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Old July 23rd 03, 04:26 PM
The Revolution Will Not Be Televised
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On Wed, 23 Jul 2003 15:35:11 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote:

Standard RAF practice was to tighen up daylight formations around
three-plane elements in vics. This was not as tight as a USAAF combat
box, but under a heavier fighter threat it probably would have evolved
further in that direction.


More likely reverted to night bombing.


Of course.

Without air superiorty
over the target daylight bombing created too many losses.


No disagreement here.

Close formation flying both increased the concentration of the bomb
pattern and the effectiveness of return fire from the gunners. The
RAF were extolling this in 1939 with Wellingtons over Heligoland
Bight, and continued to do so in "large-scale" daylight ops (e.g. the
Lancasters in the Augsburg raid).


Which were unmitigated disasters.


Of course they were. The point is that the RAF when flying in
daylight, did rely on some extent to formation flying and gun defence.
This was known to be inadequate in the absence of air superiority, and
I'm not claiming otherwise.

The Heligoland raid had 50%
losses and during the Augsburg raid 97 squadron lost 7 out of 12
aircraft. Bottom line is the .303 was worfully inadequate against
fighters armed with 20 and 30 mm cannon and unescorted daylight
raids were unsustainable.


The .5in-armed B-17's suffered from the same dynamic. Given the
ranges at night were generally closer, the .303s were more effective
as a night defensive armament than by day. Even so, the main value of
a night bomber gunner was as a lookout to initiate evasive action.

Sure but as both the USAAF and RAF learned the hard way
tdeep penetration daylight raids were NOT sustainable without
fighter escort.


Of course not, and I'm not contending otherwise. I'm just pointing
out how the late-war Lanc family evolved in the operational climate of
1944-45, which was permissive enough to allow daylight bombing to be
resumed and a certain level of adaption for that role in terms of
aircraft equipment to be utilised.

ISTR that during late 44/45 daylight raids 617 squadron deliberately
flew in loose gaggle of aircraft rather than a tight box as this presented
a more dispersed target for the flak.


Formation flying in fully-laden B.1S Lancs was never a practicable
proposition - there was almost no margin of available power in hand
for formating.

Gavin Bailey

--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003