SD sdatverizondot.net@ wrote
Thanks guys for being supportive. I think I am being harder on myself
then what I have received here, I really expected harsher criticism
which I feel is dully warranted.

Which is why you didn't receive it. You know what you did wrong so no
point making an issue of it.

The only thing
that I can figure out as far as the discrepancy between the two tanks
fuel levels is this. First the Janitrol heater draws off of the right
tank which for the flight should have only drawn around 2.5 gallons,
this was considered for the flight planning. Second is when I had the
tanks filled for my journey home, there may have been a 1-2 gallon
discrepancy in the fill (just a guess) between the two tanks. Third,
with leaning, I use the EGT gauge to lean so there could have been a
difference in fuel flow to the right engine, the fuel flow indicators
are always off a little but they are always approximate anyways.

I don't really see how even all three factors in combination would
account for the discrepancy. 40 burned from the left, 60 from the
right. Just doesn't make sense.

I would look for fuel leaks, and don't forget that misfueling happens.

When I got on the ground, I was curious as to how much fuel was in the
left tank so I had the line guy fill the plane (he wasn't really happy
about that because it was like 10 degrees nowand still snowing). I
had about 11 gallons left in the left tank. That was after I landed
and had to taxi (on both engines) about 1.3 miles due to taxi way
closers and having to land on the opposite side of the field from the
FBO.

Still seems a bit high. I'm thinking you're leaking fuel somewhere on
the right engine/fuel system.

As far as the fuel reserves were concerned, they were considered, FOR
VFR.

The fuel is a red herring. 20 gallons at the end of a trip in a plane
that burns only a little more than that at max cruise in an hour (and
can burn a lot less if you pull it back) is not an issue. The
question is why 20 gallons of fuel disappeared from the right tank.

With regards to restarting the engine, that was not a decision that I
had made. When the fan quit, I was in the middle of intercepting the
localizer and I had no time to really make that decision at that
moment, I was doing everything I could to intercept and turn inbound
because I knew things were getting critical.

I think your priorities were dead on here. No matter how pathetic the
twin is (and the one you have is not pathetic) you really don't need
the engine once you've turned inbound unless you're going to miss.
Don't miss. Especially don't miss because you're screwing with the
engine.

I had the plane under
control for the most part and I did not want to divert my scan to
something else for the moment, all I did at that time is hit the cross
feed.

I don't know that I would even have done that much - or wanted to.
You now you can shoot a single engine approach. You don't know why
there is 20 gallons missing from the right side, but the first thing
to suspect is a leak. How bad is it? Maybe bad enough that 20
gallons won't be enough with both running?

20/20 hindsight, of course. Single engine approaches have their risks
too. What you did was reasonable, but not necessarily best IMO. I
think I would have just feathered it and called it good. But again -
that's a fine point. We're talking about relative risks that are
small and difficult to calculate, so no way was this wrong. Just
trying to present alternatives for next time.

Certainly not wanting to divert attention from a plane not fully under
control to mess with an engine you really didn't absolutely need makes
all kinds of sense.

Once I got the plane semi stabilized on the localizer and I had
intercepted the GS and started my decent was when I diverted a little
attention to that situation. Things had calmed down just a smidge so
I was in the thought process of determining the best action. Just as
I was checking the mixture, prop, throttle and fuel settings for the
right engine is when I noticed the manifold pressure and RPM'S started
to come up and then a very noticeable yaw to the left because of more
power was being produced by the right engine. I then brought the power
down to match the left. CHT temps on the right engine was a little
cooler but with regards to the time frame it didn't have much time to
cool too much. Of course I really have no idea how much time the
engine had been down (looking at the clock for that was just not in my
mind) but given my approx location and the decent point I figured
probably around 3 minutes but that is a guess, it seemed like an
eternity to me.

No kidding. If you had enough cycles left over to be troubleshooting
the engine inside the marker, you were doing OK skillwise. The wisdom
of doing it, though, is another gray area. Personally, I doubt I
would divert the attention unless both needles were in the donut and I
wasn't working too hard to keep them there. Again - if you shoot a
good approach, you won't need the other engine. If you botch the
approach and don't get the engine back, you're hosed. Once again, not
a case of right or wrong - more like personal preference.

I have set aside some time in the next few days to go under the hood
and shoot multiple approaches and holds using this equipment. Not
that I have not done this already. I have shot about 5 approaches
with the new equipment when we first got it but the stress level was
not there as it was this time. I plan on having my safety pilot do
all kinds of things to try and get the blood pressure back to where it
was that night.

I strongly recommend partial panel single engine full procedure night
circling NDB approaches to short runways. It's what I do for my
recurrent training, and I recommend it highly. If you can do that,
real life failures are quite anticlimactic.

Michael