On Thu, 17 Feb 2005 02:02:28 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Wed, 16 Feb 2005 16:28:37 -0700, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::


And, your arguments citing a mishap in Florida relating to a MOA
change in New Mexico are inadequate to address the training
requirements of combat forces in high performance tactical jet
aircraft.

My argument was with the USAF's statement _in_ the proposed MOA
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) about claims procedures for
"damage due to Air Force activity." If the USAF hadn't raised the
issue in conjunction with their proposal to increase the size of the
MOA, I wouldn't have referred to their failure to criminally prosecute
Parker for the death of Oliveier.

What part of "accident" is so difficult to understand. For what crime
would you prosecute the flight lead? Murder? Did he premeditate? What
crime?

I'm deeply sympathetic to Ms Olivier or Oliveier,

The USAF wasn't when they heard that she was going to sue them. An
Air Force spokesman was reported to have said, that they'd seek
compensation for the F-16 that killed her husband due to Lead Parker's
deliberate decision to descend into congested terminal airspace
without the required ATC clearance.

We live in a litigious society. Folks threaten to sue when the spill
hot coffee in their laps and to avoid the costs of the litigation, the
prospective defendant will often reach a settlement. No criminal
charges were brought, because no prosecuter with an ounce of judgement
would be able to define a "crime" and no civil action was brought,
because Ms Olivier really couldn't prove that a flight lead decision
was in any way malicious toward her husband.


So, creating a MOA which would advise all aircraft operators of the
intended operations would not be as good as operating in non-special
use airspace as was being done in the Florida accident?

From that statement, it seems you might be a bit confused about the
proposed MOA enlargement as well as the Florida mishap.

The USAF proposes not to establish a MOA, but to increase the size of
the one currently in existence, so that they can conduct supersonic
operations within 5,000' to 6,000' of the surface instead of at
30,000' as is currently occurring. Please read the USAF EIS, so that
you'll at least know what we are discussing. Here's a link to it:
www.cannon.af.mil

I read it and I know what we are discussing. We are talking about a
proposal to increase available training airspace for Cannon AFB and to
change the limits of permissible operations. That is considerably
different than a descent in non-special use airspace a continent away.


My point was that 3.3 MILLION hours per 120 mishaps (which aren't all
mid-airs or even aircraft losses and which didn't all occur in special
sue airspace) is a statistic that is better viewed as mishaps/100k
flight hours rather than mishaps/month.

So, you agree with my math now?

I'm suggesting that extrapolating 20 years experience into a
"mishap/month" stat is misleading. The rate is not constant over the
period. And, the rate for mishaps is measured traditionally as mishaps
per 100k flying hours, not as a function of calendar months.

Not much. But a non-combat Class A mishap every two months continuing
for a period of 20 years is significant in its own right, in my
opinion.

That's the error--the mishaps don't occur at a constant rate through
the period and the assumption that they do is erroneous. The extension
of mishaps to equate with loss of aircraft, association with special
use airspace, supersonic operation and mid-air collisions are all
further errors related to the statistic.

First, note that the tactical applicability of supersonic operations
at high or low altitude is very limited. Second, note that most
PLANNED supersonic operation is done at high altitude, such as
high-speed intercept training. Third, note that UNPLANNED supersonic
operation can occur momentarily during air combat maneuver/BFM
training and that might be at relatively low altitude (although most
tactical training employs a 10k or 5k AGL "floor"). Fourth, note that
most training in which supersonic operations are planned or highly
likely will be conducted in restricted airspace rather than MOA.
Fifth, note that transiting of MOAs by VFR traffic while allowed is
discourage; by IFR traffic is not allowed when the MOA is in use.

Those statements reveal the fact that you haven't read the USAF EIS
statement proposing the increase in size of the MOA. The reason the
USAF is seeking to increase the size of the MOA is so that they can
conduct supersonic operations within 5,000' to 6,000' of the surface
instead of at 30,000' as is currently occurring. Please read the USAF
EIS, so that you'll at least know what we are discussing. Here's a
link to it: www.cannon.af.mil

You're redundant and beginning to carp. My list of five factors is to
point out that simply because an airspace is AUTHORIZED for supersonic
operation does not mean that is what is going on within. Being
AUTHORIZED simply means that if tactically necessary, you can exceed
the mach without filling out reams of paperwork and having an
investigation or potential violation. Most operations are
subsonic--there is little tactical appliacation for supersonic flight.
It can and does occur, usually inadvertently, during engagement. Get
it? You don't use supersonic AUTHORIZED airspace to go blasting back
and forth with your hair on fire.

You confirm my asssertion of cluelessness. Some military aircraft
don't function very well at 250 KIAS unless in landing configuration.
They burn fuel at high rates and are restricted in their agility. For
that reason the FARs have waivered the 250 max exactly for the reason
you quote "minimum SAFE airspseed".

I didn't say there was no reason for the DOD exemption from the 250
knot maximum speed below 10,000' feet. I said it brakes the NAS, and
is unsafe. There is not enough time to see-and-avoid at speeds in
excess of 250 knots.

You're saying military aircraft need to go faster than 250 knots below
10,000'; who am I to dispute that. I'm saying regardless of that
need, it creates a flight hazard to civil aviation when it occurs
outside of Restricted airspace (such as MTRs and MOAs).

Excuse me? If my airplane is drastically hampered in its ability to
safely maneuver by going slower than 250 KIAS below 10k feet MSL, then
it "creates a flight hazard" to me, my flight members, other aircraft
and folks on the ground.

How much time does a military pilot spend with his head down in the
cockpit studying charts, tuning radios, setting up navigation
equipment and not scanning for conflicting traffic? If it's more than
three seconds out of every 20, he's causing a safety hazard by virtue
of a military research study. If you have the flight experience you
claim, you know I'm correct.

Lessee a channel change every fifteen minutes takes about four second.
Charts? If VFR, I'm navigating by pilotage--i.e. looking at landmarks
out the window. If IFR, I'm head-down (or actually looking at the HUD
which is looking out the window) anyway if in the clouds, or
navigating by pilotage if in VMC. And, "setting up nav equipment" is
once again something that isn't done continually and in many systems
is done pre-flight through cartridge programming which then updates.

And, I have the flight experience I claim.


Look out the window and don't bump into things in front of you.

Oh, if it were only so simple.

Don't knock it if you haven't tried it.

I've tried it. Trust me, it's not that easy to spot an aircraft ATC
has pointed out that is only a mile or two distant. Now, at
supersonic speeds of ~11.5 miles a minute, it would only take 5
seconds for a 2 mile distant supersonic aircraft to reach you! You
have to agree, that's not a reasonable amount of time to
see-and-avoid.

Then you need to get your eyes checked. As stated repeatedly, there is
little utility to supersonic operation and very little reason to have
other than very momentary excursions into the supersonic regime at low
altitude. Even so, the shift in visual acquistion range between what
you see at 500 kts and what you see at 660 kts is insignificant.

As for your acquistion ranges, I've regularly seen F-5 sized targets
at 10-15 miles, tanker sized targets at 20 miles and light civil
airplanes at 10 miles--particularly if cued by a radar return, ATC
advisory or other input.

If there are so many adjustments occurring, it should be easy to
provide several examples of _reductions_ in military airspace, please.

Did you read previous posts? Walker AFB, Roswell NM. Williams AFB,
Chandler AZ. Webb AFB, Big Spring TX. Wendover AFB, Wendover UT.
Wurtsmith AFB....and those are just W's--all closed within the last 30
years, all with airspace which was no longer needed.

No, I did not read the articles that mentioned those closures.

Google BRAC. Are you unaware that in the last thirty years the
military has been significantly reduced?

Does it require the closure of an airbase to get the military to
relinquish its SUA? Aren't there situations where they no longer
train in the same way, and can relinquish it without closing the a
base?

Yes there are. There are also changes of mission. If you go back in
history to the '50s and '60s you will find a special use airspace
category called MCC (Military Climb Corridor) at the end of virtually
every runway of every major airport in the US. This was used for
departure of Cold War jet interceptors on scramble departure. They are
no longer used and you won't find them anywhere.

There are more civil aircraft flying more hours. That's the reason.

So, for civil aircraft mishaps, the rate per 100k flying hours might
be a good statistic? Not mishaps per month?

I have read both the military AIB and the NTSB reports. (I'd be happy
to provide copies via e-mail to anyone interested.) It's clear that
flight lead Parker deliberately chose to descend into congested
terminal airspace at high speed without the required ATC clearance,
and lead his wingman into the fatal collision.

That's called "flight lead discretion". It's one of literally hundreds
of decisions a flight lead is required to make in each and every
flight.


It was reported to be a verbal reprimand. So while the accident
report was made public, the details of the "punishment" Parker
received were confidential, unlike those in FAA certificate actions.
The military does not disclose as much information as the FAA.

What part of "verbal reprimand" is so difficult to understand. For
"details" do you require a transcript of the counseling session?


His deliberate decision to descend into congested terminal airspace at
high-speed without the required ATC clearance resulted in the death of
an innocent civilian, a fellow American. I consider that not only
significant, but worthy of criminal action. The USAF allowed Parker
to retire as planned with full pension and rank; that is not just.

Again we come to the terminology of "accident" and "crime". Yes,
someone died. No, there was no criminal intent and while there might
have been an arguably poor decision, it wasn't actionable after a
detailed investigation.

The "hubris beyond comprehension" here is your flogging of the issue
with little apparent background and a total unwillingness to
acknowledge any of the alternatives to your pronouncements.

When the government perpetrates injustice, it is the prerogative of a
citizen of a free nation to publicly air his views. I believe I have
provided evidence of reasonable background knowledge, and haven't seen
any alternative "pronouncements" to which you refer.

And, reread my sentence above: "unwillingness to acknowledge any of
the alternatives to your pronouncements"--that's not "alternative
'prounouncement'".

How is it different?

I didn't say you made an "alternative pronouncement". I said you
haven't acknowledged that numerous posters have provided alternative
information which conflicts with the pronouncements you made.


Perhaps, but at least I read the USAF EIS, and am aware that the
airspace they are seeking is to enable them to train at supersonic
speed within 5,000' to 6,000' of the surface, unlike you.

That's three times redundant. And, see above for the discussion.

Well, it would appear one of us is. But at least I'm not forced to
profane a fellow airman due to lack of reasonable arguments.

Excuse me? I've got more time in the Beak MOA inverted than you've
apparently got in military jets.

How is that revenant to the USAF's attempted airspace grab?

It is relevant to my experience in the airspace in question (have you
read the EIS to see the prominent mentions of Beak MOA and Capitan
MOA?) It is further relevant to your claim to be a "fellow
airman"--can you tell me what you've flown and where that gives you
this status of peer?


1 : to treat (something sacred) with abuse, irreverence, or
contempt : DESECRATE
2 : to debase by a wrong, unworthy, or vulgar use
–profaner noun

If I said you were an asshole, that would be vulgar. If I said ****
you that would be vulgar as well. And, since I don't consider you as
"something sacred", I can't very well be irreverant.

The record is clear; you haven't read the USAF EIS and weren't aware
they want to enlarge the MOA to permit low-level supersonic operations
north of Roswell, NM. You may not like my lack of objectivity and
overt criticism of the military, but it is you who apparently has no
clue about this airspace grab.

That's four and still redundant. But, if you've got little to say,
saying it often will serve equally as well. I've been refuting your
major issue of "airpace grab" with regard to a very small extension of
the MOAs used by both Cannon and Holloman AFBs and the applicability
of the supersonic authorization. (And you might want to get out a map
to check that both Beak and Capitan are W. of Roswell.)

If you want profaning of "a fellow airman", I suggest you scan recent
posts from Dudley--he's proven a master at it. But, I can stoop if
need be.

You not only can stoop, you have publicly. I hope you're indiscretion
isn't typical of most military airmen.

You'll have to familiarize yourself with a lot more military airmen to
make the decision on whether or not I'm typical. But, I'd advise you
to do it online and at a distance.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com