Oversimplification. First, the issue of transit time for USN strikes
versus AF--the carriers could launch and be to the target in Route
Pack VI in less than 30 minutes. Most of that time would be overwater
and at low to medium altitudes. Definitely a short available reaction
time. Additionally, with few exceptions the Navy targeting trended to
be coastal, even on those days that they went to Nam Dinh or Kep, they
would still be able to get in and out in less than 30 minutes from feet
dry.

The AF used both overland and overwater approaches to targets in RP VI
(as well as combinations--in by sea/out by Laos or vice-versa). We
always used refueling on RP VI strikes (and that's not the 1000 pound
post-launch taps on a buddy-tank that the Navy uses)--orbiting at 20K
feet with twelve tankers or more, each with a flight of four sucking
gas until drop-off time will provide a lot of early warning for
interceptor launch.

Probability that a surface sampan with a radio could transmit to a
land-based GCI with early warning info is low--radar/radio horizon from
surface runs about 20 miles. Integration of that kind of input assumes
a technology level that probably wasn't likely at the time.

But, I'll agree that the difference in training and doctrine between
the services was significant regarding air/air. The Navy had the
philosophy of specialization (F vs A tasking) while the USAF was a
"jack-of-all-trades" concept. Navy had dedicated training in the
fighter role while the AF chose to concentrate on ground attack with
A/A as a corollary mission. Neither service had dissimilar A/A training
and with the exception of the AF Fighter Weapons School and the USN Top
Gun program, there were few highly trained air superiority folks.

Further, the Navy's dual track initial training put jet guys into seats
for a long time, while the USAF flawed concept of the "universally
assignable" pilot meant a lot of unsuitable folks got funnelled into
fighters from bombers, trainers, transports, etc, that didn't belong
there.

And, the Navy didn't lose more aircraft to AAA or any other
cause--proportional losses (losses relative to sortie numbers flown)
are largely parallel.