In message , Kevin
Brooks writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
Resolution 660 was passed on August 2 1990, demanding an immediate Iraqi
withdrawal. Resolution 661, imposing a trade and financial embargo in
Iraq, passed on 6th August.

You call that "action"?

They were used to cover US actions thereafter.

The UN, lacking troops, can't put boots on the ground.

How many resolutions did the UN subsequently
pass over the next twelve years in regards to Iraq, and what was the
sum result of all of that "action"?

Well, they were used to justify an invasion of Iraq in 2003.

How many times has the UN passed
its resolutions only to see no real "action" to enforce them?

Frequently. That's the nature of the beast, and why it's acceptable.
(Including to the US).

The US announced the imminent arrival of leading elements of the 82nd
Airborne in Saudi Arabia on the 8th August.

Actually, my source (Brasseys) indicates 7 August, but whatever--if
they were "immenent" even on 8 August, it is obvious that movement
began even earlier than 6 August, right?

Airlift, and this is first arrivals.

And the UN did not declare
Saddam's "annexation" invalid until 9 August.

They demanded Iraqi withdrawal a week before that.

If driving to Baghdad was such a good idea in 1991, why was it not done?

It wasn't a good idea in 91. METT-T.

We agree, but many others do not.

(With hindsight, 1998 was perhaps the best time for such action)

By then we had a severe leadership problem--the only actions that were
undertaken were those that afforded zero-percent chance of friendly
casualties, and which afforded maximum *appearance* of "doing
something" (witness the laughable SLCM attacks against OBL in
Afghanistan and against that asprin factory in Sudan). It was not a
particularly proud period of time for a lot of us who were serving.

I can't help wondering how much of it is chicken-and-egg. Clinton was
not a great friend of the military; but the military gave the impression
of being actively hostile to their commander at the same time. (Or at
least the members posting to Usenet, writing to Proceedings and AFJI,
and so on) This tends to lead to paralysis.

If he felt that he couldn't trust his military in any action that might
involve cost, he'd opt for safe standoff tactics. (What would the
reaction be to "Failed Raid Costs US Troops Their Lives" if Clinton had
used manned platforms or ground forces to go after bin-Laden? Would you
have respected him for using the best tool for the job, or despised him
for considering his troops expendable assets to be spent for political
gain? I'm thinking Desert One as an example here)

Which doesn't answer the question - if they were so much trouble, why
bother? Tell them that they can go back to France and the Coalition will
get the job done without them.

Political appearances, apparently. In hindsight, we probably should
have told them to shove off.

So why were political appearances so important?

Sounds like there was a perceived need to keep the French on-side.

But the fact is that the French were not exactly a key part of ODS,

Never said they were. (They were more use than many realise in OIF too,
mind you; French ships were among those covering the several risky
chokepoints on the way to the top of the Persian Gulf, as shipping laden
with military supplies trudged to their destinations. Not a point that
got much publicity then or notice now.)

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk