On Sun, 21 Sep 2003 17:38:44 GMT, "Gene Storey"
wrote:

"Ed Rasimus" wrote

Don't know where you were in the food chain of aircrew training, but
if it was installed in the planes every single day, you can bet we
knew how to use it. If it were mission essential or mission critical
we got trained in it, refreshed in it, tested in it, and briefed on
every single mission with regard to employment of it.

Well... OK...

One thing that fighter/bomber crews never seemed to understand was
Mode-4 IFF, and wide-band secure voice. In Iceland the mission was
to intercept and escort any unidentified aircraft through the defense zone.
What that meant in real life was that if the IFF gave you problems, you
shut it off. If you couldn't talk to AWACS, or the Shack on secure, then
you switched to clear. Billions in hardware in the off position.

Foggy memory trying to recall things. Best I recollect (although I
might be wrong) was that the IFF/SIF had cockpit control of modes 1,
2, 3 and C. Don't recall that Mode-4 was cockpit controllable. In the
F-4 the coding was done in the nosegear well on the ground with a
plunger-like device. If you're talking peace-time air defense
intercept, and you've got 1,2,3 and C so that AWACS/GCI can control
you, then I'd have to agree with the decision to go. In combat,
interdiction, across the fence, then I'd say the prudent choice would
be no-go.

As for secure, again, if you are an interceptor and (as you stated the
situation), you can't talk to AWACS, etc. secure, you still go and
acknowledge that you're degraded. The option is to not go and be
penetrated.

As for your final statement, "billions in hardware in the off
position"--I'd say maybe millions if all the force wasn't using those
two sub-systems, and I'd say that you didn't indicate that all the
force wasn't using the systems--you simply provided a couple of
examples of "if the IFF gave you problems" and "if you couldn't talk
secure". Seems like you're describing a choice of mission
accomplishment or not, in limited situations.


Today, I think the radio is a completely different tool than it was before
1986. The use of wide and narrow secure when it's even necessary, is
the favored position (especially satcom). I listened to some of the
Air/Air recordings from a strike near Hanoi by a flight of 105's when I
went to a technical seminar, and it pretty much defined the word Clint
Eastwood had about Clusters...

Well, it depends on when during the conflict the radio recording you
heard was made. There was no Have Quick or later version of secure
voice. Depending upon the training of the crews (see my comments in
this forum in the past or in WTR for re-qual of various types in
fighters), the mission de jour, the weather, the defenses, etc. etc.
it could indeed be an example of remarkable incompetence.

But, that certainly can't be an example to support your argument
regarding what the crews "understand". Understanding the purpose,
operation, etc of equipment is a whole lot different depending upon
the mission circumstances, and quite obviously, the equipment
availability or existence.