On Wed, 23 Jun 2004 17:37:23 GMT, "Casey Wilson"
wrote:


If it was effective, why did Germany manage to produce the greatest
amount of war related materials late in the war when the Allied
bombing was at it's greatest effectiveness? Shouldn't things have
been the other way around?

Corky Scott

What is your source for German production in the above statement?

The postwar strategic bombing assesement survey. It basically
shredded the hallowed tenents that founded the US strategic bombing
campaign.

Here is the main conclusion:

Aviation: "In 1944 the German air force is reported to have accepted a
total of 39,807 aircraft of all types -- compared with 8,295 in 1939,
or 15,596 in 1942 before the plants suffered any attack." According to
the report, almost none of the aircraft produced in 1944 were used in
combat and some may have been imaginary.
Armor production "reached its wartime peak in December 1944, when
1,854 tanks and armored vehicles were produced. This industry
continued to have relatively high production through February 1945."
Ball bearings: "There is no evidence that the attacks on the
ball-bearing industry had any measurable effect on essential war
production."
Steel: The bombing greatly reduced production, but the resulting
shortage had no contribution to the defeat.
Consumer goods: "In the early years of the war -- the soft war period
for Germany -- civilian consumption remained high. Germans continued
to try for both guns and butter. The German people entered the period
of the air war well stocked with clothing and other consumer goods.
Although most consumer goods became increasingly difficult to obtain,
Survey studies show that fairly adequate supplies of clothing were
available for those who had been bombed out until the last stages of
disorganization. Food, though strictly rationed, was in nutritionally
adequate supply throughout the war. The Germans' diet had about the
same calories as the British."
The survey concluded that one reason German production rose in so many
areas was in part that the German economy did not go on a complete war
footing until late 1942 and 1943. Up until then, factories had been on
a single shift in many industries and the German economy was generally
inefficient and not operating at full capacity.

Please note, some aspects of the bombing were very effective. The Oil
production bombing, more so than any other aspect, hugely curtailed
the ability of the German military forces to fight or train to fight.
Oil was not originally the top priority of the bomber forces.

Primarily the problem with Strategic Bombing, as visualized by the
leaders of the Army Air Forces, was that it was an untried concept.
Hundreds of thousands of airmen, in both British forces and US forces
died trying to accomplish something that turned out to be
unattainable, at least in terms of 1940 to 45 technology.

Of course, the bombing campaign affected the outcome of the war. It's
just that the manner of the affect wasn't how the leaders designed it.
They thought that if they could destroy the war making industries,
Germany would loose it's ability to wage war. That part did not
happen. But Germany spent so much time and effort attempting to stop
the bombing campaign, that their ground forces suffered. The skies
over Germany became a charnel house for the German aviators and
without an effective air force, the German army lost a lot of
effectiveness. Germany withdrew enormous numbers of flack guns from
the Russian front to ring their cities for protection. This proved
dire for the bombers, but also reduced the effectiveness of the German
army to counter the hundreds of thousands of tanks the Russians now
sent against their forces.

In the end, hard as this is to swallow, the huge Russian armies likely
would have ground out a victory which would have been even more costly
for them than it was, were it not for the air war against Germany.

Against the Japanese, any likeness to precision bombing was abandoned
when the concept broke against the realities of weather and B-29
maladies.

The Strategic Bombing Survey, as you can imagine, became as
politicized a document and process as is humanly possible. The Army
Air Force was already planning to become an independent military force
at that time and made all kinds of interpretations from the survey
that they felt justified their existance and the concept of an
independent air force.

George Ball and John Kenneth Galbreath were members of the bombing
survey. Galbreath in particular adamantly argued that the strategic
bombing of Germany was far less effective than trumpeted by the
leaders of the Army Air Corps. The Air Corps members, of course,
disagreed.

Corky Scott