hmmm ... less then one in four odds ...

but, isn't the more common denominator incompetence ... and lets define
that as a failure of execution because of lack of training or currency
or awareness or attention, etc. You can easily die in aviation doing
some routine non-cutting-edge things ... and most of the people in your
list did.

* My point is that if I had to guess the next fatality, it would be
* an experienced soaring pilot in a 43:1 ship low near a ridge
* in a gaggle.

* 7 Ridge in 29 fatalities.



Mark James Boyd wrote:
Steve,

First of all, I read the accident report from the accident you
mention. I personally concluded that the pilot was the only one
who could have prevented this accident.
www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/query.asp
look up glider fatalities and I think you'll find it.

Then I got involved in your response about the ASW-20 comment being

mis-representative. So I researched the past 5 years of US glider
fatalities. I had done this a year or two ago, and this time added
some formality.

29 fatalities.

7 ridge
4 off-airport landings
4 spin on final
3 intentional aerobatics
3 did a PCC but not an assembly check
2 drugs
2 midair
1 rope break
1 on top of rotor clouds
1 fuel exhaustion takeoff eng fail
1 trim failure, killed the towpilot

(all of these pigeonholes are arguable, of course).

Of the ridge fatalities, the sailplane L/Ds were
57, 48, 48, 43, 43, 37, 36. Median L/D of 43.

The only make/model to have two fatal incidents was the ASW-20.

Only one non-glider rated occupant was killed. An acro
ride in the ASK-21 with a midair less than 4 miles from
the airport and within 2500 ft AGL killed both passenger and
pilot.

Only ONE of the 29 fatal accidents involved a glider
with a Vne less than 120 knots. This was an SGS 1-26
that broke a shoulder strap on impact.

Over 75% of the accidents involved a glider with an L/D over 33.

The median L/D of the fatal gliders was 43, and was the ASW-20.

From some best guessing and the reports, over 80% of the
fatal accidents had PICs with over 100 hours in gliders. About half
of the
pilots were CFIs or ATPs with hundreds of hours, often in make/model.

So I used the ASW-20 as my example. If I'd used the ASW-24E or
ASW-27B or Jantar 42-2 or PIK-30 or SZD 55-1, I'm sure
pilots would have come to defend these aircraft as well.

My point is that if I had to guess the next fatality, it would be
an experienced soaring pilot in a 43:1 ship low near a ridge
in a gaggle. On Saturday I heard just this description from
a pilot (who was in such a gaggle) and he mentioned he was
keenly aware he had put himself in this position. Yes,
he did so intentionally, and found it to be an exciting challenge.

Is there something wrong with the FAA system? No. The low timers
in their low and medium performance gliders are barely a blip
on the accident reports.

Most fatalities from my perspective are due to the "naked edge."
Some experienced pilots choose to fly something with performance in
challenging conditions. They've accepted risk to gain performance.
Should we do something about this? I don't think there's
anything to be done. Drugs, aerobatics, ridge soaring, gaggles,
off-airport landings are all risks the pilots themselves
are aware of, are trained and familiar with, and accept.
Unaware passengers and people on the ground aren't being
significantly harmed (1 fatality in 5 years? An acro ride?).

From a public safety standpoint, I think the FAA has done its
job. And I'll keep training pilots in the 2-33 and L-13 and
1-26 and PW-2. And some of them will move up to fast glass and
practice to try to maintain a level of safety. Hey, man,
that really is their own personal choice, as far as I'm concerned.

In article ,
Steve Hill wrote:
Mark James Boyd Wrote:
"I've told people the difference between a 2-33 and an ASW-20
is simple. Just take all of the built in safety for the
design and replace it with higher workload and
higher required pilot proficiency for the same level of safety.
As Bob K. is apt to say "it goes like stink." The
downside is the naked edge of safety vs. performance."


Okay...alright...I'm not trying to start a fight, but to claim that
an
ASW-20 is the "naked edge of safety" leads me to believe that some
definitions are in order.
I don't own an ASW-20 but I have flown one, and I have to say they
fly VERY
nicely. At no point was I left hanging on the brink of safety. I
think that
comment is mis-representative of the machine, to say the least.

I guess my whole thought on this topic has not really changed from
my first
posting. This weekend I thought about the fact that the way we are
all
taught to fly, is mostly focused on "How-To" do the correct thing
and that
basis makes it pretty difficult to deal with what to do when things
go awry.
In many cases simple little snippets of information that you learn
along the
way that you rely on when all the normal stuff goes to
hell...Comments about
we ALWAYS do things this way or that way, generally lead to problems
later.
We simply cannot teach all the variable adversities that one may
encounter,
so we have to teach student to think and analyze and act to the best
of
their abilities.

I had a truck driver once who came to work for me. My old
truckdriver was
moving up within the company, so we had him take the new hire on the
route
the first day to show him where to go...they borrowed my pickup
truck
instead of the delivery truck in an effort to save some time. The
next day
the new hire set out on his own and at 5 o'clock in the evening I
got a call
saying he had hit a bridge and that my delivery truck was badly
broken...upon arriving I found my delivery truck torn into 4 or 5
major
separated components after having been driven under a 7ft8 clearance
train
tressle ( the truck was 13ft 6" tall as opposed to the pickup truck
which
cleared easily the day before) When asked what in the hell he was
thinking...you guessed it..."That's the way I was shown to go
yesterday"
Full steam ahead 45 miles an hour...

Students can be like that, they take what is said far too literally
sometimes and I think that's why I believe that we ought to
concentrate more
fully on addressing how they think. All too often, you see an
instructor who
settles into his plan ie...rope break in the same place...pattern
always the
same, you get to know fairly quickly what they want to see and it is
then
easy to comply with... sorta the same way the Designee's are...I'm
sure we
all remember the instructors two cents worth..." Okay when he asks
you about
this, remember to say this...and oh yeah...don't forget to clear
those
turns" I mean..there's the little "wink wink" that let's everyone in
the
loop know you're okay and ready to pass...There really wouldn't be
much
point to checkrides if instructors sent "maybe he'll be okay's" on
to
checkrides.

We had a guy die at our airport last year. His own sailplane, nicer
than
anything on the field. Everyone was a little in awe I believe. He
took a
"familiarization flight" with one of our CFIG's in our Blanik, who
said he
did great. We have a little one way, mountain strip and he self
launched and
flew for 4 hours and when he came back, he was high and fast and
screwed
things up horribly. He then proceeded to flail around indecisively,
until
which time he stalled and spun in dying on impact. Everyone felt
horrible,his logbook revealed he had hardly ANY experience with his
ship but
hundreds of hours in Blaniks. Nobody did anything wrong, but in the
end, the
real issue is how do we keep it from happening again.

From my perspective, if I were an instructor, I'd be very keen on
training a
student the way I wanted them to fly, but then I think the last 4 or
5 hours
would be spent on just doing things differently, and with an open
mind, to
see how they react. Induce stress and see how they react. Tha,t
after all,
is what I was referring to from my view on student training, making
sure we
teach them to think adequately.

We have to teach pilots to think and analyze and act. With a decided
eye
towards maximizing their odds for survivability. That's probably a
whole lot
tougher than I am aware of. I'm not sure it's covered in the
Practical Test
Standards or Airmans Knowledge Tests. But it is perhaps the biggest
reason
to be dynamic in our training as opposed to static, which I believe
to be a
major difference from teaching JUST to the PTS...and JUST to pass
the
Exam...

JUST...my humble opinion.

I take my hat off to all you instructors who give tirelessly to this
sport
and please, I hope you take my comments as they are intended, which
is
constructive, not destructive.


Respectfully,



Steve.






--

------------+
Mark J. Boyd