Jamie,

Prove your statement? Assume, for a moment, that a document exists which
gives specific (simple) pre/post flight requirements to the OO for dealing
with a couple of approved COTS units (same as we have today for photographic
and barogroph validation). For instance:

1. Validate that track logs are cleared prior to flight. This is done
by... Or, identify existing track logs prior to flight. This is done
by...

2. Observe dowload of track log post flight. This is done by...

I have it on pretty good authority from folks that have actually spent a lot
of time working with COTS units that this perceived decrease in security is
a complete, total farce. Since I'm in the US, I'll use the standard of
innocent until proven guilty - in other words, COTS is no less secure if OO
procedures are followed.

I think this idea that we're going from some iron-clad proof of validity to
basically self-certifying is a joke. How did your insurance companies know
that the OO was not in complicity with a pilot when, for example, certifying
that the barograph was sealed or a fresh roll of film was inserted under
his/her observation. Etc.




"Jamie Denton" wrote in
message ...


If we allow COTS units, we lower the standard of proof
neccesary for badges, we devalue the Silver badge etc
in the eyes of the insurance companies...