I'd say that his analysis is questionable, at least.
It sounds like written by somebody who is astonished that a 26m ship might
handle in some situations differently than a 15m ship, and that if there is
any accident evolving of this, the designer of the ship should be
responsible (and not improper pilot reactions).

And to the subject of pulling the airbrakes at vne pull-ups: If the max
g-load at vne is lower with airbrakes extended than without, it's written in
the manual. In any case, coming out of a spiral dive / spin combo with such
a ship, you are pretty sure that you will come _at least_ close to vne
and/or max g-load. A pilot pulling the airbrakes _and_ pulling hard up in
such a situation hasn't thought about such a situation beforehand (not
good), or has no idea what he is playing with (also no good).
--
Bert Willing

ASW20 "TW"


"Bill" a écrit dans le message de news:
...
I posted the message below on the thread, "Nimbus 4DT accident 31 July
2000 in Spain." I am posting it again for better visibility.

Stan Hall presented his analysis of the Nimbus-4DB accident in Minden,
NV, 1999. Stan's analysis is scary, to say the least.

The article, Probing for the Smoking Gun, was reprinted in the Soaring
Association of Canada's free flight, 2/04. Go to the link below. Click
on free flight on the side bar. Go to free flight back issues - 2004 -
issue 2. Down load the PDF file.

http://www.sac.ca/

Bill Feldbaumer 09