In message , Kevin
Brooks writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
They were used to cover US actions thereafter.

Be careful. You want to claim that we really used the UN umbrella in
this case by citing dates of UN "actions"?

It made it a *lot* easier to build a coalition, collect some allies, and
get basing rights. (And get more consensus postwar)

How about the fact that
Bush Sr authorized further US deployments on 8 Nov to allow for
"offensive action", while the UN did not get around to sanctioning
such action until 29 Nov?

What offensive action did they take?

The UN, lacking troops, can't put boots on the ground.

Nor apparently can it (collectively) pour pee out of same boots with
the proverbial instructions printed on the heels... g

Does the US really *want* an organised, powerful and effective UN? (Does
anyone?)

Well, they were used to justify an invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Not by your illustrious UN they weren't.

Who cares about the UN? You're the one (elsewhere) citing UN resolutions
as justification for action, while simultaneously decrying the UN as
useless. Interesting dichotomy, no?

Face it, we were going in
with or without UN "authorization" or "action". We would have done the
same in 91 had we had to (as evidenced by the fact that our
deployments and enforcement actions predated UN "action").

With considerably more difficulty - where were you planning to base and
stage from?

Frequently. That's the nature of the beast, and why it's acceptable.
(Including to the US).

It is increasingly irrelevant.

Quite. Why, you can now invade who you like, when you like, without
sanction. I'm not sure this is a good general principle.

Airlift, and this is first arrivals.

Uhmmm...you do realize that they just don't shuffle over to the Green
Ramp at Pope and hop on the aircraft, right?

Absolutely, but this is where the difference between announcing
departures and declaring arrivals becomes significant. Airborne units
are able to be fast-response - it's in their job description. IIRC we
keep a Spearhead battalion at 48hrs NTM.

This was not a deployment
of the ready company of the ready battalion of the ready brigade--it
was a full division deployment.

The whole division went on the 7th?

They demanded Iraqi withdrawal a week before that.

Ooooh! Another toothless demand from the UN;

Who's running Kuwait today?

Ah, what the heck. Okay, the UN is useless and all that matters is "do
these guys have friends who'll fight for them"?

I don't think any of this bodes well for your "the UN
worked well in 90-91" theory.

Okay, it was unilateral US force; the UN is irrelevant: and might makes
right. This might be convenient for the US in the short term, but it's
not going to do much for stability in the medium.

Trouble is, the UN is a bad solution but nobody has thought through any
better options.

I can't help wondering how much of it is chicken-and-egg. Clinton was
not a great friend of the military; but the military gave the impression
of being actively hostile to their commander at the same time. (Or at
least the members posting to Usenet, writing to Proceedings and AFJI,
and so on) This tends to lead to paralysis.

OFCS, when McCafferty showed up at the White House he got the cold
shoulder from a "senior advisor" in a none too respectful manner; not
a good start.

So that's the basis for an entire military organisation's mindset?

Respect generally has to be a two way street; we had
none from Clinton and his crowd, and we knew it.

Knew it personally, or just believed it?

That we accorded him
the respect due to a C-in-C was just an example of the professionalism
of the US military; it may have been grudging, but he got it.

Wasn't it Newt Gingrich who warned Clinton that he risked assassination
if he visited military bases?

His
fandango in Smalia, where he took a humanitarian mission that had gone
rather smoothly from Bush Sr and succeeded in turning it into a
ridiculous "Get Aidid" mission (at the behest of the UN Sec General,
IIRC) from which he divorced himself and turned tail when things got a
bit nasty, was merely icing on the cake.

Hey, I don't recall Reagan getting the same sort of criticism ten years
after his Lebanon intervention (which was also a feelgood job at UN
behest, which got ten times as many US servicemen killed, but was no
more effective for it)

If he felt that he couldn't trust his military in any action that might
involve cost, he'd opt for safe standoff tactics. (What would the
reaction be to "Failed Raid Costs US Troops Their Lives" if Clinton had
used manned platforms or ground forces to go after bin-Laden? Would you
have respected him for using the best tool for the job, or despised him
for considering his troops expendable assets to be spent for political
gain? I'm thinking Desert One as an example here)

That is utter bull**** Paul, and you know it. "Couldn't trust his
military"?!

Listen to your own words. Name a mission that the military undertook
under Clinton's direction that _was_ a success.

For gosh sakes, the US military did everything he ever
asked of them.

And derided every mission as a politically-inspired failure. How many
times would *you* keep asking?

As to OBL, I seem to recall that there was a *real* opportunity to
nail him, and Clinton's NS advisor, Berger, refused to authorize
it--wonder how history would have turned out if that had not been the
case?

Hey, the US _definitely_ had the perfect chance to eliminate Saddam
Hussein while he was a "useful regional ally" in the 1980s - wonder how
history would have worked that way? (Ain't hindsight great?)

No, much better to pop SLCMs at empty Afghani tents and a
Sudanese aspirin factory.

Reagan again: loft some airborne ordnance at Libyan tents, miss Gadaffi,
and come home calling it a success.


I find the difference in perception very interesting, when you have very
similar actions and results.


So why were political appearances so important?

You'd have to ask a politician.

I'm asking you.

Never said they were. (They were more use than many realise in OIF too,
mind you; French ships were among those covering the several risky
chokepoints on the way to the top of the Persian Gulf, as shipping laden
with military supplies trudged to their destinations. Not a point that
got much publicity then or notice now.)

Maybe because the USN also covered that same area?

No, the USN were up in the northern Gulf. (and it was four areas, not
one: easy to tell from a map. Gibraltar, Suez, Babr el-Mendab, Hormuz)

I doubt many US
commanders would have trusted the French last spring to actually stop
any attack against that shipping;

RN commanders did.

they would just as likely have sat
aside and waited to rush to the survivors' aid. If you are getting the
impression that a fair number of Americans have not forgiven the
French for their pro-Saddam stance (and the protection of those oil
and gas contracts they had recently secured--gee, wonder what happened
to them?), then you would be correct, and I imagine it will be some
time before these sentiments recede.

Trouble is, when you make policy based on sentiment rather than fact,
you run into trouble. You have to deal with the world as it exists, not
as you find it convenient to believe it.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk