"David CL Francis" wrote in message
...
On Tue, 26 Oct 2004 at 20:52:36 in message
, Mike Rhodes
wrote:
I recall some question concerning a weakness in the design of the
rudder itself, in that the supports to the composite structure were
too few. Not too long after the accident, I saw it was explained on
TV that the manufacturer should have distributed the load over more
points for the sake of the composite material. The known and
understood weakness of composites, compared to metals, is their lesser
ability to handle bearing stress. So Airbus should've known better,
presumably.

The original pictures seemed to show clearly that the root attachments
failed at the attachment to the fuselage.

How easy in turbulence is it to develop a pilot induced yaw oscillation?
The fin might well withstand a full deflection but not a few reversals
that built up the maximum yaw oscillation. Fins and rudders are as big as
they are to deal with the engine out case at relatively low speed I
understand. Isn't one of the functions of a yaw damper to restrict and
damp a yaw oscillation?

Do the reports give any indication of the amount of yaw excursion that
took place?

--
David CL Francis

correct me if i am wrong but wasnt it the ntsb that a few years before
aa 587 critized a crew for not using full and complete control deflection
for another accident? i do not remember which one it was but shortly after
some of the airlines started going to those upset recovery courses. sounds
like the ntsb wants it both ways.

tony zambon
grumman 9941L