On 7 Jun 2005 16:06:46 -0700, "Mike" wrote:
Isn't this the same nation that employed Johathon Pollard? Does that
give us a clue? Or not?
Or not. As it's apples (a nation fighting a war and the actions of its
military in that war) and oranges (a nation dealing w/ the collection
of intelligence which it believes can be useful). Besides, from what
little I've read on Pollard's actions, I understand he first went to
the Israelis, and that was how many years after the SDW? ...
You're correct. But it pokes a rather large hole in the "they would
never do such a thing to their only friend" theory.
LIBERTY was intell ship gathering intel. Somebody on the Israeli side
didn't like that.
"Somebody"? The issue, again, is "credible" It needs to be credible.
And as one retired Israeli gov't official has stated:
Well, we know who did the attacking. We know the "somebody." We just
don't know the motivation. Or its lack.
start
This vessel had entered the fighting area to keep Washington in touch
with the course of the war. In view of the global responsibilities of
the United States, this was a legitimate purpose, but it seemed
inevitable that those who took risks would sometimes incur tragic
sacrifice.
end
FWIW, that's from the former then-Foreign Minister, Abba Eban.
So once again, "somebody"? Who the heck is this "somebody"?
The guys who did the shooting. We don't know the "why" of the orders,
or its lack.
So they did something about it. You don't have to
sink it and kill the crew to stop it.
Oh, so you leave survivors which can later tell tales of what happened
to them? You send out MTBs which are marked and flying the Israeli
flag, and you put IAF helos overhead w/ the Star of David clearly seen?
How is this credible?
I dunno. The evidence is there and it's ambiguous.
I'll ignore here the bogus claim of the jets being "unmarked."
Either you are as blind, and maybe as dumb, as those IA pukes or you
like to blow sunshine up people's kilts. I made NO comment about any
markings on aircraft, or their lack.
As an ASW type in S2s and P3s I have spent a LOT of time at 100-200
feet rigging ships. It's not hard to do and there was a specific
proceedure taught in the S2 RAG. It's easier to rig a ship in a helo,
harder in "fast mover."
Does this mean "identifying" ships from the air?
Well, let's see. This a (at least in part) a group for the discussion
of naval aircraft and their uses. So I would guess it's fair to make
that presumption.
If so, then it
addresses what was your training, not what IAF jet jocks were trained
for, and had experience with -- or more importantly, not trained for,
and no experience with.
How about the helo guys who could (and did) pass close aboard a
properly maked ship at low altitude in daylight?
But as one retired USN type who spent time going "slow and low" has
stated:
start
In reconstruction of the attack, the Liberty crew makes much of flying
the American flag, as if it would somehow protect them in harm's way
(see Ennes, p. 152). Little does the crew appreciate the difficulty of
identifying a ship from an aircraft merely on the basis of a flag or
even a hull number (GTR 5 displayed by the Liberty). Based on my
experience of flying many "low and slow" reconnaissance flights over
ships in the Med and Atlantic with VQ2, unless the flights are almost
overhead, target identification is virtually impossible. High-powered
binoculars are not much good in a bouncing low-level aircraft.
end
The son of bitch who wrote this is an idiot. Or incompetant. Or he's
following orders. A JG out fo the RAG can do it. I did it. I taught
it. I'm not the "ace of the base."
As far as the "jet" thing is concerned, I was stationed at Cecil for a
while and made some friends in the A-7 RAG. They told me that there
was a portion of the syllabus devoted to ID of ships and SSSC. I
don't know how much there was. I don't know much about their
proceedures. Maybe we've go an A-7 type who could "fill in some
blanks."
This from Nowicki in his material he had sent to author Bamford. The
complete material from Nowicki is available here however:
http://libertyincident.com/nowicki.htm
The idea that the Israeli pilots made a mistake in ID is not credible.
The jet jocks, w/o specific maritime recognition training?
You again ignore the helos.
Or if this
is in reference to helo pilots, then never mind, as the following part
addresses that.
Ta-DA!!!!!!!!!!
The ship was marked in the standard fashion, including the name on the
stern. The ship was surveyeled by a helo minutes before the attack
began.
Okay, let's stop right here. That last is simply incorrect. It's not
factual. No helo surveyed the Liberty "minutes before the attack
began."
The crew reported otherwise.
IAF helos were overhead AFTER the torpedo attack -- which took place at
approx. 1435 Bravo. The helos were overhead around 1500-1505 Bravo.
This fact is well established and documented.
I will assume you've confused Zulu w/ Bravo time zones for when the
helos were overhead as recorded by the VQ-2 EC-121. The EC-121
recordings are Zulu. Add two hours to get Bravo and they match
Liberty's logs, for example, as to when the helos were overhead.
Even if you can "write off" an intitial "error" to Israeli Army pilots
as being blind, illiterate, and stupid the Israeli Navy took a hand in
the operation.
That they did.
They are professional naval officers. They have
binoculars. They have proper recognition manuals. What's their
excuse?
That one, the ship was abaze and smoking heavy and as they started to
signal this ship -- the ship not only signaled back the same signal,
but two, she opened fire on them. The term "professional naval
officers" has to be understood in the context of what exactly was their
training and what did they not only encounter, but what was their
perception (rightly or wrongly) on this, the fourth day of a war -- a
ship that was already assumed to be enemy. As to "proper recognition
manuals" -- the Israeli Navy was concerned about the Arab Navies, not
the US Navy. The Israeli Navy did not sail the seven seas for example.
Their sea-going manuals (at least for those operating MTBS) dealt w/
the Arabs.
In other words at best they ****ed up, at worst they were a conscious
part of the attack.
Cristol covers this aspect in some details. Believe the Israelis or
not, it's what his research uncovered -- as it dealt with how the
Israeli Navy of 1967 operated.
And here's what Liberty herself reported as to her condition when the
MTBs came up on her:
start
O 192026Z JUN 67
FM CINCUSNAVEUR
TO SECNAV
...
LIBERTY INCIDENT (U)
1. FOLLOWING RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS POSED BY SECNAV:
A. WAS SMOKE FROM FIRES ABOARD LIBERTY FOLLOWING
AIR ATTACK HEAVY ENOUGH TO PRECLUDE IDENTIFICATION?
YES, PARTICULARLY BY TORPEDO BOATS APPROACHING
FROM STARBOARD QUARTER. SURFACE WINDS WERE
NEGLIGIBLE SO RELATIVE WIND DUE PRIMARILY TO
LIBERTY'S SOA. SMOKE FROM BURNING MOTOR WHALE-
BOAT (STARBOARD WAIST) AND STACK (ABAFT ISLAND
STRUCTURE) MUST HAVE PROVIDED EFFECTIVE SCREENING
OF HOLIDAY COLORS FLYING FROM PORT HALYARD.
...
C. DID LIBERTY ATTEMPT TO ANSWER SIGNALS FROM
PATROL BOATS PRIOR TO ATTACK? YES. PATROL BOAT
SIGNALS WERE PARTIALLY OBLITERATED BY FLAMES AND
SMOKE FROM BURNING MOTOR WHALEBOAT ABAFT STARBOARD
WIND OF BRIDGE. PATROL BOAT SIGNALS COULD NOT BE
UNDERSTOOD BY LIBERTY WHO ATTEMPTED ESTABLISH
COMMUNICATIONS BY ALDIS LAMP. OTHER SIGNAL LIGHTS
HAD BEEN SHOT AWAY.
...
end
I don't claim any deep insights, here, only an operators view of SSSC.
Which is fine, for the USN.
I didn't know that fact was as a national commodity.
Besides you want me to accept that the kind of aviator who could pull
off an Entebbe or an attack deep into Iraq was unable to provide even
a poor quality ID of properly marked ship.
Sorry, boss, but it just don't wash.
If the attack was accidental then the Israeli government really
"screwed the pooch" and only the cowardice of the Johnson
Administration saved them.
From what?
If it was intentional, either as an act of
state or of some rogue faction the cowardice of the Johnson
Adminstration saved them.
Well, as the Johnson adimistration determined:
start
?Johnson ordered a thorough investigation of the facts surrounding
the attack. After extensive investigations, the Central Intelligence
Agency and the National Security Agency concluded that there was
“little doubt” that the attacking Israeli units “failed to
identify the Liberty as a US ship before or during the attack” and
that they had mistakenly identified the ship as Egyptian. Subsequently,
the Central Intelligence Agency repeated the conclusion that the
Israeli attack was a mistake although it was “both incongruous and
indicative of gross negligence.” Clark Clifford also examined the
evidence at Walt Rostow’s request and concluded that there was no
evidence that the attack was intentional.
end
This from the DOS FRUS Vol. XIX Summary document.
As we all know, it's not an accepted view by some; thanks mostly to the
USG keeping so much of the material classified for too many years, and
the availability of the LVA to generate stories which some accept at
face value and never double-check against actual documentation.
Again, best case scenario is for the Israeli Govt. is that their
forces make a truly stupid blunder. The worst case is that they
engaged in a hostile act against a ship on the high seas. In either
event the Israeli Govt. has the duty to come clean, and they never
have. IMO politics has driven each and every investigation (including
those trying to hang an albatross around the Israeli neck). But they
could put the issue to bed, if they chose to do so. They have not.
Let them reap what they have sown.
Bill Kambic