On Sun, 20 Mar 2005 15:15:52 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:

And, as for the RWR being lit up solid for several minutes--all I can
say is, "poor baby"! What was lit up solid? It was common to be
pinged by EW on the tanker. Fan Song and Firecans, along with Barlocks
and other radars would be painting consistently from the border to the
target and back. Was it radar pings, or Activity Light, or LAUNCH, or
AS (Azimuth-Sector)?

I don't remember. IIRC, his point was that sneaking in under the radar was a practical impossibility; the NVN
were always aware they were coming. ISTR there were also claims that the North Vietnamese fired chaff to make
the TFR see 'terrain' and command a pullup, which could put them at 10,000 feet within seconds. Whether there
was any independent proof of this or this is just one of those myths that the crews believed, I don't know;
there were plenty of TFR auto-pullups for unknown reasons. Monsoon rain was a problem in '68, but they
apparently figured that one out.

The whole point of terrain masking was to hide or interfere with
weapon guidance. Breaking the lock of the tracking radar by getting
below the antenna depression minimum or putting something solid
between the airplane and the defender.

Coming in undetected was not on the table for consideration. Everyone
pretty much knew we were coming and when. Simple HUMINT reports from
the Thailand bases or ground observers under the refueling tracks
would cover the TOT windows +/- 20 minutes or so.



Knowing what the situation was and what the RWR was telling you was
definitely an acquired skill--one which calmed the nerves after first
encounters with real RWR indications in combat.

From what I recall most of the '72 crews had BTDT in prior tours, so I don't think that was an issue.

Just looked at Hobson. He reports six F-111s lost during Linebacker
I/II.

28 Sept 72--Major AC and 1/Lt WSO
16 Oct --Capt AC and 1/Lt WSO
7 Nov-- Maj AC and Maj WSO
20 Nov-- Capt and Capt
18 Dec-- Lt Col and Major
22 Dec--Capt and 1/Lt

So, we've got at least three first-timers and three more probable (the
Captains.)

Certainly at Korat in the F-105 community, the force was split 50/50
with experience and FNGs. In the F-4 side of the house we had probably
25% with previous tours and the rest were first timers (including,
unbelievably, a couple of Majors with as much as 9 years experience in
the F-4 and no previous combat!)

Consider also that only BTDT crews who had participated in Rolling
Thunder would be SAM and radar-guided defense experienced. Lots of
previous tour guys had flown in S. Vietnam or during protracted
bombing pauses and had never seen a real-world RWR indication.

We actually had a half-dozen brand new 1/Lt arrivals both front and
back cockpit, straight out of training in the F-4 going to RP VI on
their first combat missions. Mike Stevens, squadron Ops Officer in the
34th went to Pack VI as a R/C/P flight lead/instructor pilot for some
of the Linebacker II sorties. (That was something I flat refused to
do!)

My recollection was that we never had Shrikes in sufficient quantity
for pre-emptive application. We didn't do it with F-100F Weasels; we
didn't do it with F-105F Weasels in '66, we didn't do it with F-105G
Weasels in LB I/II and I never saw it done with F-4C Weasels.

I pulled Thornborough off the shelf to see if I had missed something.
In discussion of the 67th deployment to Korat, starting on 25 Sept '72
(shortly before suspension of bombing N. of 20 degrees), they don't
mention pre-empting. And, most of their missions would have been flown
in areas of low defensive density and hence not very productive for
pre-emptive firing.

When LB II started, the 67th augmented the F-105G Weasels primarily at
night. The mission descriptions track with my recollection of
"detached support" for the night Hunter/Killer mission. F-4C Weasels
separated from F-4E killer elements and roamed, mostly single-ship,
engaging emitters as they were detected. But, no coordinated or
preplanned pre-emptions.

Which Thornborough book are you referring to, the F-4 book or the Iron Hand one? I think this info was in the
(revised) second edition of the F-4 book, but am not certain; it might have been in the Iron Hand book.

"Iron Hand"

It would be good to define "pre-emptive firing" before going much
further. My definition is firing without an emitter targetted.

That
is, lobbing or lofting the Shrike into an area of known defensive
radar but without a specific target for the purpose of keeping an ARM
airborne over the emitter and thereby keeping him shut down.
Time-of-flight for a pre-empt would be on the order of 2-3 minutes
maximum. Probability of detecting, tracking and engaging a radar
during such a tactic would be very low and the only effect would be as
a deterrent, not as a radar kill mechanism.

That's the definition.

If that's the definition, I categorically state that I never saw it
done. Never. Not even considered in discussions of how to improve our
tactics. First time I ever heard it suggested was around '74-'75 when
we were going to use it (simulated) in missions against CVBG forces in
the Mediterranean. (I discuss the tactic in my Air Command/Staff
College paper, "Sink the Kiev" as a means of rolling back the defenses
and providing suppression during an attack against a Soviet battle
group.)

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com