Guy Alcala wrote in message ...
Kevin Brooks wrote:

ess (phil hunt) wrote in message ...

snip

No, it has never, since the days when the LWF morphed into the
multi-role F-16 which entered into service, had an emphasis on "air
superiority" (other than the handful of A model ADF variants mentioned
earlier). Both US and European users placed more emphasis on its use
in the strike role, and its first major combat use, by the Israelis,
saw more strike missions than air superiority use (you do recall what
kind of aircraft toted the bombs to Osirak in 82?).

I'll have to disagree. The Europeans used the F-16 primarily as an interceptor/air superiority a/c in the early days
while they still had squadrons of other types available for A/G work, with a secondary A/G role (there were individual
variations between different nations as to emphasis; some had F-16s in dedicated A/A squadrons, some used them for
both missions, some had squadrons for each), and other countries have also used it as their primary air superiority
a/c if they couldn't afford F-15s (which is to say, almost every customer).

From what I have read, the european partners were also asking for the
multi-role capability from the get-go. I can buy into some of them
focusing a bit more on the air-to-air role than the USAF did, but only
so far, as I don't recall any of them pressing for a BVR capability as
would have been available with even the USAF's early ADF versions.

And while the Israelis used F-16s to bomb
Osirak (in 1981, not 1982), it was because the a/c had the range to get there and back unrefueled, along with
sufficient accuracy with dumb bombs; they'd previously planned to use F-4s with smart bombs and buddy-tank them at
low-level over SA/Iraq, not an idea that anyone could get very enthusiastic about. In 1982 over the Bekaa, along with
F-15s the F-16s were the primary air superiority a/c (and scored more kills than the F-15s did), while A-4s, F-4s and
Kfirs handled most of the strike missions. The Israelis have always wanted multi-role fighter a/c (they were the
first to use the F-15 for A/G); for instance, the main reason they took the A-4 was to get their foot in the door with
the U.S., hoping to get F-4s later. Only afterwards did they discover that the a/c suited their needs very well, and
they ordered a lot more.

Which goes to the point that the F-16 was a multi-role platform.


F-16s were forced into the swing-fighter role by the USAF, so as not to compete directly with the F-15 in the air
superiority business. The USAF was afraid that Congress would stop production of the F-15 (a better place to start if
you want multi-role) in favor of the F-16 for cost reasons if the two a/c went head-to-head in A/A, so they eliminated
the A/G part of the F-15 training syllabus as well as stopped A/G weapons compatibility testing in 1975 or 1976
(problems of a/c availability owing to F100 engine problems and shortages in the early days was also a factor in
eliminating the A/G syllabus, as pilot shortages were occurring owing to an inability to generate enough training
sorties), and made the F-15 a dedicated A/A-only bird while the F-16 was shunted off to be the F-4 replacement and was
not, repeat NOT, to be considered a direct competitor to the F-15. The F-16 has done an excellent job in that role,
and its capabilities in that area have received more and more emphasis over the years, its A/A performance naturally
decreasing as a result. The F-15 is clearly better suited as a multi-role platform owing to its size, but that's kind
of irrelevant if most potential customers can't afford to buy, maintain or operate them.

I can see the point about the internal politics of the decision, but
not exclusive of all other factors. If this had really been simply and
only a matter of protecting the F-15, then why has the A/G function
never been significantly redressed in the past few years, when it was
no longer a factor? The Navy did so with the F-14 (witness the
Bombcat). I'd imagine that more went into these decisions than just
budget-fights; the F-15 is without a doubt the better of the two in
the air superiority role when you include the BVR capability, greater
AAM load, and better radar (IIRC, though there may not be much
difference today between the latest F-16 blocks and the F-15C in this
regard).

To summarize, you seem to disagree with the bit about mud moving being
more important to *all* of the initial users from the beginning of
operational use--OK, I can grant that some of the Euro users placed a
higher degree of importance on the AA role than the USAF did. But in
toto, all of the users wanted a multi-role aircraft (strangely, this
is not true today, as we have seen the Italians lease thier older ADF
variants exclusively for the AA role), and that was the major point of
my argument.

Brooks


Guy