"The Revolution Will Not Be Televised" wrote in
message ...
On Wed, 23 Jul 2003 14:00:12 +0100, John Halliwell
wrote:

The crucial point though, is that you're assuming the Lanc would have to
follow US practises and fly in the big box formations.

Standard RAF practice was to tighen up daylight formations around
three-plane elements in vics. This was not as tight as a USAAF combat
box, but under a heavier fighter threat it probably would have evolved
further in that direction.


More likely reverted to night bombing. Without air superiorty
over the target daylight bombing created too many losses.

Whilst this may
have suited the B-17 with machine guns sprouting everywhere (although I
don't think it was appropriate before P-51D escorts were available), it
may not have suited the Lanc. You simply can't enforce US practises on
UK types in an attempt to 'equate' them with one another.

Close formation flying both increased the concentration of the bomb
pattern and the effectiveness of return fire from the gunners. The
RAF were extolling this in 1939 with Wellingtons over Heligoland
Bight, and continued to do so in "large-scale" daylight ops (e.g. the
Lancasters in the Augsburg raid).



Which were unmitigated disasters. The Heligoland raid had 50%
losses and during the Augsburg raid 97 squadron lost 7 out of 12
aircraft. Bottom line is the .303 was worfully inadequate against
fighters armed with 20 and 30 mm cannon and unescorted daylight
raids were unsustainable.

One Halifax squadron removed the nose and mid-upper turrets, armour,
flame dampers and various other bits, the lighter weight and less
restricted engines flew higher, faster and their losses were reduced
significantly.

This works at night, where difficulty of interception is the primary
defence. It would have been a lot less effective when some measure of
resiliance and defensive capacity was required, which is why the RAF
stuck self-sealing tanks, protective armour and increased armament on
their bombers after their daylight experiences in 1939. Increasing
height and cruising speed at night made it harder for night-fighters
with a marginal performance advantage to achieve an interception,
particularly within a context where there were easier targets at
slower speeds and lower height to engage first. The same dynamic
doesn't neccessarily apply in daytime, in fact loose formations and
seperation from the main body positively attract enemy fighter
attention in those circumstances.


Sure but as both the USAAF and RAF learned the hard way
tdeep penetration daylight raids were NOT sustainable without
fighter escort. Once air superiority had been gained the major risk
came from flak and in that case a tight formation may be a liability

ISTR that during late 44/45 daylight raids 617 squadron deliberately
flew in loose gaggle of aircraft rather than a tight box as this presented
a more dispersed target for the flak.

Keith