minute Sea Harrier sortie, 65 minutes was spent in transit to
and from the carriers, 10 minutes on CAP. After HMS Sheathbill was established,
33 minutes was spent in transit to CAP, 37 minutes on CAP, five minutes to HMS
Sheathbill for refueling/rearming. Reverse the above mission, or turn Sea
Harriers at Sheathbill all day, giving 65 minutes on CAP, 10 minutes in transit
to/from the FARP. And then there were the Harrier GR.3s sitting ground alert for
CAS (25-30nm away from their targets), instead of 200-250 nm away on the carriers.



I doubt that. Is STVL the way to go for all TACAIR? Of course
not. But eliminating it just reduces your own versatility, and that would
not be a wise move in the current environment of uncertainty (as regards
where/when/how we'll have to fight).

What I'm claiming is that STOVL is still risky technology that kills too
many pilots in peace time and offers too little benefit in war time for that
cost.

You could say the same about helicopters: IIRC helo crashes were the
biggest single killer of British troops in Telic / Iraqi Freedom.

US troops too, I suspect. Certainly the case in Afghanistan, along with those
disasters waiting to happen, the C/KC-130s. Subsequent to the major fighting in
Iraq helo accidents/shootdowns have made up a fair percentage as well, although
probably less than those from IEDs and ground vehicle accidents. Wait, we'd
better get rid of those latter too, especially those damned HMMWV deathtraps. And
then there were those tank and LAV crews that drove into rivers or canals and
drowned; away with them all, I say. They're obviously far too dangerous to be
used by military personnel.

Guy