Tom Cooper wrote:
"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in
message ...
Tom Cooper wrote:
"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in
message ...
Quant wrote:
"Matt A.00 01 is Matthew Ackerman" wrote in
message ...
Arie Kazachin wrote:
In message - "Matt A.00 01
is Matthew Ackerman" writes:
snip

Israel during the wars often found themeselves with
more Combat ready pilots than planes. Actually it was always that
way as the planes meant buying planes and a lot of spare parts.

According to this logic of yours: buying spare parts = bad.

No not bad just added expense that the Israeli budget even with the
US aid could not afford.

I don't remember to have ever heard about any such problems. As a
matter of fact, the Israeli defence budget doubled between 1972 and
1974, and at the time the USA - also in the sence of the Nixon's
Doctrine - trippled the worth of their aid projects for Israel. The
problems with the Israeli defence budgets which not even the US aid
could support developed only in 1986-1987, at the time of terrible
economic problems and a massive inflation in Israel.

Also having more piltots then planes allowed for more
long time missions when the same pilot would not be taking that
plane out again that day but another pilot would who was rested and
well briefed on the next mission well prior to the plane landing and
being refitted for
that
mission.

But how many really "long-range" missions were flown in 1973? The most
distanced targets were Homs in Syria and el-Mansoura in Egypt. That's
what - 250-300km, and that because of the over-the-sea leg, in order
to avoid the enemy SAM-belts.

Besides, this argument of yours is contradictive to your explanations
about pilots flying five and more sorties a day: why should they, if
there were enough pilots?

As said: the tempo of operations was nowhere as high as in 1973 as it
was on THE FIRST DAY (only) in 1967. I tried to explain why several
times already, and can't help if you ignored this.

Shooting down most of their best pilots supressed them to
defense only.

Err, actually the Egyptians reorganized and from the third day of the
war hit hard on Israeli troops moving along the roads on Sinai. In
that sence, the EAF lost most of its combat strenght, that's truth,
but it never quit fighting.

The Syrians lost too many planes also in one day engagement.

The Syrians lost most of their planes on the ground. In air battles
fought over the Syrian airfields it was 6:2 for the Israelis, if I
recall all the details correctly. In total, however, the SyAAF was
not as heavily damaged as the EAF, and certainly not as heavily as
the RJAF (which lost of all its combat aircraft) - and none of the
top Syrian pilot was killed (well, not in 1967: two or three were KIA
in the War of Attrition; one in 1973, and at least two in 1982).

By the third day no arab air force threatened Israel or its forces.

You should ask the Israeli vets about this: there is even pictorial
evidence about "non-threatening" (Algerian-supplied) Egyptian MiG-17s
bombing Israeli column on Sinai, and several trucks going up in
flame... Just because the Israeli media is not talking about such
attacks (over 100) it doesn't mean they never happened.

In the six day war also a Russian Frieter and 2
ships of their line were attacked in Port Alexandria. They had no
air
cover
to speak of and were heavily enough damaged to flee the waters
entirely to Lybian Waters and harbor to perform some repairs and set
off again to sea ASAP.

Aha. What was the name of this freighter? This is the first time I
heard about any kind of air strikes against targets in the Alexandria
area, in June 1967. They are not mentioned in any of at least a dozen
of books and three dozens of articles I have to the topic of that air
war....

After those first three days the majority of IAF activities was close
ground support missions to take out bunkers, Tanks, other Armored
Viechles as well as troops. This is how the Egyptian and Syrian
Ground forces kept finding any defendable position unatenable.

Not truth either. Egyptian Gen. Amer did a mistake (because of which
he was later relieved of command and commited suicide) by ordering
the troops on Sinai to pull back towards the Canal. In this way he
draw his troops out of their well-dug in positions into the open,
where they were hit by the air. This pull-back resulted in a rout, in
which the Egyptians suffered over
30.000 KIA, MIA, and injured for almost nothing in return. If they
remained in their positions along the Israeli border and fought it is
100% sure they would have not suffered similar losses.

The Syrians, on the contrary, just sat there and wait, and then -
when the Israelis were on the end with their strenght, they started
pulling out of Golan. They were not routed, however: quite on the
contrary, they inflicted heavy losses to the IDF. The 7th AB, for
example, had only seven tanks remaining at the time of the cease-fire.

In close ground support flying the pilot must be well rested. When
he
takes
off he only knows what sector on he is to patrol. He has no
designated targets to be briefed on. His targets are communicated
to him from the ground forces that need an airstrike at a set of
co-ordinates.

Yeah, this was tried on 7, 8, 9 and 10 October 1973, with the result
that the IDF/AF lost over 80 combat aircraft shot down and over 150
damaged...

If there is
time he does a flyover at susonic speed and Id's his target(s) and
then on the next pass unloads it. Sometimes he is asked for
specific ordinence
and
a direction of the attack. That is common when they are against a
line of heavy firing from hidden troops. They ask for Nalpalm from
one direction from a start point. That causes a large line of
incinerating fire that cannot be put out till it all burns off. The
pilot only knows that he and the number of planes that will be in
that sector. Nothing is known about what targets he will hit, when
or where in that sector. If on his return
to
the field he still has ordinence and can find a target of oportunity
he
will
use what is left to take that out.

Sorry, but I doubt I ever read anything as senseless as this.

Briefing time is not needed for those missions, just pilots that are
rested
and planes loaded with the ordinence and fuel.

Aha. Briefings are not needed now either? You don't really know what
are you talking about, or?

Not every pilot
could fly 24 * 7 any way for the entire war.

As a matter of fact, nobody can do this. Not "even" the Israelis:
please, permit them to remain human beings. Four sorties a day - and
for a single day - yes, but that's already the limit. Three a day
for duration of three, four, perhaps five days. That can function
too. But more would only decrease the capability of the pilot: it
would simply drain him down.


But make the ratio of pilots to planes heavier on the number of
pilots to planes and the IAF could give the pilots a break after
short periods and less sorties. That is how the IAF opperated in
both the Six Day and Yom Kippur Wars as well as against the
Palestinians in Lebanon. Any tired
pilot
could be given a break when he landed and another pilot would be
available to relieve him for some time to rest.

In the war, Matt, there are no "tired" or "rested" pilots: there are
pilots that can fly and others that can't. Period.

You have several combat-experienced pilots on this NG: go and ask Ed
Rasimus if he would explain it any other way.

So while they refitted the
planes with more fuel, refilled Gpods, and other weapons used up,
they
often
changed pilots allowing the pilot that already flew 1 to 5 missions
to get some rest and a fresh rested pilot took his place.

Could you name a single Israeli pilot that flew five sorties in one
day, either in 1967 or 1973? I couldn't. Feel free to correct me,
but I can only remember several that flew four sorties on the first
day of the Six Day War, not a single one that flew as much in 1973.


Over the 1/4 of the first wave against Egypt flew 5 sortees the
first day
in
'67.

Look: I asked you for names. I can mention names of the one or two
IDF/AF pilots that flew four missions on that day. You say one
quarter of them did so. OK. Can you mention even one name of an
IDF/AF pilot that flew five sorties on that day?

The story about this was on the History Channel as well
as in a book by one of the lead pilots, (I do not rememeber his
name).
The
Show on the History Channel was one of a series called "Air Power".

Oh, now I understand everything. Thank's Lord, there is a "History
Channel". You never came to the idea that they could be wrong about
this?

Have you ever heard about some stuff called "books" or something
similar? I've heard these are made of paper and ink, and one might be
forced to go to the so-called "book-shops" or "libraries" in order to
get them, and then even have to "read" (spelling?) these too....

But, they say one can learn quite some stuff from reading these
strange things.

Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/t...hp/title=S6585

They flew several sorties over Port Alexandria well to the East of Ciaro
where some of the air bases had been moved after the Six Day War. They flew
and bombed the norther Air Bases in Syia nearer to Turkey as well. A lot
further than you incicate. Those are excptions I will admit but they were
long and strenous and tired those pilots out as they could not fly anything
near direct routes due to the SAM Threats. Also A single flight for ground
support was several sortees all rolled into one. They might be called at
times to make 6 or more runs at enemy ground troops, armor, or
installations, as well as field artilery. After these they needed relief,
there is something very taxing coming in at 50 feet and bombing an enemy
position when a miss could kill a lot of IDF troops. So the usual pattern
(History of Air Power) was to relieve them as soon as they landed and ready
the aircraft with a fresh, rested pilot for the next ground suppot mission.
At times IAF Pilots were called in to hit troops less than 100 yards away
from the IDF soldiers that called in the strike. How many time could you do
that type of sortee and keep at it? The quicker they got to rest and try
to relax the quiker they rested enough to do it all over again. Each plane
could fly double the number of such missions and not burn out the pilots.


--�
MattA
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