On Fri, 11 Mar 2005 23:48:34 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:

We didn't have the luxury of configuring specific jets for specific
missions other than with regard to the mission expendables themselves.
By that I mean a H/K F-4E during Linebacker was loaded with 4xCBU-52
on the inboard TERs (two on each), three fuel tanks, three AIM-7E-2,
and ONE ECM pod in the (usually) left forward missile well.

Yes, I know, but we're talking about the majority of F-4s, not just your H/K birds.
Loads varied depending on the unit and the tasking.

My point is that aircraft scheduled for Hunter/Killer and aircraft
scheduled for A/A escort, and aircraft that were scheduled as bomb
droppers all came out of the basic 27 aircraft that were available to
the 34th TFS--24 UE plus 3 attrition spares.

Before 1 October '72, when the 469th was still around, the two
squadrons were equipped at 18 UE, so the frag drew from those 36
aircraft for whatever mission was required.

Judging by photo frequency, strikers and
strike escorts were often carrying a pair of ALQ-87s in the forward wells by that
time, if they weren't carrying a strike camera in place of one of the jammers.

Over the years there were a lot of different configurations. Some
places and times carried ECM on an inboard wing station. Some carried
two pods. Various models of pods were carried and, yes, strike cameras
were occasionally hung.

For instance, I've got a shot of Coe and Webb's 34th TFS F-4E waiting to tank P/S
after they'd gotten their MiG-21 on 5 Oct. 1972.

No, from another F-4, probably Coe's wingman. The photo appears in Squadron/Signal's
"and kill MiGs" by Lou Drendel, on page 34 of my second edition. The caption reads
"F-4E of DickCoe refueling on egress from North vietnam after kill. Note missing
AIM-7!"

While I'm normally careful about trusting captions as to details, in the background is
a KC-135 along with 3 F-4D strikers, all of which appear to be from the 25 TFS (FA),
one of which is on the boom. Coe's a/c, "JJ" 68-0493 is missing an AIM-7E-2 from the
aft left well, plus all the tanks, and is presumably waiting his turn on that or
another tanker. Oh, and Drendel's source for the photo is Coe himself, so I think in
this case we can trust that the date and details are correct;-) Coe himself says he
was tasked as the only spare flight lead "for three MiGCAP flights [Sic. Presumably he
means escort, as is clearer below] and two flights in support of the Wild Weasels. As
soon as I got on the Ground frequency, the leader of the last flight in support of the
bombers aborted. He told me to go ahead and take his flight."

Curiosity got the better of me, so I dug out Don Logan's excellent
photo anthology, "The 388th Tactical Fighter Wing" by Schiffer
Publishing. (As an aside, Don was shot down about three days before I
arrived at Korat in '72. I moved into his hootch room even before his
personal effects were packed up.)

What surprised me was the number of F-4E photos both ground and
in-flight in which aircraft had NO ECM pod. Even in photos indicating
that they were taken after the commencement of Linebacker operations
there is no evidence of a pod.

There is a brief account of the Coe/Webb victory, but no mention of
pod configuration nor of tank jettisoning. Apparently from that
account, he was vectored by Disco to the vicinity of a pair of MiG-21s
cruising along in route formation. He sliced down into their six
o'clock and got an auto-aq lock-on and fired one AIM-7 for his kill.
(So much for the dog-fighting....)

All the pictures of pods in Don's book show the pod carried in a
forward missile well--none on an inboard wing station (at least at
Korat at that time.) In none could I discern carrying two pods.

They were tasked as strike
escort, and theyre carrying four AIM-9Es, plus two ALQ-87s forward and a single
AIM-7E-2 aft (they got the MiG with the other). Course, they had to sit there
and wait for the SAMs and MiGs to a greater extent than you did, plus they turned
the pods ON, so I imagine carrying a pair of them was a lot more valuable to them
than an extra (and unlikely to be used) AIM-7.

You are making a bad assumption here. A/A escort flights flew as
"out-riggers" on a set of bomb-droppers, usually three or four flights
of four. They went in with the bombers and out with the bombers.

H/K flights were "first-in/last-out", sweeping ahead of the strikers
and remaining in the area until the package was clear--and often
beyond that if fuel allowed to do visual armed recce for SAM sites.

We have no disagreement here, Ed. I wasn't referring to duration of time you spent in
Indian country, I was referring to the relative freedom to maneuver of the H/K (and
MiGCAP) flights compared to strikers, chaffers and escorts. The escorts were tied to
the chaffers and strikers, couldn't maneuver freely, and were usually on the edge of
the chaff corridor (as you said, outriggers) so the extra jamming power would come in
handy. As Coe says, he was tasked as spare flight lead for either strike or WW
escort, and his a/c is carrying a pair of pods.

I'm not enough of an electronic warfare guru to comment on whether
carrying a second pod would provide either additional jamming power or
broader frequency coverage. Clearly with a straight noise jammer the
advantage would be delayed burn-through, but by the time of the ALQ-87
and 101, there was at least as much deception output as noise (as
evidenced by the demise of the dreaded "pod roll-in" tactics.)

Since resolution pod formation depended on four-ship, there wouldn't
have been much benefit to a second pod on what was essentially an
autonomous two-ship formation.

They did run pods "ON" and we never turned them on except as a
last-ditch defense in a SAM-dance. But, as mentioned above, we did not
have the luxury of uploading and downloading ECM pods for the day's
mission. They were bolted on (unjettisonable) and stayed on.

Well, this and other a/c with the same mission have two "bolted on" in that time
frame, judging by the photos.

As for the likelihood of use--since we were not configured with
AIM-9s, we were at least as likely as the escort guys to need an
AIM-7.

Given that the AIM-7s were your only missiles, far more so.

The Strike escorts seem to have
felt that they were primarily there as Atoll absorbers for the strikers, and
comments by COM 7th AF (or maybe it was CINCPACAF, I forget) at the time seem to
confirm that was the case.

Strike escort guys more commonly felt themselves used (abused?) as
"herders" to create a situation to turn the MiGs to a place where the
fair-haired boys of the 555th could get their shots. We didn't even
get to talk to Teaball.

Given the number of frequencies you guys had to monitor, I'd say that was a reasonable
decision. After all, presumably the escort guys needed to have one radio on the
strike (or chaffer, if that was a different frequency), monitor Guard, plus be able to
talk to Disco/Red Crown. MiGCAPs were free to engage and AFAIK didn't need tobe on
the strike frequency, so letting them talk directly to Teaball makes sense.

The F-4 add a "one and a half" UHF radio--meaning a transmit/receive
primary radio and a receive-only auxiliary channel (with a limited
number of pre-set channel choices.) Plus Guard channel, of course.

All strike flights after tanker drop-off were on strike primary
frequency--Weasels, escorts, bombers, chaffers, jammers, et. al. Disco
and Red Crown broadcast on Guard--never any need to talk to them, so
that's not a factor. Teaball could have simulcast MiG calls on strike
primary to let the guys being targetted know what was going on. They
could have let the players know what the MiGCAP was doing. There was
no need to talk back to Teaball since we weren't being vectored by
them, but to deny guys in the arena essential elements of situational
awareness is unconscionable.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com