On Fri, 05 Jan 2007 15:38:12 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

The idea would be the classic Special Forces model. "Advisors"
embedded in national units. They keep the local force honest
(hopefully), correct errors in training, gain insight into community
relations/intel, and provide feedback to HHQ on progress. It reduces
external force visibility and hence the opportunity to use the
"occupier" propaganda against us.

I'd argue for both - the major effort being special forces intermixed
with Iraqi units as advisors (and even leaders, given the customary
standard of Arab military leadership) with those Iraqi units as the
most visible end of the force. However, I still think there's a
powerful case for US units to be partnered up with the best Iraqi ones
to provide a localised presence in certain areas and under certain
conditions, mostly because I don't think there's enough Special Forces
available to do the job required, and the Iraqis aren't at the point
where they can handle substantial stand-up combat outside their base
areas yet.

I'm strongly in favour of
'minimum force' to reduce the asymmetric propaganda dynamic, but I
have to say bombing Zarqawi accurately from the air is a better
alternative to going though the door (or window, or wall) on foot,
always provided the intelligence is sufficiently accurate.

No doubt about it.

The only proviso as far as I can see - and it's a big one - is having
the level of intelligence required, which should be really
substantive. Short of that, risking people on the ground means risking
people on the ground, but if handled properly it can pay off with
better interactions with the locals leading to incrementally better
intelligence.

Good point. But the essence of the tactic is that the front end,
visible security force is national not foreign.

As far as possible, yes. But if any action is taken against groups
such as Sadrs militia it will require a substantive and sustained
operation by sizeable US ground forces, even if this is disguised
behind token (or hopefully increasingly less token) Iraqi forces. In
short, I think US forces are still required to operationally influence
the situation to the point where Iraqi forces can cope, even as they
are also required to increase Iraqi capacity via training at the same
time.

Where the indirect
fire support comes from is not readily apparent. (You could even mount
a disinformation campaign to deflect responsibility to newly
reconstituted Iraqi units....)

CAS (as opposed to selective airstrikes beyond the immediate area of
US force presence on the ground) has an advantage in larger operations
as the US/Iraqi/British forces can control the ground after the fact,
and the customary Arab hyperbole about innocent children being
murdered by the Yanqui imperialist warmongers becomes a little more
difficult to sustain when the bodies of the Mehdi army militiamen and
their AK 47s are visibly being pulled out of the rubble besides the
bodies of any collateral casualties.

On the disinformation side, this is where some accurate air strikes
and artillery can pay dividends - hitting a known mortar firing point
with observed air/artillery fire as the latest gang of "fire and flee"
militia men turn up and then attributing their demise to another
agency (no obvious sign of US forces on the spot in the morning when
their cousins and friends tentatively approach the body-strewn scene,
even if anything of intelligence value has already been lifted...)
always appealed to me, probably because I was never allowed to try it.

Gavin Bailey

--
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