From: vincent p. norris

According to _Breakout_ by Martin Russ, the Army units up north were
so inept they were a burden on the marines, rather than help.

The only things the Marines did at Hungnam was march through the perimeter held
by the 3rd ID, board ships and leave. Next to be evacuated were the ROK troops.
Remnants of the 7th ID which was strung out in a rapid advance when the
Chicoms hit and was badly mauled, left next. Then 100,000 civilian refugees
which streamed into the city were evacuated. The 3rd which had been dealing
with the NK in the Wonsan area and had made a fighting retreat to Hungnam,
secured and held the perimeter, some 7 miles deep, throughout the entire
evacuation. 3ID troops were the last off the beach. The 1st Marine division
played no role at Hungnam other than evacuating from there.
As far as the situation when the Chinese attacked, it was worth a congressional
investigation to find out just what happened. Remember than Gen. MacArthur
had pushed 8th Army's Gen. Walker to advance faster and threatened to remove
him if he didn't. X Corps MG Edward Almond was aware of that and pushed his
units to move forward on the double. The 7th ID, NNW of the lst Marines, did
as ordered. The Marines' Gen Oliver Smith moved forward very slowly, so slowly
that Almond chided him repeatedly. One reason Smith was so cautious is that
the Marines had run into Chicoms in the first week of Nov.--when no chinese
were thought or anticipated to be in Korea. Had the 7th ID had a similar
encounter, they might have slowed and been better prepared to resist the hit of
some 300,000 Chicoms. Smith himself said that if his division had been
dispersed like 7ID it would have been wiped out. As it was, he was able to
command a compact legion that scythed through the Chicoms and reached a port of
evacuation held by a US Army Division, the Third, which had had to fight its
way there itself--with nary a marine to be found.
The 3rd, which nominally a full division, was understrength by an incredible
8,500 men when it was sent to assist in "mop up" operations of North Korean
troops around Wonsan. The shortage at the time wasn't considered a bid deal
because major combat was assumed to be over.
This mopping up cost hundreds of casualties, but was considered "light" by the
standards of the day. But by Dec.1, when the 3rd was ordered to secure
Hungnam, the Chicoms had infiltrated troops into the area and cut the rail
lines and placed roadblocks along the road routes. The 3rd fought its way
through all of these, made it to Hungnam, and secured it. No Marines had to
rescue them.
A month after leaving Hungnam the 3rd was back in action in brutal fighting to
secure bridgeheads over the Han river and was in fierce fighting beyond the
Han. During a massive Chinese counterattack during the last week of April 1951
iirc about a half dozen CMHs went to 3ID soldiers. Then they went into the
original "Iron Triangle" (before the one in Vietnam). And on through the war.
I would not consider myself an expert on the Korean War, but Russ's comments do
seem to be out of line.


Chris Mark