"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ...
In message , Kevin
Brooks writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
Worked pretty well at getting Hussein out of Kuwait in 1991.

US troops were enroute and on the ground before the UN took any form
of "action".

Resolution 660 was passed on August 2 1990, demanding an immediate Iraqi
withdrawal. Resolution 661, imposing a trade and financial embargo in
Iraq, passed on 6th August.

You call that "action"? How many resolutions did the UN subsequently
pass over the next twelve years in regards to Iraq, and what was the
sum result of all of that "action"? How many times has the UN passed
its resolutions only to see no real "action" to enforce them?


The US announced the imminent arrival of leading elements of the 82nd
Airborne in Saudi Arabia on the 8th August.

Actually, my source (Brasseys) indicates 7 August, but whatever--if
they were "immenent" even on 8 August, it is obvious that movement
began even earlier than 6 August, right? And the UN did not declare
Saddam's "annexation" invalid until 9 August.


Might have worked again in 2003.

Why? It sure as hell had NOT worked between 1991 and 2003 (or do you
think the multitude of resolutions that were not backed up due to foot
dragging actually *meant* anything?), so why you think it would have
enjoyed a miraculous conversion to being an effective organization in
03 is beyond me.

If driving to Baghdad was such a good idea in 1991, why was it not done?

It wasn't a good idea in 91. METT-T.


(With hindsight, 1998 was perhaps the best time for such action)

By then we had a severe leadership problem--the only actions that were
undertaken were those that afforded zero-percent chance of friendly
casualties, and which afforded maximum *appearance* of "doing
something" (witness the laughable SLCM attacks against OBL in
Afghanistan and against that asprin factory in Sudan). It was not a
particularly proud period of time for a lot of us who were serving.


So the US _resented_ having French troops guard its left flank in 1991?
Why didn't it tell the French to go copulate with themselves and provide
their own flank security?

LOL! You must have missed the last-minute cringing of the French
leadership; you know, when they started waffling about actually going
into combat, requiring your then-PM and our then-President to get on
the phone to try to stiffen French resolve? And if you really think
the 6th LAD's "flank protection" role was that important, much less
critical, then I have overestimated your tactical/operational insight,
Paul. The fact is that the French were shuffled off to that flank
because we could not count on them, and we then backed them up with a
brigade of the 82nd Abn Div in case they pulled another last minute
"we have decided that we should give Hussein more time" crap.

Which doesn't answer the question - if they were so much trouble, why
bother? Tell them that they can go back to France and the Coalition will
get the job done without them.

Political appearances, apparently. In hindsight, we probably should
have told them to shove off.


Sounds like there was a perceived need to keep the French on-side.

But the fact is that the French were not exactly a key part of ODS,
largely due to their own foot dragging. No offense intended against
the French troops who were there--an old friend of mine found himself
supporting that 82nd ABN DIV element, and he was rather impressed with
them, especially their Foreign Legion troops. But their national
leadership sent them there, and then waffled--little wonder they were
given a mission of dubious, at best, value, and then had US troops
trailing along behind even then.

Brooks