"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in message
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Tom Cooper wrote:
"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in
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Quant wrote:
"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in
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Arie Kazachin wrote:
In message - "Matt A.00 01 is
Matthew Ackerman" writes:
snip

Israel during the wars often found themeselves with
more Combat ready pilots than planes. Actually it was always that
way as the planes meant buying planes and a lot of spare parts.

According to this logic of yours: buying spare parts = bad.

No not bad just added expense that the Israeli budget even with the US aid
could not afford.

I don't remember to have ever heard about any such problems. As a matter of
fact, the Israeli defence budget doubled between 1972 and 1974, and at the
time the USA - also in the sence of the Nixon's Doctrine - trippled the
worth of their aid projects for Israel. The problems with the Israeli
defence budgets which not even the US aid could support developed only in
1986-1987, at the time of terrible economic problems and a massive inflation
in Israel.

Also having more piltots then planes allowed for more
long time missions when the same pilot would not be taking that plane out
again that day but another pilot would who was rested and well briefed on
the next mission well prior to the plane landing and being refitted for
that
mission.

But how many really "long-range" missions were flown in 1973? The most
distanced targets were Homs in Syria and el-Mansoura in Egypt. That's what -
250-300km, and that because of the over-the-sea leg, in order to avoid the
enemy SAM-belts.

Besides, this argument of yours is contradictive to your explanations about
pilots flying five and more sorties a day: why should they, if there were
enough pilots?

As said: the tempo of operations was nowhere as high as in 1973 as it was on
THE FIRST DAY (only) in 1967. I tried to explain why several times already,
and can't help if you ignored this.

Shooting down most of their best pilots supressed them to
defense only.

Err, actually the Egyptians reorganized and from the third day of the war
hit hard on Israeli troops moving along the roads on Sinai. In that sence,
the EAF lost most of its combat strenght, that's truth, but it never quit
fighting.

The Syrians lost too many planes also in one day engagement.

The Syrians lost most of their planes on the ground. In air battles fought
over the Syrian airfields it was 6:2 for the Israelis, if I recall all the
details correctly. In total, however, the SyAAF was not as heavily damaged
as the EAF, and certainly not as heavily as the RJAF (which lost of all its
combat aircraft) - and none of the top Syrian pilot was killed (well, not in
1967: two or three were KIA in the War of Attrition; one in 1973, and at
least two in 1982).

By the third day no arab air force threatened Israel or its forces.

You should ask the Israeli vets about this: there is even pictorial evidence
about "non-threatening" (Algerian-supplied) Egyptian MiG-17s bombing Israeli
column on Sinai, and several trucks going up in flame... Just because the
Israeli media is not talking about such attacks (over 100) it doesn't mean
they never happened.

In the six day war also a Russian Frieter and 2
ships of their line were attacked in Port Alexandria. They had no air
cover
to speak of and were heavily enough damaged to flee the waters entirely to
Lybian Waters and harbor to perform some repairs and set off again to sea
ASAP.

Aha. What was the name of this freighter? This is the first time I heard
about any kind of air strikes against targets in the Alexandria area, in
June 1967. They are not mentioned in any of at least a dozen of books and
three dozens of articles I have to the topic of that air war....

After those first three days the majority of IAF activities was close
ground support missions to take out bunkers, Tanks, other Armored Viechles
as well as troops. This is how the Egyptian and Syrian Ground forces kept
finding any defendable position unatenable.

Not truth either. Egyptian Gen. Amer did a mistake (because of which he was
later relieved of command and commited suicide) by ordering the troops on
Sinai to pull back towards the Canal. In this way he draw his troops out of
their well-dug in positions into the open, where they were hit by the air.
This pull-back resulted in a rout, in which the Egyptians suffered over
30.000 KIA, MIA, and injured for almost nothing in return. If they remained
in their positions along the Israeli border and fought it is 100% sure they
would have not suffered similar losses.

The Syrians, on the contrary, just sat there and wait, and then - when the
Israelis were on the end with their strenght, they started pulling out of
Golan. They were not routed, however: quite on the contrary, they inflicted
heavy losses to the IDF. The 7th AB, for example, had only seven tanks
remaining at the time of the cease-fire.

In close ground support flying the pilot must be well rested. When he
takes
off he only knows what sector on he is to patrol. He has no designated
targets to be briefed on. His targets are communicated to him from the
ground forces that need an airstrike at a set of co-ordinates.

Yeah, this was tried on 7, 8, 9 and 10 October 1973, with the result that
the IDF/AF lost over 80 combat aircraft shot down and over 150 damaged...

If there is
time he does a flyover at susonic speed and Id's his target(s) and then on
the next pass unloads it. Sometimes he is asked for specific ordinence
and
a direction of the attack. That is common when they are against a line of
heavy firing from hidden troops. They ask for Nalpalm from one direction
from a start point. That causes a large line of incinerating fire that
cannot be put out till it all burns off. The pilot only knows that he and
the number of planes that will be in that sector. Nothing is known about
what targets he will hit, when or where in that sector. If on his return
to
the field he still has ordinence and can find a target of oportunity he
will
use what is left to take that out.

Sorry, but I doubt I ever read anything as senseless as this.

Briefing time is not needed for those missions, just pilots that are
rested
and planes loaded with the ordinence and fuel.

Aha. Briefings are not needed now either? You don't really know what are you
talking about, or?

Not every pilot
could fly 24 * 7 any way for the entire war.

As a matter of fact, nobody can do this. Not "even" the Israelis:
please, permit them to remain human beings. Four sorties a day - and
for a single day - yes, but that's already the limit. Three a day for
duration of three, four, perhaps five days. That can function too.
But more would only decrease the capability of the pilot: it would
simply drain him down.


But make the ratio of pilots to planes heavier on the number of pilots to
planes and the IAF could give the pilots a break after short periods and
less sorties. That is how the IAF opperated in both the Six Day and Yom
Kippur Wars as well as against the Palestinians in Lebanon. Any tired
pilot
could be given a break when he landed and another pilot would be available
to relieve him for some time to rest.

In the war, Matt, there are no "tired" or "rested" pilots: there are pilots
that can fly and others that can't. Period.

You have several combat-experienced pilots on this NG: go and ask Ed Rasimus
if he would explain it any other way.

So while they refitted the
planes with more fuel, refilled Gpods, and other weapons used up,
they
often
changed pilots allowing the pilot that already flew 1 to 5 missions
to get some rest and a fresh rested pilot took his place.

Could you name a single Israeli pilot that flew five sorties in one
day, either in 1967 or 1973? I couldn't. Feel free to correct me, but
I can only remember several that flew four sorties on the first day
of the Six Day War, not a single one that flew as much in 1973.


Over the 1/4 of the first wave against Egypt flew 5 sortees the first day
in
'67.

Look: I asked you for names. I can mention names of the one or two IDF/AF
pilots that flew four missions on that day. You say one quarter of them did
so. OK. Can you mention even one name of an IDF/AF pilot that flew five
sorties on that day?

The story about this was on the History Channel as well
as in a book by one of the lead pilots, (I do not rememeber his name).
The
Show on the History Channel was one of a series called "Air Power".

Oh, now I understand everything. Thank's Lord, there is a "History Channel".
You never came to the idea that they could be wrong about this?

Have you ever heard about some stuff called "books" or something similar?
I've heard these are made of paper and ink, and one might be forced to go to
the so-called "book-shops" or "libraries" in order to get them, and then
even have to "read" (spelling?) these too....

But, they say one can learn quite some stuff from reading these strange
things.

Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/t...hp/title=S6585