On Wed, 02 Aug 2006 15:09:27 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::

On Wed, 02 Aug 2006 14:35:16 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Tue, 01 Aug 2006 20:52:49 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::

On Tue, 01 Aug 2006 20:46:38 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Tue, 01 Aug 2006 20:13:06 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::

Reread what Dudley said. "A pilot who flies without being constantly
aware that he/she is the main aspect of the mid-air avoidance equation
is misguided."

That won't change one bit with a futuristic automated system.

Right. That's why equipping GA aircraft with TCAS-equivalent systems
makes sense; it puts the tools to avoid 99% of MACS in the hands of
the GA pilot, not ATC nor the military.

You are still missing the point.

Actually, I believe it is you who are missing a very important point:
the inadequate time available to deconflict at high rates of closure.

I think several people in this forum with extensive experience over
several decades of operating high performance aircraft worldwide have
expressed the well founded opinion that visual deconfliction is not
significantly degraded or inadequate at operational speeds. You seem
to be unwilling to acknowledge experience of others in areas in which
you have no familiarity beyond your own opinion.

First, I'd like to see some quotes of the "well founded opinions" to
which you refer; Message-ID numbers will be fine.

Second, I am perfectly willing to acknowledge _unbiased_ opinion, and
objectively conducted test results.


It is "wetware" not "hardware" this is the critical component.

Agreed. But if the 'wetware' isn't up to the task, it would seem
logical to augment its abilities through technological means. After
all, isn't that what you claim occurs on military flights when they
use radar for collision avoidance?

My point is that you think a hardware gadget will solve the problem.
It might help, but it won't be the total, fail-safe solution. TCAS is
an aid when other already-installed systems don't provide similar or
better information. Look out the window! That's basic.

Why do you state the obvious; looking out the window is mandated by
regulations. We all know that. Unfortunately, looking out the
windows was totally inadequate to separate the aircraft involved in
the four military/civil MACs posted earlier. There is no question of
that fact.

After that, listen to controllers and try to get the "big picture."

In the case of the Florida MAC, the Cessna pilot was being controlled
in Class C airspace by ATC at the time. The trainee controller failed
to issue the traffic alert his equipment was giving him. There was no
opportunity for the Cessna pilot to get information on the Ninja
flight from ATC, as Ninja lead Parker failed to establish radio
contact with ATC as required by regulations (civil and military).

If you've got radar, use it [for deconfliction].

It's clear the AIB report, that the Ninja flight did not use their
radars for deconfliction.

If you want advisories, ask.

The Cessna was being controlled by ATC at the time of the MAC. He
shouldn't have to ask for traffic advisories, even though ATC was not
providing separation to VFR aircraft in Class C airspace.

While the advise you advocate is obvious to any competent pilot, it
would not have prevented any of the four military/civil MACs I cited.
If the civil aircraft involved in those MACs had been equipped with
collision avoidance technology, there is a very good chance those MACs
would not have occurred. Why won't you acknowledge that fact?

If you demand deconfliction, go IFR, but recognize that unless you are in IMC
someone might be there to threaten you.

In the case of the Florida MAC, I doubt even that would have worked.

TCAS is a nice gadget, but it isn't a panacea. Looking out the window
and recognizing, whether you are GA, commercial or military, that there
is always the possibility of mishap is the essential element.

Given the fact that the Cessna 172 hit by the F-16 in Florida (for
example) was in a right bank at the time of the left-on-left collision
impact, it would seem that there is insufficient time available for
human capabilities to successfully accomplish see-and-avoid separation
at high rates of closure. Visual separation failed in the other
military/civil MACs I mentioned in earlier posts also.

At the most basic, "**** happens." There is no perfect system. Someone
somewhere will find a way to get into an accident.

That sort of complacency is inappropriate for someone truly interested
in air safety.

The system is broken. Technical fixes are available. Failing to
acknowledge them is tantamount to sticking your head in the sand.

This is not an indication of operations in excess of human
capabilities.

We disagree about that.

Before turning left in a slow moving aircraft, it is
prudent to look left and clear. It is equally prudent to look right
and clear prior to turning to make sure that the train doesn't hit you
during the period you are involved in the turn.

The Cessna pilot was following an ATC instruction to proceed to a
point in space at the time immediately prior to attempting to avoid
the F-16 that killed him. If his turn was not an attempt to avoid the
fighter, why would have been turning contrary to ATC's instructions?
He was an ATP rated flight instructor who surely knew that failing to
follow ATC instructions was against regulations.


Given this information:

http://www.aopa.org/asf/publications/sa15.pdf
An experimental scan training course conducted with military
pilots found the average time needed to conduct the operations
essential to flying the airplane was 20 seconds – 17 seconds for
the outside scan, and three seconds for the panel scan.

It would seem like 17 seconds in inadequate time for non-military
trained pilots to successfully deconflict, not to mention the
deconfliction failures of the military pilots in the afore mentioned
MACs.

Apples/oranges.

Please try to construct complete sentences. I know you're capable of
it, and it provides your reader a more accurate understanding of the
thoughts you are attempting to convey.

The F-15 pilot cycle was determined as 20 seconds, but
that relates to the rate at which deviations from desired/required
flight conditions occur.

Can you cite a source for that information? I'd like to read the
document that contains that determination.

Your non-military trained pilot has
considerably more time in his/her focus cycle to search.

Perhaps. Upon what do you base that conclusion?

Note also,
that with full-bubble canopies, HUDs and multi-sensory data input in
modern tactical aircraft, simple visual scan is much more efficient
than that of the high-wing C-172 pilot.

Now you're making my point. If the aforementioned objective military
test of highly trained military pilots found that:

"the average time needed to conduct the operations essential to
flying the airplane was 20 seconds – 17 seconds for the outside
scan, and three seconds for the panel scan."

You can bet that a less highly trained civil pilot without the benefit
of a HUD nor bubble canopy, and the necessity to deconflict a
significantly wider angle of arc than a high-speed aircraft, will
require significantly more time deconflicting than the military pilot,
not less time.


You can't have a mechanical, fool-proof solution.

Agreed. Of course, I never claimed equipping GA aircraft with TCAS
capability would be 100% effective.

I think we've had a break through here!


Well, one of us is willing to face reality it seems.