"Michael Williamson" wrote in message
...


Tarver Engineering wrote:

No Curt, the sequence began when the validation rule: "remove all
doubles"
was written for the FMS design. In fact, Columbia uses ROZO twice as a
waypoint indetifyer for navigating to the runway in question. Something
both operators should have known.

It wasn't Rozo that was doubled- it was the identifier "R" for
that navaid. The crew called up the identifier, resulting in selection
of the navaid "Rome," an NDB serving Bogota, per the accident report.

At 2137:29, AA965 asked Approach, "can American airlines uh, nine six five
go direct to Rozo and then do the Rozo arrival sir?" The Cali approach
controller replied, "affirmative. take the Rozo one and runway one niner,
the wind is calm." The captain responded, "alright Rozo, the Rozo one to one
nine, thank you, American nine six five." The controller stated, "(thank you
very much) [8].... report Tulua and e'eh, twenty one miles ah, five thousand
feet." The captain responded, "OK, report Tulua twenty one miles and five
thousand feet, American nine uh, six five."

The crew apparently failed to confirm that they had the correct
navaid, which, combined with a hurried approach, led to lack of
awareness as to the position of the aircraft relative to the airport,
the approach, and the high terrain.

The FO wanted to hand fly the airplane.

John P. Tarver, MS/PE