"Michael" wrote in message
om...
"Chip Jones" wrote
Safety first and above all, right?

No, not right. If safety was first and above all, we would all ground
ourselves and fly the airlines. No matter what we do, we won't ever
be able to match the airline safety record - our equipment, training,
and experienec are simply not up to it. So the very fact that we fly
these little airplanes demonstrates that safety is NOT the most
important thing, and that we are willing to trade off safety for what
appear to us to be good and sufficient reasons - be they cost, fun, or
convenience.

I was referring to the controller. Controllers aren't flying those "little
airplanes". They're operating an air traffic system where safety is the
most important goal, even above efficiency.



You pay him to be correct 100% of the time, every time.

Sorry, but that's just nonsense. Nobody is correct 100% of the time.

I never said anyone was correct 100% of the time. I said the controller is
paid to be correct 100% of the time- that is the air safety goal of the FAA,
zero errors. Not saying it's achievable, but that is the goal and that is
part of why the controller is drawing a salary funded by your tax dollars.


Mistakes are going to be made. Any system that depends on human
reliability is unreliable.

I strongly disagree. Human ATC is not unreliable at all, nor is it
inherintly error prone.

Further, the more complex you make the
system, the more mistakes will be made. If you need consistently
correct execution of a complex set of rules some of which are used
only rarely, you need a computer, not a human.

LOL! What is so complex about issuing a legal Visual Approach Clearance?


I think this controller is breaking regs because he doesn't know any
better.

I agree. The important question to ask is WHY doesn't he know any
better? He's not an isolated example.

Maybe this controller is the product of the Clinton-era "Train to Succeed"
program, in which FAA management deemed that any human being, especially
female and minority human beings, could succeed as a full performance level
controllers, if only given enough training time, regardless of failing
benchmark checkrides. The result is that now we have some weak controllers
whom we can't fire because we don't have a replacement pipe-line. In my
facility, we don't even have time to do recurrent training anymore.

Try asking for an IFR climb
while providing own obstacle clearance sometime.

What? Be more specific- I see this done correctly every day.


In my opinion, the rules are overly complex. The complexity is the
result of accidents that have occurred - an attempt is made to have
the rules cover every possible situation. First, that's impossible
anyway. Second, this results in a complex set of rules some of which
are applicable only rarely. This is a situation that encourages an
increase in human error. I think at some point you have to simplify
the rules, even if this makes them less comprehensive, because the
reduction in human error will more than offset the systematic error in
rare cases.

Interesting points, but I don't see the rules governing cruise clearances
and visual approaches to be overly complex.

Chip, ZTL