Tom Cooper wrote:
"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in
message ...
Quant wrote:
"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in
message ...
Arie Kazachin wrote:
In message - "Matt A.00 01 is
Matthew Ackerman" writes:
snip
I may say I stand corrected on one thing though, I assumed that the
discussion was about the war time '67 and the War on Yom Kippur. If
these IAF pilots shot down Soviet Piloted Migs they were better
pilots as the Israelis fight most of their air to air battles with
cannon fire not air
to
air heat seeking rockets.
Actually, the situation in that engagement was so that the Israelis
have purposedly set-up a trap: they have sent Phantoms to hit that
Egyptian radar station and act as a demonstration group, knowing that
any attack in _that_ area would cause the Soviets to react - not
Egyptians. The purpose was to deliver a message to the Soviets: don't
play with us. When the Soviets reacted as expected, additional groups
of Israeli Mirages and Phantoms - all flown by hand-picked pilots,
every single one of which had far more fresh combat experience than
all the Soviets together - hit them from the side.
So, the Soviets fell to their own ignorance as much as they did to
missiles fired from their fighters: they considered themselves
"better" than the Israelis because of what they were at hom ("best"
Soviet pilots), not because of their true combat experience (which
was 0). Also because they would not listen to the "stupid Arabs",
which were warning them that new air combat methods and weapons were
needed in order the counter the Israelis. The Soviets believed they
did not need anything better than MiG-21s and their nifty weaponry.
Israelis, on the other side, concentrated all of their best pilots to
deliver the message: these were excellently trained in air-to-air
gunnery, and also knew the MiG-21 and the weaknesses of its weapons
system so well, they could exploit this in combat to their advantage.
The Israelis knew, for example, that the R-13 - (AA-2 "Atoll", the
main air-to-air missile used by the MiG-21) - was completely useless
in air combat, so they could maneuver and use afterburners without
the fear of being hit, while their own missiles were functioning.
They were, however, neither "super" nor the "best": they were only
better than the Soviets and the Egyptians at the time and place. Of
course, that was what counted and what was important at the time and
place.
As a matter of fact several of "best" Israeli "aces" are known for
poor section discipline: they were fighting alone, leaving their
wingmen alone and without support (which caused quite some losses in
air combats in 1973, when the Arabs got better).
That requires geting in close and out flying the
enemy planes and the pilots. Israel due to this found ways to
reload the Gpods of their planes much faster than any other nation
had.
Hm, somehow I have a feeling you're missing here too. Guns were
important mainly during the Six Day War. Subsequently, an increasing
number of kills were scored by missiles.
If I recall it exactly all the Israeli kills against Soviets on 30
July 1970 were scored by missiles, just for example....
The US sent
their ground crew instructors to study how Iseal in Yom Kippur war
put US planes refuled and reloaded back in the air in 15 minutes
when the US
ground
crews needed an hour.
The turn-around times were more important on the first day of the Six
Day War, in 1967, than in 1970 or 1973: on the first day of the Six
Day War the Israelis had to fly as much in order to keep the enemy
under the constant pressure. The situation changed already on the
next day, when the threat from Arab air forces was minimized. On
specific days during the October War, 1973, the IDF/AF flew not more
than 150-200 sorties, while having something like 400 combat aircraft
at the time. Means, obviously less than 50% of the force was flying
at all. So, I doubt there was a need for the US to send anybody to
Israel in 1973 to see these Israeli super-turbo turn-around times...
In fact, in 1973 the Israelis had nothing like turn-around times of 15
minutes: this was neither really needed, nor advisible, and in the
cases where it was attempted the results were heavy losses. The first
reason was that the pilots could not be properly briefed for such
operations as fought in 1973: as after such fast turn-around times
the pilots were sent to hit targets they did not know where to find
they got shot down while looking around... On the first day of the
Six Day War, the situation was simplier, as they had to strike mainly
Arab airfields.
Also, in 1973 the IDF/AF was flying Phantoms: a single Phantom can
carry as many bombs as four or more Mirages - and deliver them with
far better precision, over a longer range, at a higher speed. A
"salvo" of 12 Mk.82s dropped from a single F-4E in 1973 could shut
down an Arab airfield for several hours: in 1973 one needed at least
four Mirages, or SMB.2s, or Vautors to do the same job. Consequently
they did not need fly as many sorties as in 1967.
Israel during the wars often found themeselves with
more Combat ready pilots than planes. Actually it was always that
way as the planes meant buying planes and a lot of spare parts.
According to this logic of yours: buying spare parts = bad.
No not bad just added expense that the Israeli budget even with the US aid
could not afford. Also having more piltots then planes allowed for more
long time missions when the same pilot would not be taking that plane out
again that day but another pilot would who was rested and well briefed on
the next mission well prior to the plane landing and being refitted for that
mission. In the Six day war after the first day against Egypt, many of the
sorties were flown against the Syrian and Israeli Air Forces to stop the
danger of the air raids that the Jordanians did pull off in the early hours
of the war. Shooting down most of their best pilots supressed them to
defense only. The Syrians lost too many planes also in one day engagement.
By the third day no arab air force threatened Israel or its forces. They
were a nullified threat. In the six day war also a Russian Frieter and 2
ships of their line were attacked in Port Alexandria. They had no air cover
to speak of and were heavily enough damaged to flee the waters entirely to
Lybian Waters and harbor to perform some repairs and set off again to sea
ASAP. After those first three days the majority of IAF activities was close
ground support missions to take out bunkers, Tanks, other Armored Viechles
as well as troops. This is how the Egyptian and Syrian Ground forces kept
finding any defendable position unatenable. Israel did continue to use the
fast refiting time during that time. They were handed known fixed locations
to hit, and then any target of opurtunity as well as those strikes that the
ground troops called in.
In close ground support flying the pilot must be well rested. When he takes
off he only knows what sector on he is to patrol. He has no designated
targets to be briefed on. His targets are communicated to him from the
ground forces that need an airstrike at a set of co-ordinates. If there is
time he does a flyover at susonic speed and Id's his target(s) and then on
the next pass unloads it. Sometimes he is asked for specific ordinence and
a direction of the attack. That is common when they are against a line of
heavy firing from hidden troops. They ask for Nalpalm from one direction
from a start point. That causes a large line of incinerating fire that
cannot be put out till it all burns off. The pilot only knows that he and
the number of planes that will be in that sector. Nothing is known about
what targets he will hit, when or where in that sector. If on his return to
the field he still has ordinence and can find a target of oportunity he will
use what is left to take that out.
Briefing time is not needed for those missions, just pilots that are rested
and planes loaded with the ordinence and fuel. How long does it take for a
tired pilot to get out of his plane and his rested replacement get in. Not
two hours, not one hour, but perhaps about 15 minutes of them climbing and
talking about the plane's handling. So a 15 minute turn around is a good
and better way to go. The other 50 planes were incase another nation joined
in the fray and they needed to scramble their planes in defense.
Hehe, I doubt anybody working in any air force could agree with
this....
Not every pilot
could fly 24 * 7 any way for the entire war.
As a matter of fact, nobody can do this. Not "even" the Israelis:
please, permit them to remain human beings. Four sorties a day - and
for a single day - yes, but that's already the limit. Three a day for
duration of three, four, perhaps five days. That can function too.
But more would only decrease the capability of the pilot: it would
simply drain him down.
But make the ratio of pilots to planes heavier on the number of pilots to
planes and the IAF could give the pilots a break after short periods and
less sorties. That is how the IAF opperated in both the Six Day and Yom
Kippur Wars as well as against the Palestinians in Lebanon. Any tired pilot
could be given a break when he landed and another pilot would be available
to relieve him for some time to rest.
So while they refitted the
planes with more fuel, refilled Gpods, and other weapons used up,
they
often
changed pilots allowing the pilot that already flew 1 to 5 missions
to get some rest and a fresh rested pilot took his place.
Could you name a single Israeli pilot that flew five sorties in one
day, either in 1967 or 1973? I couldn't. Feel free to correct me, but
I can only remember several that flew four sorties on the first day
of the Six Day War, not a single one that flew as much in 1973.
Over the 1/4 of the first wave against Egypt flew 5 sortees the first day in
'67. Many of these raides went very quickly just take out the air fields
some key roadways and rail line. Also they were the ones that bombed some
Russian Ships in Port Alexandria sending them packing that day. That was
their fifth sortee. The story about this was on the History Channel as well
as in a book by one of the lead pilots, (I do not rememeber his name). The
Show on the History Channel was one of a series called "Air Power".
Now you indicate they outclassed the Soviets who would have sent
their
best
in not their worst.
This is nothing special: the fact that the Soviets considered their
"best" pilots "best" means not these were indeed the "best" around.
They've got shot down in air combats fought on a number of other
places too... You can bet your annual income that the same can be
said for the Israelis too: some of their "best" were shot down
several times. So also the "best" Arab pilot ever, Syrian Bassam
Hamshu, who shot down nine Israelis in air combats between 1970 and
1973 - and then got himself shot down and killed in 1982: there is
always somebody who's _better_.....
Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/t...hp/title=S6585
--
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