"Andrew Gideon" wrote in message
news

It's certainly more fun, though, to listen to all the alphabet groups
with
a vested interest.

You don't think those links are written by someone with a vested interest
or bias of some sort?

What in\terest would that be?


Why else would the first article start with citing
the problem of congested airports but call that an ATC issue? That's
misdirection; simple literary dishonesty.

Maybe the fact there's no fees for landing during peak timeslots has
something to do with that? Maybe if you dig a bit you find that's a mjor
tenent of his proposal?


The second simply says essentially "there's evidence that we're right" w/o
citing any.

Could you poin that one out?


The third speaks to a funding problem. Yet the GAO disagrees, according
to testimony by Gerald Dillingham. Calvin Scovel of the DOT agrees with
that testimony.


The FAA Funding Crunch--One More Time

Is there or isn't there a looming budget shortfall that could impede timely
implementation of the $20 billion NextGen system? Advocates of the status
quo-both in Congress and among the general aviation alphabet groups-say
there isn't. The FAA and others, such as your editor, maintain that there
is. The most recent round in this back and forth was a letter from the
Government Accountability Office, in response to a question from the House
Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee (www.gao.gov/new.items/d07918r.pdf).
GAO's Gerald Dillingham told the members that "the current FAA funding
structure can provide sufficient funding for NextGen-with some caveats."
Dillingham relied mostly on a projection made last fall by the Congressional
Budget Office, which projected future aviation excise tax revenues through
2016.



That, unfortunately, is an incomplete and misleading picture. I wrote about
that CBO projection last fall (issue #38), after talking with the CBO
analysts who prepared it. As I'd suspected, they did a simple projection of
the aviation tax revenues, assuming that they grow slightly faster than
inflation and GDP, based on historic relations between air travel and
economic growth. What that ignores is structural changes in air
transportation, discussed in last fall's GAO report on the same subject
(GAO-06-1114T) and in FAA's justification for its funding reform proposal. A
fundamental disconnect exists between the drivers of aviation tax revenue
(the number of passengers carried and the average ticket price) and the ATC
system's annual cost (driven by workload, based on the growth in air
traffic). As the same total number of people gets carried in more, smaller
units (RJs instead of 737s, air taxis and fractionals instead of airliners,
etc.), traffic grows faster than passengers, and therefore costs grow faster
than revenue. It is this structural disconnect that threatens the ability to
afford NextGen.



The Congressional Research Service pointed this out last fall in their
background report, "Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration:
Background and Issues for Congress," Oct. 18, 2006. In the section on
Airport and Airway Trust Fund Issues (p. 13), CRS points out that the "FAA
sees little prospect of a major increase in revenue from the trust fund's
existing tax and fee system," and that "The FAA position is supported by the
Department of Treasury estimates that suggest that annual revenue increases
to the trust fund in the years ahead will be modest." (U.S. Treasury, Office
of Tax Analysis, "Airport and Airway Trust Fund: FY2007 Mid-Session Review,
Current Law Baseline," Summer 2006).



Status-quo defenders also like to claim that the existing aviation excise
tax structure has provided stable and predictable funding. Guess again.
What's most relevant in looking at NextGen funding is FAA's capital budget,
called "Facilities and Equipment." I went back and got F&E figures from
FY1992 through 2006 and adjusted them for inflation. Over that time period,
the real value has bounced around from a low of $2.4 billion (1998) to a
high of $3.5 billion (1992). We're also told not to worry because Congress
can always supplement FAA's budget by adding general funding. CRS looked at
that, over the period FY1997-FY2006, finding that the general fund
contribution varied enormously, from as high as 38% (1997) to as low as 0%
(2000) and 8% (2002)-not exactly stable and predictable. The DOT Office of
Inspector General has seconded this point. In a report last fall on FAA
management questions, it said that it's "extremely difficult, if not
impossible" to predict future government appropriations and general fund
contributions.



Unfortunately, although both GAO and FAA have done a good job of explaining
the "fundamental disconnect" between revenues and costs, neither has
produced a budget projection based on that disconnect. That leaves the naïve
CBO projection as the baseline for discussion-and a handy rack for defenders
of the status quo to hang their hats on.



The forth, in part 3, commits the same act (though admittedly it is merely
citing FAA staffers with their own biases and vested interests).

More, the fact that the airlines are apparently able to exploit this
process to try to achieve yet another tax break (despite the claimed
issue being an FAA cash shortfall) makes it clear that the process is
biased and therefore flawed (and pretty much congressional business as
usual).

It's the airlines funding model that he explicitly rejects.

Try again.