posted & mailed

Mike, thanks for the details and for taking the time to do it. I can't
really add much because you've said everything g.

Enjoy reading this stuff from the guys who have actually done it; much
appreciated.

Nick



Mike Kanze wrote:

Nick,

Got back my copy of FOTI this weekend and turned to the segment you
mention.

From Coonts' narrative, the route sounds a bunch like the OB-16 route.
IIRC, OB-16 started in northern Oregon and ended at the B-16 nuclear
bullseye at NAS Fallon, NV. The early legs of this route took one
into the canyons of the John Day River system, including one
particular canyon that
runs almost exactly N-S. After watching canyon walls go by for about
20 nm, the terrain begins to broaden and you change course to roughly
SSE for a ~70
nm leg to Harney Lake. The few charts I saved of this area confirm
the existence of some low hills and shallow valleys along this
otherwise
flattening route. I would guess these are the hills Coonts was
visualizing as threats to Jake and Morg when he wrote this segment.

(For those among you who are limited to the likes of a Rand-McNally
road atlas, the route starts at a little burg named Kimberly which is
about 60 nm SSW of Umatilla, OR.)

There's no specific thing that Coonts mentions in his narrative that
would
cause Morg to scream for a pull-up. Morg has just put his head back
into
the hood, so he is not looking at the pilot's VDI. (Neither
apparently is Jake, since he is not maintaining the 1,000 feet of
clearance he has cranked
into the VDI's offset impact bar.) Since Jake is viewing SRTC on the
VDI,
Morg is limited to a PPI display on his DVI. Morg may have noted a
way-too-strong radar return too close-in for comfort. Or maybe things
just "didn't look right" to him, the sound of that little voice we all
carry
within us. Or maybe this was just some artistic license taken by
Coonts.

Night or IMC conditions are absolutely the most demanding environment
for
low-level flight. Jake clearly has let his scan deteriorate away from
the SRTC info and (as the narrative states) dwell too much upon other
things
like engine instruments and fuel state. Unless you're heading
directly for a canyon wall, your radar altimeter readings do not
deteriorate from 1,000 feet to 100 feet in only an instant.

Coonts' narrative is one of many good examples of the value of having
two
pairs of eyeballs sitting side by side. For attack work - including
low-level, all wx ops - this was the gold standard of that era. The
situational awareness such an arrangement facilitates - and demands -
of both pilot and B/N undoubtedly saved many a mission, bird and crew.