Matt Whiting wrote in
:
snip
I don't, assuming that you are proficient in making approaches.
However, it seems that many here do. There have been claims that the
American Flyers instructor flew an approach in weather than was below
minimums. I haven't seen any official data that proves or disproves
that. Even so, I've flown a number of approaches into conditions
Unfortunately, the history will be eradicated from this free site soon,
but for a few hours more you can get it at:
http://www.uswx.com/us/stn/?code=c&n=999&stn=Khpn
Here's a clip in case you missed it:
METAR KHPN 231456Z 19010KT 1/2SM FG VV002 12/12 A2955 RMK AO2 RAE11
SLP008 P0000 60008 T01220122 56013
METAR KHPN 231556Z 18006KT 1/4SM -RA FG VV002 12/12 A2954 RMK AO2 RAB07
SLP004 P0002 T01220122
METAR KHPN 231656Z 19013KT 1/2SM FG VV002 13/13 A2952 RMK AO2 RAE55
SLP998 P0004 T01280128
SPECI KHPN 231743Z 17016G22KT 1/8SM FG OVC002 12/12 A2951 RMK AO2
METAR KHPN 231756Z 18013G19KT 1/8SM FG OVC002 12/12 A2952 RMK AO2 SLP996
60014 T01220122 10128 20100 56012
METAR KHPN 231856Z 19012G16KT 1/2SM FG OVC002 12/12 A2951 RMK AO2 SLP993
T01220122
METAR KHPN 231956Z 18012G20KT 3/4SM -RA BR OVC002 13/13 A2948 RMK AO2
RAB12 SLP985 P0003 T01280128
SPECI KHPN 232018Z 19012G20KT 160V220 1/2SM -RA FG OVC002 13/13 A2948
RMK AO2 P0001
METAR KHPN 232056Z 19014G20KT 1/4SM FG OVC002 13/13 A2947 RMK AO2 RAE43
SLP981 P0002 60005 T01280128 58015
SPECI KHPN 232118Z 19013G19KT 3/4SM -RA BR OVC002 13/13 A2947 RMK AO2
RAB01 P0000
The accident report can be found he
http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/brief.asp?e...28X00521&key=1
According to the report,
"According to initial information obtained from the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), the pilot and student pilot departed HPN, at 1209,
under an IFR flight plan, and flew to ALB. They then departed ALB at
1348, to return to HPN."
At 1209 local, 1609UTC, the last reported weather was
METAR KHPN 231556Z 18006KT 1/4SM -RA FG VV002 12/12 A2954 RMK AO2 RAB07
SLP004 P0002 T01220122
At 1348 local, 1748 UTC, the last reported weather was
METAR KHPN 231656Z 19013KT 1/2SM FG VV002 13/13 A2952 RMK AO2 RAE55
SLP998 P0004 T01280128
SPECI KHPN 231743Z 17016G22KT 1/8SM FG OVC002 12/12 A2951 RMK AO2
You can download the approach plate from AOPA's web site if you are a
member:
http://download.aopa.org/iap/2005051...ils_rwy_16.pdf
And you will see that minimums on the ILS-16 for all four categories of
aircraft is 200-1/2. It would seem clear that the pilot took off in
weather that was below minimums - if some sort of problem arose, it
might not be safe to return to the airport. Basically, he was commited
to a trip shortly after leaving the runway, whether the problem was
equipment related, or even if his student pilot passenger decided he
wanted to abort the mission and just go home.
I don't think you'll find an official report of the status of the
MALSRS. The reason that I know that it was out was because I was there
that morning, planning a trip to the AVP area, and heard it on the ATIS.
That doesn't necessarily imply that it wasn't corrected by then.
Incidentally, as a moderately experienced instrument rated pilot, I
don't feel comfortable flying in weather that low unless I am at my
sharpest - both with respect to recent flying experience (ie: when's the
last time I practiced (or flew) a low approach?) and overall health and
concentration level (did I get enough sleep last night? Am I feeling
100%?). I chose to drive that day.
According to the report, "The CFI reported 168 hours of total flight
experience on his most recent application for an FAA second class
medical certificate, which was issued on March 7, 2003. According to the
flight school, at the time of the accident, the CFI had accumulated
about 900 hours, and the student pilot had accumulated 31.9 hours of
total flight experience."
snip
It is hardly irresponsible for a competent and proficient instrument
pilot to fly an approach in conditions reported at, or even below,
mininums. It is only irresponsible to continue the approach below the
published minimums. To me, that is what the American Flyers
instructor did wrong. It wasn't making the flight itself, it was
descending below minimums without having the appropriate ground
facility references in sight.
He failed to go missed when the plane got about 200' low and hit a bank
of 75' tall trees that extend up to 591' MSL (about 150' AGL). He failed
to do this even after getting a Low Altitude alert from Tower. Not only
did he continue his approach significantly below 639' (the Decision
Height), but I believe he would have had a fully deflected low
glideslope indication at the time.
And the final piece of evidence, of course, is the expired medical,
which is also listed in the Landings Airmen database as having expired
in March of 2004 - over a year ago.
It's easy to Monday Morning Quarterback, but it would seem that this
particular instructor's focus was not on the safe outcome of the flight
but instead on something else. There's no question that there are pilots
and instructors who could have flown this approach safely and without
incident. But there seems to be a plethora of evidence that would
indicate that this instructor had a pattern of not acting responsibly
and shouldn't have taken that student up in those conditions.