I've been voting since 1968 and have voted in every
election, from school board to Presidential. I have never
known positively that any of my ballots or votes was
actually counted. The candidates I voted for won a lot of
the time, but not always.

How does anybody know their vote was ever counted
accurately, whether a paper ballot with an X in the box, a
punch card or some electrical machine...all can be rigged,
spoiled, stuffed or otherwise invalidated.

Unless we give up the secret ballot, voter fraud will always
be possible and the possible happens.

Being a poll worker, like jury duty, is an essential public
service.



--
The people think the Constitution protects their rights;
But government sees it as an obstacle to be overcome.
some support
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/secondamendment2.htm
See http://www.fija.org/ more about your rights and duties.


"Neil Gould" wrote in message
. com...
| Recently, Larry Dighera posted:
|
| On Fri, 30 Dec 2005 11:35:36 GMT, "Neil Gould"
| wrote in
| ::
|
| What method would you employ to assure that the
receipts are not
| forgeries?
|
| The same method that assures that paper ballots aren't
forgeries. If
| you go back a few messages, I suggested that *two*
receipts would be
| printed & verified by the voter; one would be given to
the polling
| official, just as paper ballots are handled now. Then,
at least one
| machine selected at random from each precinct would
have its
| electronic tally audited against the receipt. In the
case of a
| discrepancy, a 100% audit would be performed at that
precinct.
|
|
| That's a reasoned solution. Why do you feel it
necessary to *add* a
| receipt to be given to the voter? What would be the
advantage of
| electronic voting over the current *one* ballot system?
|
| After thinking about it, there probably is no advantage to
two printed
| receipts. I know I wouldn't care to have one.
|
| Personally, I think it's going to be nearly impossible
to insure an
| accurate electronic vote tally much as it was in the
| paper-vote/voting-machine era. But here's an idea:
|
| All voting methods have "issues", but I was only trying to
suggest a
| solution to a system that introduces a lot of new issues,
and could be
| very easily "rigged". The fact is, I'm not being paid to
figure this out,
| but many people are. What are *their* solutions to this
problem?
|
| Provide a real-time running total of each ballot
choice on the
| voter's display screen, so that s/he can confirm
their vote
| incremented accurately. The real-time vote tally
could be
| continuously monitored by representatives of each
party/candidate?
| If a dispute should arise, the sealed camera that
monitored the
| running tally could be consulted. Under no
circumstances should
| anyone other than the voter be able to modify the
running tally;
| their must be no way for administrator intervention
to modify the
| running tally.
|
| I don't see much value in knowing how my vote tallied with
previous votes,
| and as others pointed out, that tally is likely to be
changing so rapidly
| it would be unreadable anyway.
|
| Everything occurs in real-time. The voter confirms his
own vote.
| There is no necessity to print anything.
|
| The idea of the printed receipt is to verify the accuracy
of the machine.
| If all you have is an on-screen display, there is no way
to insure that
| the data passed to the board of elections is a valid
representation of the
| actual votes, which I find to be an intolerable scenario.
Why others
| aren't bothered by it does puzzle me.
|
| Neil
|
|