The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

On Sat, 09 Aug 2003 07:52:50 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

[snip unacceptable tirade of rational discourse]

[3 Group flying B-24s]

Remember, though, that the U.S. phased out B-24 production at 3 of the 5 factories
making them (Douglas Tulsa, Convair Fort Worth, and North American in Dallas) during
1944, as Ford and Consolidated San Diego were able to produce sufficient numbers for U.S.
requirements. Even so, according to Joe Baugher's website the RAF received 1,600 B-24H, J
and Ls between Spring '44 and August '45, so there was clearly excess capacity
available.

OK, I can accept the increased B-24 availability in 1944, but what do
we lose as a consequence, and what do we do in 1943 meanwhile?

The RAF loses very little. The USAAF slows down the formation of B-24 groups slightly, but
mainly doesn't need to cut training time for its heavy crews owing to high loss rates, as the
RAF crews will be taking up much of the slack.

They had some in East Anglia, and could be allocated more. Just like
3 Group (and 8 Group), they were adjacent to USAAF bases, so the fuel
pipeline and rail links would have been available.

I was thinking more of runway/taxiway/ hardstand length and strength, as well as hangar
size, bomb dumps, accomodations etc. All would likely need upgrading.

They'd just re-allocate the bases to the relevant groups. Swap a
grass strip for an asphalt one in another Group. I don't think it's a
major issue.

Not quite that simple, if you want to base them close to the U.S. daytime units. Who's going
to use the grass strips 2 Gp. would be giving up? The heavies aren't.

I think the B-25
is a contender he it had the range for shallow penetration raids
to the Ruhr, reasonable defensive armament and a good bombload. I
suggest phasing out the Boston in 2 Group and replacing it with the
Mitchell, and using the six to eight squadrons in 2 Group for daylight
strategic bombing. Further expansion could follow if the aircraft
were available.

Nah, same limitations of range and ceiling as the B-26s, with a smaller bombload.

Really? I thought it had a better range and bombload, but I'm no
expert.

Slightly (but not significant in a tactical sense) better range, but only 3,000 lb. vs. 4,000
lb. bombload. Going into the Ruhr by day in 1943/early '44 at 10-15,000 feet (vs. the 20,000
feet plus of the heavies) would be a 'really bad idea' (tm).

I saw it fulfilling a diversionary/supporting role, hitting
airfields and less-heavily defended targets outside the major heavy
Flak belts and giving the Luftwaffe controllers headaches trying to
identify the main raiding force formations. In other words, doing for
the B-24s in 3 Group what the 2nd Bomb Division B-24s did for the
B-17s in the rest of the 8th AF historically at this point.

The mediums were doing what you say, but at shorter ranges, and there was never much doubt by
the Luftwaffe who they were owing to the very different cruise and bombing altitudes.

Hell,
the mediums were operating down below Stirling height (both the R-2600s in the B-25 and
the R-2800s in the B-26 had single-stage two-speed supercharging, optimized for about
15,000 feet) which is okay for relatively lightly defended tactical targets but a really
bad idea going after German industrial targets. If they wanted to go to Germany from
England it had to be with heavies, or the unavailable in sufficient numbers Mossie.

The tactical bombers had to face the Flak when operating over western
Germany in 1945, and it was suvivable given adequate support and
decent planning.

In 1945, when much of the defense was in a state approaching collapse, and where our airpower
was overwhelming.

And many of the tactical targets they did hit had
substantive flak defence (albeit nowhere near 1943 Ruhr levels, let
alone 1945 Politz levels). Even so, I wouldn't suggest using them as
a deep-penetration strategic force.

Seems we agree on that, then.


Well, if it would help get things back to normal around here, whenever one of us chooses
to present and discuss factual data that contradicts hoary old myth and one-sided
perceptions, the other could accuse him of belittling the accomplishments, bravery and/or
importance of various aircrew nationalities/theaters/periods.

At last, a contribution in this thread which reaches beyond
rationality to advocate a return to the traditional and time-honoured
mode of usenet discourse.

How much civil discussion,
analysis and argument can r.a.m. stand? ;-)

Of course, the key difference between a USAAF daylight strategic
bombing effort and an RAF one would be the greater efficiency of the
latter. I mean, once we factor out all those ludicrous PX
requirements for Coca-Cola, ice-cream and signed movie star's
underwear, we should free up about 50% extra import capacity for bombs
and replacement aircraft.....

Ha! And if we could eliminate all the manhours lost/opportunites missed to morning and
afternoon tea/brewing up, we could have won the war in 1944 at the latest;-)

Guy