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Old May 5th 05, 08:08 PM
Michael
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Is there something specific that is disturbing, or are you referring
to the
entire report? I read through it and, while it is always disturbing

when
an accident results in fatalities, I honestly didn't see anything

that
stuck out as *really disturbing* such as drugs, alcohol, or a blatant


mistake. What did I miss?


I think that's pretty much the point. This is the reality of most
accidents. The pilot is qualified (at least on paper) and there are no
red flags likel buzzing, running out of fuel, drugs, alcohol, or a
blatant mistake or disregard for the regulations. There is simple
mishandling of the airplane in the takeoff/climb or approach/landing
phase of flight. That's what accounts for most accidents and
fatalities.

The last reported weather was 200 and 1/2 - not great, but certainly
legal and acceptable on an ILS. I've shot that particular ILS into
HPN, and there's nothing special or tricky about it - it's a garden
variety approach. The airplane was new, well equipped for IFR, and
very simple, slow, and stable.

So how could something like this happen?

It's important to remember that just because someone is qualified on
paper doesn't mean he is qualified in reality. There is a huge
difference between giving instrument dual in actual and instrument dual
under the hood. And while 900 hours sounds like a lot of experience
(and it can be), it's not much at all if it consists of 300 hours of
preparing for checkrides and 600 hours of sitting in the right seat of
a trainer preparing other people for checkrides.

Let me tell you a story.

Imagine a student pilot, getting close to the checkride, who already
has some hood time. The student already meets the PTS standards for
emergency instrument flight, and there's still well over an hour of
instrument time to go, since 3 hours are now required. The CFI is also
a CFII. An IFR-certified C-172 is available, and the student already
has about 6 hours of C-172 time, VFR. And the CFI/CFII is not
comfortable.

The student can't understand why, and keeps pushing. Eventually, the
CFII runs out of excuses. After months of waiting, there is benign IMC
- ceilings in the 1000 ft range, good vis underneath, high freezing
levels (well above what a 172 will cruise), no convective activity, and
the weather is only forecast to improve. So he grits his teeth, files
IFR, and off they go.

The student does a reasonable job in IMC - gets vertigo, but keeps the
plane upright and keeps on trucking. In the meantime, the transponder
fails. ATC pressures the CFI to cancel IFR (which he can't - they're
IMC) and he gets further and further behind the ball. The student is
flying the LOC BC approach and botches it badly. The needle is pegged,
and as the CFI sits there muttering to himself "We shouldn't be doing
this" the student descends below minimums with the needle pegged and
the runway not in sight.

Fortunately they don't hit anything, the student is familiar with the
area, identifies a water tower, turns towards the airport, and lands.
Had the conditions been worse, we would have read about the fatality.

So how does this sort of thing happen? More importantly, why?

The CFI/CFII in question had made ONE flight in actual IMC prior to
this. This was his second, and he was attempting to teach. According
to the FAA, he was well qualified to make this instructional flight -
but there's a big difference between a pilot who has just read the
books and gone through the motions, and one who has real experience.

A real instrument pilot would have told ATC to deal - a transponder is
not required outside Class B/C airspace below 10,000 ft, and in any
case it had failed in flight.

A real instrument pilot would have recognized that the approach was
being botched, and either talked the student through a recovery or
missed approach, or done those things himself. A real instrument pilot
would certainly not have permitted descent below minimums with the
needle pegged and the runway not in sight.

In the end, it was the student's local knowledge and level headed
action that saved the flight. The instructor became a passenger.

The CFI has gone on to bigger and better things years ago, has
thousands of hours, and from all reports has become quite a good pilot.
The student went on to complete the private (with another instructor),
and is now considered a very good pilot, quite capable on instruments -
but did not get an instrument rating for many years, until the fear of
IMC wore off.

Those two were lucky. As this accident shows, it could have been much
worse.

Michael