On 28 May 2006 12:36:47 -0700, "Jay Beckman" wrote
in .com::

Look down on Tuesday April 25, 2006...

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/AccList.asp?month=4&year=2006


Thanks.

That would be this report:


http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...09X00531&key=1
NTSB Identification: CHI06MA121
14 CFR Public Use
Incident occurred Tuesday, April 25, 2006 in Nogales, AZ
Aircraft: General Atomics Predator B, registration: None
Injuries: 1 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may
contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when
the final report has been completed.

On April 25, 2006, at approximately 0341 mountain standard time,
an unregistered Predator B aircraft, collided with the terrain
approximately 30 statute miles northwest of Nogales, Arizona. The
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) was registered to the U.S. Customs
and Border Protection agency. The public use flight was operating
in visual meteorological conditions. An instrument flight rules
flight plan had been filed and activated for the flight. The UAV
sustained substantial damage. There were no injuries to persons on
the ground. The flight originated from the Libby Army Airfield
(HFU), Sierra Vista, Arizona.

The flight was being flown from a ground control station (GCS)
located at HFU. The GCS contains two nearly identical consoles,
pilot payload operator (PPO)-1, and PPO-2. During a routine
mission, a certified pilot controls the UAV from the PPO-1 console
and the camera payload operator (typically a U.S. Border Patrol
Agent) controls the camera from PPO-2. The aircraft controls
(flaps, stop/feather, throttle, and speed lever) on PPO-1 and
PPO-2 are identical. However, when control of the UAV is being
accomplished from PPO-1, the controls at PPO-2 are used to control
the camera.

The pilot reported that during the flight the console at PPO-1
"locked up", prompting him to switch control of the UAV to PPO-2.
Checklist procedures state that prior to switching operational
control between the two consoles, the pilot must match the control
positions on the new console to those on the console, which had
been controlling the UAV. The pilot stated in an interview that he
failed to do this. The result was that the stop/feather control in
PPO-2 was in the fuel cutoff position when the switch over from
PPO-1 to PPO-2 occurred. As a result, the fuel was cut off to the
UAV when control was transferred to PPO-2.

The pilot stated that after the switch to the other console, he
noticed the UAV was not maintaining altitude but did not know why.
As a result he decided to shut down the GCS so that the UAV would
enter its lost link procedure, which called for the UAV to climb
to 15,000 feet above mean sea level and to fly a predetermined
course until contact could be established. With no engine power,
the UAV continued to descend below line-of-site communications and
further attempts to re-establish contact with the UAV were not
successful.


Well, at least we found out that UAVs are "piloted" by certificated
airmen.

However, it appears that UAVs are finding ways to comply with the
see-and-avoid regulations and gain access to unrestricted airspace:

http://uav.noaa.gov/silverfox/flights.html
Airspace considerations
In order to comply with the FAA’s guidance on UAS operations, the
Silver Fox will be flown within sight of a trained observer in
direct PTT radio contact with the UAS operator. This will provide
for See and Avoid capability in case of airspace conflict with
other aircraft. It is anticipated that future operational UAS
flights will not require a local manned observer as the FAA and
industry progress towards more ready integration of UASs into the
national airspace.

Does that mean a blind pilot could fly a Cherokee if he were in
contact with a non-pilot ground observer? :-)