Some complicating factors that came with the F-14:

1. Congress dictated, and the Navy agreed, that 70% of aircraft failures
would be repairable at the organizational or intermediate level.

2. Congress dictated that Grumman use many small-business minority-setaside
subcontractors. Many of these were frauds from the start; the president of
the company was last seen headed for Brazil with his secretary under one arm
and the entire assets of the company under the other. Once the company was
gone, where do we get the parts? Just get the drawings and find another
bidder, right? Wrong! The drawings were assets in bankruptcy, and
bankruptcy courts do not work for DOD.

3. From day one, the RAG's, fleet squadrons, the production line and the
Iranian buy were in competition for parts. It had been agreed that Iran
would receive a one-year AVCAL (spare parts allowance based on aircraft
quantity and projected flight hours) at the time of delivery of the first
aircraft. Shortly into production, it was decided we could get more oil
money back by providing Iran a two-year AVCAL with the first aircraft.

4. Every Congresscritter had to have an ankle to bite where the F-14 was
concerned. Practically all F-14 communications from the fleet to Washington
were by phone; any telegraphic message mentioning a fault or shortage would
be highlighted in Jack Anderson's newspaper column within hours.

5. Fleet introduction was the classic Chinese fire drill. The first fleet
F-14's that landed on Enterprise couldn't be launched; the nose launch bars
would not fit the ship's fittings. George Skurla, President of Grumman
Aerospace, was personally assigned a helicopter with crew and a machinist
mate with a set of micrometers and flew the parts ashore to a machine shop
in San Diego so they could be machined to fit.

6. By the time VF-124, -1, -2, -14 and -32 were outfitted, there had been
so many configuration changes that the maintainers had to carry a matrix
chart listing Bureau Numbers versus LRU dash numbers. Each LRU version had
a code for each BUNO: 1) Works OK; 2) Works - Degraded Capability, or; 3)
Don't Plug It In - Makes Smoke.

Truly, a flying miracle!

Rick

P.S.: Would one of you REAL old-timers give me the real scoop on the Wing
Flap Glove Vane System?










"Jim Carriere" wrote in message
...
Harry Andreas wrote:
This 3 level maintenance was the same for both USAF and USN.

Lately, since the mid-90's, contracts have gone to 2 level maintenance.
Getting rid of the intermediate shop has eased a lot of problems;

Harry, there is still 3 level maintenance. In the USN, what you refer to
as flightline is usually called "O level" as in organization (squadron).
"I level" for intermediate, may be as close as across the street on base,
but it is a separate entity from the squadron. (It is also usually a "good
deal" for the maintenance folks for a shore tour after their time in the
squadron, especially if the guys with families, because they don't have to
move.) Depot level is usually not on the same base, as one depot serves a
geographical reqion of several hundred miles radius or more.

From what I've seen so far, I agree with how you describe the direction of
the work on the flightline. Fault codes, troubleshooting flowcharts, and
replacing black boxes. The avionics guys still know how to detail work
like repair individual pins in connectors, check for continuity, but I've
seen major components like an entire FLIR turret get shipped to swap out
with a bad one on a deployed aircraft.

By the way I'm a helicopter guy, not fast mover, but maintenance is a
pretty similar business through all of naval aviation.