John Mazor writes:

And the tower? Might they be perching controllers so high up, in windowed
cabs, so they can see what's happening on the ground there? Such as
airplanes deviating from their clearances? If not, you don't need a tower,
any darkened room on the ground will do.

The pilot-in-command is the final authority. The crash was the
pilot's fault. There was nobody else around, except the copilot, and
the PIC's decision is still final.

The air regulations are a double-edged sword: if a competent pilot
feels he needs to do something for the sake of safety, he can do it,
no matter what anyone else says, and the regulations will protect him.
However, if he's incompetent and screws up, he takes the full blame;
it's not anyone else's responsibility to check up on him.

Controllers function in an advisory capacity. The PIC can always
deviate from a controller's instructions, if he deems it necessary.

Meanwhile, ponder the significance of this portion of the probable cause
statement in the 1990 runway collision in Detroit. Part of the accident
chain was one of the crews becoming confused in low viz weather by a taxi
intersection known colloquially to pilots as "spaghetti junction."

CONTRIBUING TO CAUSE OF ACDNT WERE (1) DEFICIENCIES IN ATC SVCS PROVIDED BY
DETROIT TWR, INCLUDING FAILURE OF GND CTLR TO TAKE TIMELY ACTN TO ALERT LCL
CTLR TO PSBL RWY INCURSION, INADQT VIS OBS, FAILURE TO USE PROGRESSIVE TAXI
INSTRNS IN LOW-VIS CONDS, & ISSUANCE OF INAPPROPRIATE & CONFUSING TAXI
INSTRNS COMPOUNDED BY INADQ BACKUP SUPERVISION FOR LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE OF
STAFF ON DUTY; (2) DEFICIENCIES IN SURFACE MARKINGS, SIGNAGE & LGTG AT ARPT
& FAILURE OF FAA SURVEILLANCE TO DETECT OR CORRECT ANY OF THESE
DEFICIENCIES;

Not all of that applies here ...

None of it applies here. ATC services were not deficient. No
conflicting instructions were given. There were no other aircraft
involved. And even on an unmarked grass strip, a competent pilot will
still check his heading before he rolls.

And what else, pray tell, would the controller who cleared the accident
aircraft from the gate have been doing?

He could be playing pool, and it would still be the sole
responsibility of the pilot-in-command. That's the say the FARs work,
and I think that's how they should work (it's inherited from maritime
law).

There's no guarantee that he would have noticed the erroneous movement if he
hadn't been required to turn to other tasks because of the lack of the
second controller, but it's a pretty sure bet that once he turned from that
area of responsibility (control and monitoring of ground movement), he
wasn't going to notice anything happening on the runway. Thus, his
potential role to provide redundancy and prevent an accident was negated by
FAA's violation of its own staffing rules.

The PIC's negligence was so glaring in this case that any question of
ATC is moot. It is not ATC's job to hold the hand of pilots.

Care to guess how many times a day that two pilots (never mind just one)
miss something and a warning system or a controller (that's all part of
redundancy, you now) prevents a mishap?

How many times?

You can't deny that the crew missed it, but is that as far as your
understanding of aviation safety goes? "The crew screwed up, end of
discussion"?

My understanding is that if you cannot trust the crew, nothing else
matters. The buck stops in the left-hand seat.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.