Thread: Big scare story
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Old December 13th 05, 12:53 AM posted to rec.aviation.piloting
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Default Big scare story

nrp wrote:
My altitude was excessive - I was that close-in doing the teardrop. I
accepted I would probably overrun 9R with the tailwind, but somehow it
didn't happen.


I'm glad it worked out for you, and I'm sure that your perspective has
been enhanced by that experience.

I encourage everyone to compare performance charts for your aircraft's
takeoff over a fifty foot obstacle v landing over a fifty foot obstacle,
with and without flaps. That can be very illuminating in trying to get a
mental picture of what to expect when tempted to do a "180" back to the
runway after engine failure on takeoff. A comparison of full flap rates
of descent v takeoff climb rates for the given atmospheric conditions
can also be quite handy to have previously sorted out. When one gets in
the habit of making power-on approaches in light planes, which most do,
the angle and rate of descent of the power-off, full flap approach can
be a surprise. Airspeed control throughout MUST be precise to achieve
the book figures for the configuration used.

A study of the feasibility of turnbacks after engine failure has been
published on the web, and the parameters for success should be well
understood by all of us.

http://www.nar-associates.com/techni.../possible.html

and,

http://www.nar-associates.com/techni...e/aiaa1col.pdf


In the sailplane community we actually get to practice this sort of
thing (the "rope-break" on departure, or "pt3" -- premature termination
of the tow) as part of our basic training, and on BFR's. However, I know
of none who teach, demonstrate, and/or practice it in the power
community -- for what most would consider good reasons. Still, there's
nothing like having seen it, or as close a simulation of it as you can
safely manage with an experienced instructor, before you need either to
do it, or to decide not to do it, for real.

In helicopter operations a comparable thing (auto-rotations to a
landing) is a normal part of training. In fixed-wing ops, for those
times when landing straight ahead or within 90 degrees or less of the
runway heading is not a good option, we need to think anew about the
kind of training we are giving and getting. With the ever-increasing
encroachment of development around our established airports, there are
fewer and fewer acceptable alternatives for emergency landings in single
engine operations.


Jack