angry wrote:

I see that both you and I are bieased -

Perhaps, if you consider my desire to wait for the full story from the
official accident report before blaming anyone to be a bias.

I know that I am seeing things in this light because I hate ATC's
"policeman" attitude, irrespective of the cisrcumstances... I have
been a victim of similar attitude, fortunatelty I am here, angry,
but allive and kicking...

So they are simply guilty before all the facts have been collected and
sorted out.

So let's get the facts straight -

Unfortunately, your "facts" are not correct again. Hence the need to
wait for the accident report.

The ATC instructed the russians to descend as part of the approachg for
landing procedure. At that time, he claims that he did not noticed the
conflict situation because the radar warning system was not operational -
this is bull, as that system is there as an aural warning, and an alert ATC
should have noticed that situation developping himself, not waiting for the
radar to ring a bell to him about it...

The transcript of the CVR and FDRs on both aircraft indicate that the
first instruction the ATC gave was to the Russian plane to descend to
avoid the traffic. They still had a long way to go to Barcelona, so it
would be too early for starting a descent.

It is also clear that the controller was distracted, since he was
talking on a telephone.

Yes, an alert ATC should have noticed the conflict. However, backup
alarms are provided as a safety precaution. Alert pilots should never
execute a CFIT, land with gear retracted, or try to take off in a DC-9
without flaps, either. Alarms are often provided to reduce the risk of
those things happening.

The issue is that there were a number of reported problems at Skyguide,
which might have "set up" the ATC, such that an accident was
inevitable. First, the conflict warning system was inoperable; then,
there was only one controller handling the aircraft at the time, even
though there are supposed to be two when the conflict warning system was
inoperable; finally, there was only one phone line available, so German
controllers who saw the impending conflict could not contact their
Skyguide counterpart to warn him. Given those problems, how much
responsibility does the ATC's employer share in the tragedy?

The desent instruction coinsided with the TCAS warning and the subsequent
RA. Although the ATC mentiones that there is a potential conflict in his
descent instruction, he fails to advise that the conflict is and will remain
on same FL, he never issues instruction to the DHL traffic although all are
on the same FRQ - that misfortunately makes the russion pilot stay put as he
has to figure out what to do - to to follow the RA (climb) or to follow the
ATC (descent)

Yes, but the Russian pilot should not have needed to hesitate. He
should have followed the TCAS RA without any need to think about it.
That is an additional question about the accident - why did the Russian
pilot take the action he did? You can't blame the ATC for what the pilot
chose to do.

The ATC has a 5 sec update (not 12)

The updates are indeed 12 seconds on the Skyguide radar, based on the
sweep of their secondary radar antenna. There are a number of sources
for that, including a report released only one week prior to the
collision by the Swiss accident investigation branch. Skyguide was
planning to upgrade their radar systems to at least meet European
recommendations of a minimum of 8 second updates, but had not yet done
so. This would allow the implementation of reduced vertical separation
standards.

and the Mode C data error is +/- 100 ft,
sufficiently accurate. At the time the ATC issues his second "expedite"
instruction, the ATC fails to notice that the DHL traffic already has
desended halfway trough - still, no radio contact with the DHL traffic, no
instructions to maintain assigned FL, no query "hey, where are you
going..." - although that information is available cleraly on his radar for
almost 45 sec and the picture is there to show that the DHL is descending
from FL360 into his "other" trafic that he just instructed to descend to
FL350!

You are being optimistic about what the controller can see. Given the
12 second update interval, and the 100 foot resolution of display, he
wouldn't be confident of any change for two or three sweeps of the
radar. I understand that ATC are often told not to be confident about
any information until that information has been updated twice, since
they sometimes get data with errors, which is corrected at the next
pass.

Under the pressure, the russion pilot finally decides to follow the ATC
instruction and descend.

Yet you have no criticism of the Russian pilot, even though an automatic
system has given him a clear warning? I ask that, recognizing that
there is some controversy about what pilots will do when ATC and TCAS
instructions conflict, though the JAA policies are quite clear on the
subject - the pilot should have followed the TCAS RA, and not the ATC
instruction.

30 sec after that decision they collide - now, I want to know
what the stupid ATC was doing for that time - 30 seconds - was not
he seeing on his radar screen ( 6 x 5 sec updates)

Again, the Skyguard radar sweeps are 12 seconds apart. He would only
have seen one or two updates before the collision was inevitable. It
also appears that the DHL pilot only announced that he had a TCAS RA,
and was descending, at about 13 seconds prior to the collision. This
was the first the ATC would have known about the RA, and it was too late
for the controller to take any further action.

that the he just forced one aicraft to descent into another one
that was descending on it's own. Surely he could have just open
his mouth and call the DHL traffic and stop him.

Based on the CVR information, he didn't force the Russian captain to do
anything. The captain made the decision to descend, and instructed the
first officer to do so, even though the first officer questioned the
decision. Hence the delay in beginning the descent, while they
discussed what to do. That opens up the questions of CRM and training.

As far as the ATC calling the DHL aircraft to stop its descent, if I was
the pilot on that aircraft, I would have completely ignored the ATC
instruction, and increased my rate of descent in accordance with the RA
I was getting from TCAS. That clearly is the training.

That brings up the question of what the TCAS system was doing. Both
aircraft were supposedly equipped with the latest version - TCAS II,
version 7 - which is supposed to alter the RA if one of the aircraft
does not do what it is instructed. In this case, why didn't that system
provide an RA to the DHL aircraft to stop descending and climb when the
Russian aircraft descended contrary to its RA?

Or he could have just open his mouth and changed the clearence to
the russian guy. Or just open his mouth and say something, anything that
would give a clue to the both pilots that they are heading on a collision
course.

He did give an instruction to avoid the collision. If the Russian
aircraft had descended, and the DHL remained at its assigned altitude,
there wouldn't have been a collision. With the 12 second sweep of the
radar, by the time he would have been sure the DHL aircraft was also
descending, it was too late to do anything.

You see, the ATC was the only one that had a whole clear picture in front of
him and his job was to keep the things separated and not colliding with each
other... He failed... He should not have...

The ATC did not have a full picture, since he did not have any
information about what the TCAS systems were telling the pilots.

That's the way I see it.

You are still prejudging the results of the accident investigation based
on erroneous information and assumptions. There is a whole list of
events that shouldn't have happened they way they did, and certainly the
ATC's late instruction was one of them, but so were the policies of
Skyguide, the way the TCAS system reacted, the training of the crew on
the Russian airliner, and the political divisions that require
fragmented ATC over Europe. Again, that is what the accident report will
sort out. Wait for it before assigning blame. I certainly don't know who
is at fault. I have many questions, but won't make any judgment until
the report is released.