On Wed, 21 Jun 2006 14:05:17 -0400, Vince wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:
On Wed, 21 Jun 2006 09:47:36 -0400, Vince wrote:

Ed, with all due respect the "dolchstoss" theory didn't wash then and it
doesn't wash now.

No "dolchstoss" involved here. There was certainly no knife in the
back in '64-'68. We had the military power to impose our will if we
had the political will to do so.


You need to read up a bit
"The Dolchstoßlegende, (German "dagger-thrust legend", often translated
in English as "stab-in-the-back legend") refers to a social mythos and
persecution-propaganda theory popular in post-World War I Germany, which
claimed a direct link between Germany's defeat with German citizens who
nationalists claimed had sabotaged or otherwise lacked dedication to the
promoted cause of the war —ie. "to unify the German nation."

Der Dolchstoss is cited as a important factor in Adolf Hitler's later
rise to power, as the Nazi Party grew its original political base
largely from embittered WWI veterans and those sympathetic with the
Dolchstoss interpretation."

It sounds like you found a term and are dedicated to making it apply.
The conspiracy theory for Germany doesn't hold much water for WW I or
II and it doesn't get traction for the US experience in SEA.

It's precisely on point to your claim that:

IF--repeat IF--the
give-up rather than fight crowd in the US would have stopped
distracting the politicians so that we could have won.

and

We had the military power to impose our will if we
had the political will to do so.

"Conservatives, nationalists and ex-military leaders began to speak
critically about the peace and Weimar politicians, socialists,
communists, and Jews were viewed with suspicion due to their supposed
extra-national loyalties. It was rumored that they had not supported the
war and had played a role in selling-out Germany to its enemies. These
November Criminals, or those who seemed to benefit from the newly formed
Weimar Republic, were seen to have "stabbed them in the back" on the
home front, by either criticizing the cause of German nationalism,
instigating unrest and strikes in the critical military industries or
profiteering. In essence the accusation was that the accused committed
treason against the "benevolent and righteous" common cause."

"Other wars have been viewed as winnable but lost due to some sort of
homefront betrayal. For example, some believe this had happened to the
United States during the Vietnam War. However, some believe that the
so-called "Vietnam Syndrome" is also a myth."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dolchsto%C3%9Flegende

"Some believe" is a load of crap. There's been a lot of work written
since 1975 to describe what went right and what went wrong. Much has
been written by politicians on the scene (i.e. Kissinger, McNamara,
etc.) and much be military historians. A lot of research has been done
by political analysts in universities on both the pro and con sides of
the war. (For that matter, there's been a lot of first-person
participant writing on the topic--even I wrote two published books on
the air war.)

Not many proponents except possibly on the fringe who suspect some
sort of conspiracy or betrayal. It goes a lot deeper than that.

For whatever reason our proxies , the south Vietnamese
, would not fight with the same intensity as the Russian and Chinese
proxies, the north Vietnamese.

And, we were woefully ignorant of culture other than our own. The
agrarian south was not quite as easily mobilized as the industrialized
(and hence Marxist prone) north.

It was not able to fucntion at all, and in both countries the majority
of the population were farmers.

You probably didn't get the view of Hanoi, Haiphong, Thai Nguyen, Cam
Pha, Viet Tri, Pho Tho, and other urban areas that I did.


Yet we could have "contained" the
communist threat readily had we not gradually fell victim to political
posturing and pacifism at home.

Ah yes, more dolchstoss

None of the sort. Politicians seldom transcend the base selfishness of
the re-election motive. One need only examine the tax structure of the
US and the redistribution schemes of the IRS to see proof of catering
to the majority of the electorate. Welfare sells for votes and
anti-war is always more convenient than combat in terms of popular
appeal.

The official birth of the term itself possibly can be dated to mid 1919,
when Ludendorff was having lunch with a British general Sir Neil
Malcolm. Malcolm asked Ludendorff why it was that he thought Germany
lost the war. Ludendorff replied with his list of excuses: The home
front failed us etc. Then, Sir Neil Malcolm said that "it sounds like
you were stabbed in the back then?" The phrase was to Ludendorff's
liking and he let it be known among the general staff that this was the
'official' version, then disseminated throughout German society. This
was picked up by right wing political factions and used as a form of
attack against the hated Weimar regime, who were the exponents of the
German Revolution.

great excuse when you've lost a war.

A fairly anecdotal and arguably revisionist view of the seeds of
Nazism. One might look at the reparations of Versaille as a more
concrete causative factor.



Throw in a draft, a Spock-raised generation with expectations of a
life of privilege, a rising expectation of equality for our
minorities, and a propensity increasingly for politicians to pander
for votes rather than doing what is arguably painful but better for
the nation in the long run.

Like avoiding 50,000 plus dead Americans?

The number is a bit over 58,000, but why quibble. Better for the
nation would be winning conflicts decisively as quickly as possible.
Better for the nation is doing what needs to be done before the nation
suffers another terrorist attack of the magnitude of 9/11. Better for
the nation is a stable Middle East (rather than an abandoned one under
control of the jihadists.)

Since both sides had nuclear weapons we
were constrained to fight a limited war. As a result "we" could not
win. Only the south Vietnamese could win and they did not want to fight.

Exactly the issue. We were still woefully uncertain of how to keep
wars "limited" and how to stem escalation.
This was obvious to the world in the late 60s.

Up until that line we had significant agreement. Not much of all of
this was obvious to the world in the late '60s. And, I would forecast
that in 2040, not much of what will be then obvious about jihadists
and dealing with them will have been known now.


I was inside the beltway all through the Vietnam War.

Passing through town or with a job relevant to the policy-making
process?

I recall talking
to French paratroopers who had been at Dien Ben Phu.

Most every officer I knew had read Bernard Fall. "Street Without Joy"
has more relevance than "Hell in a Very Small Place." I've seen Dien
Bien Phu. It's a poor site for a defensive battle--inaccessible,
surrounded by high ground and supportable only by air. The French must
have read George Custer's tactics manual.

The duplicity of
the US government,

Eisenhower provided logistic, but not military support to the French.
He accepted the Geneva Accords. Kennedy had more Laos on his plate
than Vietnam. LBJ, unfortunately was saddled with McNamara and might
have been duplicitious. Nixon initiated Vietnamization and wrapped up
the treaty that got us out and got the POWs returned. At the same time
he opened up trade and relations with the PRC.

the a lack of a meaningful game plan for
Vietnamization ,

The term was coined by Nixon in 1968. We were four years (more
actually) into it by then. In his first term he brought troop levels
down from half a million to about 65K in the summer of 1972. What
wasn't "meaningful" about that game plan?

The corruption of the south Vietnamese government , the
over estimation of the effect of bombing,

I suspect I've got a more immediate estimation of the effect of
bombing on N. Vietnam than you, unless you were some sort of child
protege in your position inside the beltway.

the reduction in quality of
the conscript infantry and the political problem of bombing the North
and risking Russian nuclear attack were matters of daily conversation.

The draft reflected the increasing lack of education, morality,
ethics, integrity, and self-sacrifice of the population at large.

The "political problem of bombing the North" apparently was pretty
minimal. We did it from 1964 to 1968, intermittently from 69-71 and
then resumed it with impunity in '72.

I remember the skillful means by which the vast majority of the "rich,
well born OR emphasize OR able" avoided the Jungles and rice paddies.

It seemed to work for you. I served with a large number of "rich,
well-born" and decidedly "able" folks in combat.

That canard about who went to war and who went to the Guard has been
discussed at length in R.A.M. Flying single seat, single engine
tactical jets for 4.5 years trumps driving a fishing boat upriver for
six months and then calling everyone you served with a war criminal in
the balance of most of the folks I deal with.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com