"Geoffrey Sinclair" wrote in message ...



John Freck wrote in message ...



Keith Willshaw wrote in message ...


Why do you think Britain didn't develop
fighter bombers early like Germany?



Because Britain went with the light bomber idea pre war
and was on the defensive in 1940, which meant the RAF
fighter bombers appeared in 1941 versus 1940 for the
Luftwaffe.



Well, then: Why did they like the line up they went with more than
other options?



Compare just 2-engined bombers with long ranged
fighter bombers, and tell me which would have
been better for Britain to have during the BoB.



Easy the twin engined bombers like a Wellington could haul
4,000 pounds of bombs to the invasion ports, a Hurricane
fighter bomber 500 pounds when it came into service in
1941, even the Battles could do twice this.



Don't you kind of think, however, that Britain needed fighters
(fighter bombers can fight fighters, shoot down bombers, destroyers,
and transports) during the Battle of Britain more than bombers? If
Britain had the same number of a additional fighters as Britain had
bombers, then Germany would do even worse. Germany would lose more
planes faster. From July 1st, 1940 there are still bombers around to
do stuff by the hundreds if not thousands, as I recall. I'm just
providing to fighter command even a higher priority for fuel, labor
and tools, manufacturing, maintenance, and materials.



Are you willing to argue that; in a reasonable
war-game, that if Britain swaps all of her
2-engined bombers for fighter bombers, that
Britain will do worse? Never mind alternative
history POD (POint of departure) "soundness",
we are just subbing fighter bombers for bombers
in a game. Which is more important? Which can
sub for what?



Easily, the damage being done to the invasion
fleet was a factor in the decision not to go
and why it had to be dispersed.



Fighter bombers did well against naval targets, and fighter bombers
can defend against bombers and fighter bombers.



No sir you cant, retooling a factory
and re-training its workforce takes
considerable time during which you
produce nothing at all.



What retooling? Both use the same job description
workers to a tee. Both use riveters, welders,
assemblers, fitters, cutters, pressers, ect.
Both use the forklifts, ceiling cranes, metal
cutters, metal benders, grinders, torches, drills, ect.
Both use large open space-warehouses-with strong ceilings.
Both use the same basic raw materials in nearly identical
configurations, and many parts are only different like 28"
waist pants are different than 60" pants.



A long amount of reading into the concept of machine tools
is clearly in order here. If it was so simple then hours after
the changeover to a new model, day a Spitfire V to IX
then the entire air force should have had the new model.



We are discussing increase current model monthly production counts,
and not as you insist over and over and over, that we are discussing
accelerating the time from prototypes first test flight to first
months mass production. Mass production of the Hurricane had been
established by July 1st, 1940 and the Spitfire was on immediate path
for start-up to mass production. Did the Spitfire stay on production
targets projected from March 1938, or September 1939, or January 1940,
or June 1940, or December 1941? It has been my impression as an
American that new airplane production surpassed all projection by
government and corporate economists.



Snipped 50+ lines on trasnistioning to newer models



Why didn't you use the Corsair as an example?



First flew 29 May 1940, ordered 30 June 1941 first
deliveries 3 October 1942.



This Corsair information is relevant to increasing Hurricane
production from July 1st, 1940, exactly how? It might somehow be
relevant to increasing Tempest production for July 1st, 1940. Is it
relevant to Spitfire productions exceeding economists projections from
July 1, 1940? Please, give me a clue, and just go into some great
detail!



HOw did all aircraft production jump by tens
or thousands per year then? All major types
of aircraft, that is all fighters, bombers,
fighter bombers, and transports all taken
together all were jumping up rapidly for all
sides monthly. How was this done, and how
is it then that there can be no flexibility
to increase fighter bombers over bombers from
July 1st, 1940 to October 1st, 1940. Early on
air bases themselves were producing large
numbers of planes in mini factories:



So if we want the 1910 model
aircraft we can do this method.



I think you need to understand that historians are not all they are
cracked up to be, you missed some interesting information on
manufacturing in W.W.II.



Every piece of a warplane could be made in
the field. I have heard on the USA's
History Channel that nearly 50% of USAAF
warplanes were not made in factories at
all but on or near air bases.



This is so wrong it is really funny.



The United States military very robust maintenance of machines during
W.W.II. On board every large aircraft carrier there were, and still
are, factories capable of making any mechanical part needed for any
airplane the aircraft carrier carries. The scale of Allied, and Axis,
repair and mantenicen was huge and sophisticated. YOu might be a
historian, and as such you might not realize that people have been
making planes in small garages for a long time.
The repair and maintenance made complete airplanes in W.W.II. You
need to have your nose out for the sort on information in relaying to
you. There is a moderator of soc.history.wwii who pontificate on the
Axis logistical situation in the Mediterreans from 1940-1943. The
book he liked to quote had no mention of German, and Axis, military
barges augmenting Axis supply in Africa--but they existed, as do
mini-mills and small aircraft factories on and near air bases during
W.W.II. You will just have to keep a nose out. It is really sad how
ignorant some "experts" are around here. I suppose you don't think
that a mini-mill can even exist.



The mini factories had stuff like, mini-mills,
diamond grinders, drills, metal scissors,
tool and die makers, ect. All of those can
be made in a snap, are common, and on the shelf.



Ah yes, machine tools that take months to build are a snap,
and of course they are all waiting on the shelf for the declaration
of war.



Friend, the Hurricane's production was augmented this way, and repair
and manitience was upgrade very quickly as to allow them to make
planes. What machine tool for the Hurricane can't be made very fast?



I consider it a fact that Britain set up these mini-mills
very quickly and this is a prime reason Britain had
such a high production rate.



So please detail where all those mini mills are, since no
historian has found one.



You have never come across one in books you read
because the historian who write them are ignorant of them.
The exist today, as yesterday, on board every capital class
USN aircraft carrier, and still today on large air force bases.
Look, why don't you invest more time called me dumb, and then
I might be more motivated to show you I'm right. Or you can look
for, or nose for, a documentary on the B-26 which repeats fairly
often on the US History Channel.



When Germany started with this method
too, its production went up to.



So again, show the locations.



You have to provoke me more. Provoke me like, Phillip McGregor,
provoked me into proving that the Axis used military barges to supply
its armies and air forces in Africa. He never knew they built 700
very large landingcrafts, barges, that could deliver on most any beach
on the shores of Africa, or Black Sea, or Baltic Sea. He would rant
about trucks rolling thousands of miles to deliver fuel and other
stuff from ports in Libya. His book's author had it that way. Buddy,
Allied and Axis both used mini factories for weapons' repair to the
scale as allowing for new construction near the action. I have met
gunsmiths, former soldiers, who have very small furnaces in garages.
The can make, literally, an M-16, their own bullets, or a host of
metal parts. If you keep a look out you will discover what I'm
talking about. I'm sure it didn't peak your interest, and that's all.



I don't think that it is hard to boost fighter
production from July 1st, 1940 since it was
boosted on an emergency basis. By no means
is fighter production structurally limited
like you indicate. Adding more assembly
lines to an already developed plane already
in production is easy and quick. The mini-mills
can larger factory lines can be added fast
until basic raw material availability has
been tapped. Sorry. Try harder, maybe.



It is really hard to punch through such iron clad ignorance
when you cannot see the screen because you are
laughing too much.



It is really sad in your case.



Consider further the second Spitfire
production plant at Castle Bromwich
in the West Midlands. On April 12,1938
a contract was placed for 1,000 Spitfires
to be built at this new factory, aircraft
first came off the production line in
September 1940.



And now provide further data on how
fast additional production was added.



Since you are so sure it was
easy to ramp it up perhaps you
can provide production figures.



Now, it is whether, it was ‘easy' or ‘hard' to have production
sky-rocket past the projections of government and corporate
economists! Ok, we can break horns here, if we're not careful. How
do you like this? ‘It is hard, very hard and difficult, for brave
smart Brits to have fighter production sky-rocket past the projections
of government and corporate projections.'



What is easy, is for me to suggest 60+ years latter that Britain
should have put even more effort into making that sky-rocket happen
sooner, or harder, or more intensely. They should have put even more
pressure on bomber command for resources.



I don't happen to have Hurricane and Spitfire
monthly production counts from July, August,
September, and October 1940: but I suppose you do.



Ah I see no information but absolute certainty about what the
facts are.



As this debate goes on I might show that USA production exceed
economists projections. I don't feel like doing the homework. If I
had an aid, I might assign her to do some research, but this is chat.



Now how do you account for the increasing
counts? From you examples, I could infer
that back in 1938 Britain had pre planned the
build-up and it just so happen the BoB rolled
right in just then as things were picking up steam.



This sort of proves how random chance can make you
right occasionally. The explanation is completely correct
the increases in RAF fighter production in 1940 was due
to decisions taken in 1938 and 1939.


British Fighter output June to October 1940 by type, planned
and actual


Month // Beau fighter P/A // Defiant P/A // Hurricane P/A // Spitfire
P/A // Whirlwind P/A


June // 8/2 // 30/30 // 300/309 // 135/103 // 8/2
July // 14/5 // 50/56 // 220/272 // 140/160 // 4/3
August // 21/25 // 65/38 // 270/251 // 155/163 // 6/1
September // 24/15 // 65/41 // 280/252 // 175/156 // 8/3
October // 40/21 // 50/48 // 300/250 // 231/149 // 10/1

Total British aircraft production in 1940 January 802, February
719, March 860, April 1,081, May 1,279, June 1,591, July 1,665,
August 1,601, September 1,341, October 1,419, November
1,461, December 1,230.



Production doubled. Well, I have it that aviation production
expansion was faster than projected by far, maybe this is a USA
artifact and not a Brit thing after all. Are you positive that RAF
front line strength was unaffected by on-or-near base manufacturing?
And that this on-ronear-base manufacturing was rapidly expanded?
Since you are interested, here is a related problem: How to boost the
French's readiness. If you were to prepare the French's air force
from January 1940, what would you spend on? How would you spending
work? How would it be similar to Britain's better preparedness?


So, you have it that production numbers were right in line with
economic projections from 1938-? To when? When did, if ever, did
British aircraft production exceed projections, and I don't mean
monthly, fringing projections!



There are two reasons for the summer peak, more good weather
for acceptance flights and people putting in large amounts of
overtime to produce as much as possible, with the inevitable
result of declining production as the workers tired. It took until
March 1941 to beat the peak monthly figure in 1940.


Bomber production was going up according to my atlas, and rapidly.




I have heard in many interviews that the RAF
was very tight on fuel. Just the other day
on the Dorothy Reeem show that what was
husbanding fighters to fight "Sea Lion"
was not having fuel to head over ot the fight.



Which sort of fiction does this show push?
The RAF did not have a fuel problem in 1940.




Why were resource husbanded long after any serious military analyst
thought Sea Lion was any threat at all. Even when all the top
commanders and top insider intelligence staff officers who know that
was real feared an invasion, Germany did very little other than BoB to
prepare of Sea Lion. Germany during Britain's greatest anxiety was not
doing logical preparation for an invasion: But still Britain husbanded
resources vigorously, really strenuously. Britain was in a
conservation mode to the hilt and this was not just propaganda.


The RAF, RN, and Army were all very worried
about fuel conservation. In addition, I have
read that Britain was very interested in
projecting confidence and prowess.



Given the problems in shipping fuel to England the British
did take conservation measures, that is all.



NO. Britain was not simply conserving. It done with great sense of
emergency, top national priority, for the survival of the nation, all
sectors had inspectors and enforcers. The government mean business,
there was tremendous mass media attention. You write the fiction
according to the people who lived it and fought the BoB. Britain will
tremendous dramatic energy--conserved energy like victory of defeat
hung in the balance, and the top and inside, and the bottom and
outside all thought it was the truth. Your emotional casting is
Monday morning quarterbacking for a winning team; and this QB cares to
cast the tight game as "effortless." You are understating a situation
you didn't live though, and the people who did live thru it don't like
the way you cast the situation.


Snip



In that case why not go away?



It is somewhat fun to debate. You see, I know that in your hardest
heart you really do think, project, that Britain simply went with some
conservation measures. And you think, and write with complete ablam.
Well, the USA military history reader demands differently than you,
and will win since the American emotional reaction is accurate. Your
emotional reaction is s form of denial.



John Freck