On 2006-08-29, Andrew Sarangan wrote:
I think you are taking the phrase "angry" to an extreme. It is not that
I am sitting here pounding my fist on the table and crying for revenge.
I am angry that the pilots were so careless and took so many innocent
lives with them. No, it was not a deliberate attempt, that would be
murder or terrorism. This was a mistake due to carelessness and
negligence.

With all due respect, we don't know that yet! It may well have been due
to carelessness and negligence (hopefully, the FO and CVR tapes can shed
light on that). But it may not have. I'll reserve my judgement on
whether it was an unfortunate mistake or gross negligence until the NTSB
sheds more light on the issue.

I have experience of making a mistake that could have been just as
catastrophic given the wrong set of circumstances.

It was a nice sunny day in Houston, but a rather wet low IFR day in
Austin as I departed in the club's (perfectly functional) Beech Bonanza
to go see a friend who was in Austin for the weekend. I wasn't tired, I
wasn't rushed, maybe a bit sweaty because it was an incredibly humid
morning in Houston - but once I was cruising IFR at 6000' in clear air,
that had all gone. The flight was going smoothly, the plane was trimmed,
the workload was low.

Approaching Austin, I started going into the clouds. There was only a
little light chop, and the Bonanza trimmed for hands off flight was just
running along nicely. I had the approach plates ready, and had the
frequencies all tuned by the time Austin approach had cleared me for the
approach into 35R at Bergstrom Intl. That's the runway GA uses there.

But after I passed the outer marker, it was quite clear that the
glideslope was as dead as a stone. The cloud bases were too low to make
it into a loc only approach, so I kept my altitude and told tower my
problem. I asked for an approach into 35L instead because I was certain
that the glideslope was fully functional in that plane, I'd only used it
the previous week. Tower turned me back to approach, and I got vectors
to fly. While I was doing that, I was double checking I had the radios
tuned in properly the last time, and then tuned the new frequencies for
the ILS to 35L, the runway used by the airliners. Talking to ATC and
twiddling knobs on the radio at the same time is pretty routine - I had
done it on real flights and training countless times without an issue.

More vectors.

"Bonanza 45U, maintain 2000' until established, cleared ILS 35R," said
the approach controller.
"45U, 2000 'til established, cleared ILS 35R", I replied.

A bit more flying and extra checking to make sure that the glideslope
was going to come alive as I flew towards the approach path. Sure
enough, the glideslope needle had gone to the top of the instrument and
was unflagged. Everything looked good.

"Bonanza 45U, it looks like you're trying to line up on 35R", came
approach's voice.
Huh?

Yep, I'd told tower I wanted 35R, but the message had got lost. I had
retuned for 35R. However, when the controller cleared me for 35L I
actually read back the clearance he gave me correctly, and failed to
spot that I was cleared for the wrong runway. Not the controller's
fault, entirely my fault for failing to notice the word "right" when I
wanted "left". In the eventuality, I replied to the controller that I'd
asked for 35L, and the controller immediately cleared me for 35L
instead, and I flew an uneventful approach and landing.

Gross negligence or a simple human error that could happen to any IFR
pilot? If it was gross negligence, then surely any mistake that could
result in an accident is gross negligence?

I did a lot of soul searching after that (and wrote an ASRS report).
With different circumstances - an approach controller that was possibly
distracted, lots of traffic coming into 35L, it could have resulted in a
collision with an airliner stuffed full of people and we'd have all been
dead.

Could the crew we're talking about been distracted by an equipment
problem? We don't know yet. I'm VERY interested why they selected the
wrong runway because I want to recognise the symptoms before they result
in a possibly catastrophic error. It may have been simple gross
negligence - they may have been joking around in the flight deck and not
paying attention. On the other hand a bit of comms intereference may
have made them both hear "26" instead of "22". We don't know. We won't
know until the NTSB have reviewed all the data. I'll reserve anger until
I know more about their mistake, because through first hand experience I
know that they CAN be made even when making your best efforts to be
careful and thorough. So until the NTSB offers more data, I'm reserving
my judgement.

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