(The Revolution Will Not Be Televised) wrote in message ...
On 23 Oct 2003 12:39:28 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
wrote:
No. As I show below, they quite accurately report the content of the
discussions between Wohlthat and Sir Horace Wilson. The latter was
not, to my knowlege, assigned to the German embassy.

No, they quite accurately report what Wohlthat _reported_ were the
content of the discussions he had with Horace Wilson on 21st July
1939. Wilson not only denied that he had met Wohlthat on that date,
but denied offering Germany a non-aggression treaty during his
acknowledged contacts with Wohlthat at earlier and later meetings.

"I don't recall. It's not in my appointment book.... I suggest that
it is not necessary to pay much attention to Wohlthat." isn't a
denial.

And of course, the paying of little attention to Wohlthat is
facilitated by his files in the Public Records Office being sealed
until 2015.

I suspect that where there are conflicting accounts of such contacts
on the Soviet side in regard to non-aggression pacts in the context of
German ambitions towards Poland in 1939, your reading will be a little
less convinced of the definative nature of the diplomatic feelers in
question.

Why? The German accounts of these negotiation show continued Soviet
suspicion of the Germans, and go so far as to say, as late as 4 August
1939, that the Soviets remain determined to sign with the British and
French if their conditions are met. Mr. Willshaw made a feeble
attempt to show that these Soviet conditions were unreasonable, but I
notice that he hasn't really responded to my showing that British
military types thought them just what the situation required.

about PLANS for negotiation not negotiations themselves
and certainly no offers of recognition as you claimed.

How does that explain the discussions State Advisor Wohlthat had in
London, on British initiative...

Actually, my reading of the source you quote is that Wohlthat asked
permission from Goring to pursue economic contacts with the British in
June 1939. [page 88]

How does this contradict Dirksen's cable of 24 July?

The persons engaged in drawing up a list of points for negotiation

A confirmation that at this point no negotiations have occurred

Nonsense. The discussions Wohlthat held with Sir Horace Wilson are
mentioned specifically. Wohlthat and Wilson met on 6 June, 7 July, 19
July, 21 July, and 31 July.

Not according to Wilson.

"I have no recollection... My book shows seven appointments and there
is no mention of Wohlthat... I suggest that it is unnecessary to pay
much attention to Wohlthat..."

Which account you believe (Wilson or Wohlthat] is up to you.

On the one hand, we have the German account. On the other we have "I
have no recollection..." and the sealing of the relevant British files
until 2015.

In most cases people seem to allow their interpretation to be dictated
by their prejudices, and I don't think you're an exception.

Here's Zachary Shore "What Hitler Knew" Oxford University Press, 2003,
pg 89, on these negotiations:

"Sir Horace presented a detailed plan for Anglo-German accord that
began with a proposal of a nonaggression pact. ... There would be a
recognition of spheres of influence. Eastern and southeastern Europe
were to be designated as Germany's sphere. Third, there would be
agreements on arms limitations for land, sea, and air power
(Chamberlain had long sought an air pact with Germany, as this was a
particular concern for British security.) Fourth, colonial issues
would be resolved, including how best to develope Africa. ... Sir
Horace Wilson said that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact would
release Britain from her commitments to Poland; thus, the Danzig
question would lose much of its importance for Britain."

Wohlthat asked what authority lay behind these British proposals.

"When asked whether Chamberlain had approved these plans, Wilson
asserted that the Prime Minister had given his full consent." - Shore
pg 90.

Notice how, on page 89, Shore refers to this as "Sir Horace [Wilson]
then supposedly presented his interlocutor with a draft formula for
Anglo-German cooperation, but this memorandum has never been found."
Shore is quite careful to use terms like "allegedly" and "supposedly"
in this respect, qualifications which I note you drop when you present
these interpretations as unchallenged fact, which, in fact, they are
not.

"I have no recollection..." is not a challenge to a statement of fact.

therefore realize that the preparatory steps vis-a-vis Germany must be
shrouded in the utmost secrecy.

So you think these were discussions "...vis-a-vis Germany..." held
between the German themselves.

Who knows, given that all you have is one German civil servant's
opinion of what was discussed and what this meant?

Confirmed by another German civil servant's (Dirksen's) account of
discussions held on 3 August 1939 with the very same Sir Horace
Wilson.

I wonder what his appointment book has to say about that.

Or, you're just trying to weasle out
of their uncomfortable implications.

The latter, I think.

I think you should be very careful when casting this sort of language
around,

Mr. Willshaw tried to portray Dirksen's cable as a report of
discussions within the German embassy about plans for negotiations.

"So we have a report of discussions within the German embassy
about PLANS for negotiation not negotiations themselves
and certainly no offers of recognition as you claimed"

He later tried to portray the Deputy Chiefs of Staff's favorable
opinion of one of the Soviet conditions as evidence the British side
were serious about the Moscow staff talks, despite the fact that the
British delegation wasn't authorized to agree to it.

given that in fact the basic thrust of the source you quote,
at least in regard to secret Anglo-German contacts in June-July 1939
contradicts your basic assertion that Hitler was aware of them and
they informed his decision in regard to attacking Poland.

I do not assert that Hitler was informed of the Wohlthat-Wilson or the
Dirksen-Wilson talks.

I asserted that Hitler saw no evidence of British preparations to go
to Poland's aid in the event of a German attack on Poland.

Shore makes it explictly clear that there was no evidence that Hitler
was aware of them, in contrast to Ribbentrop.

Only when Germany's willingness to
negotiate has been ascertained,

One might think that the German Embassy might already have an idea of
Germany's willingness to negotiate. Or, you're just trying to weasle
out of their uncomfortable implications.

I think we can take the readiness of Germany to negotiate on the basis
of Wilson's efforts from the conclusion they reached (a conclusion, I
note in passing, that you don't seek to widely publicise in your
references to Shore):

"Just two weeks before the outbreak of war, the Anglo-German talks
reached their finale. Whether he had proposed them or not,
Chamberlain finally received a response to his or Sir Horace's secret
overtures. On August 20, Fritz Hesse, the German embassy advisor,
wrote to Sir Horace on Ribbentrop's instructions. The German
government, Wilson was told, had no interest whatsoever in
negotiations with Britain." [page 99]

Indeed. The Germans turned down negotiations with the British on 20
August 1939. And Chamberlain's concept of "...germany and England as
pillars of European peace and buttresses against Communism" crashed
into ruins.

So we have is the German belief that Britain would not in fact declare
war over Poland but would if forced negotiate, they were wrong

They had not the slightest indication of a serious British intention
to go to Poland's aid.

This is where I am convinced you are using references in bad faith.

I do not reference Shore for this, but the war diary of
Colonel-General Franz Halder, Chief of the German General Staff, entry
for 14 August 1939 describing one of Hitler's monologues:

"Britain, unlike in 1914, will not allow herself to blunder into a war
drawn out over years. Talk of Britain wanting a long war is
discounted. ... Britain has not gained in naval power over the last
year. On land, it will be months before stepped-up conscription can
take effect in the form of efficient fighting units. Progress in the
air: bombers, fighters, improved ground organization. Air defense has
not made any basic imporvements. On the whole, everything is still in
the developing stage, similar to ours in 1934.

....

All these factors argue for the liklihood of Britain and France
refraining from entering the war, particularly since they are not
under any compulsion.

Pacts are not yet ratified. Formula: "Aid with all our power" lacks
good faith. Proof: Britain does not give Poland any money to buy
arms in other countries.

....

Further evidence that no determined action is expected on the part of
Britain may be inferred from Poland's attitude. Poland would be even
more insolent if she knew she had the unqualified backing of Britain.
Britain has strongly remonstrated with Poland over the latest Polish
notes and is a continually restraining influence. Tapped telephone
conversations in Poland! Even now Britain is putting out feelers to
find out how the Fuehrer envisages developments after Poland's
disposal."

"The Halder War Diary, 1939-1942" edited by Charles burdick and
Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, presidio Press, 1988, pgs 23-24.

It appears that Hitler was not greatly impressed by the British
efforts to acquire the capability to go to Poland's aid in the event
of a german attack on Poland.

In fact Shore makes it clear that the source *you* are utilising to
indicate underlying British policy in the form of Wohlstadt's and
Dirksen reports, explictly contradicts this:

"Unable to gain an audience with Ribbentrop, Dirksen decided to send
yet another report summarising his previous cables and stressing his
conviction that Britain would fight to defend Poland." [page 98]
Shore claims this report was sent to Weizsacker and Ribbentrop. Note
that phrase ".. stressing his conviction that Britain would fight to
defend Poland."

Now, either you didn't read that last sentence or you are seeking to
selectively distort the actual meaning of the references you quote to
support your position.

Anybody taking Dirksen's report's of his own and Wohlstadt's activity
seriously, as you do, should be able to account for the fact that they
stressed that the British _were_ in fact prepared to fight over Poland
in accordance with their guarantee. This appears to flatly contradict
what you believe on the matter, on the basis of what you have posted
in this thread so far.

Again, Hitler himself saw little reason to be impressed.

...In conclusion, I should like to point out that the German-Polish
problem has found a place in this tendency toward an adjustment with
Germany, inasmuch as it is believed that in the event of an
Anglo-German adjustment the solution of the Polish problem will be
easier, since a calmer atmosphere will facilitate the negotiations,
and the British interest in Poland will be diminished."

Wishful thinking in action since on the 14th July Sir Nevile Henderson
discussed with Baron von Weizsäcker, German State Secretary at the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs, a statement by one of the German Under-Secretaries that
"Herr Hitler was convinced that England would never fight over Danzig." Sir
Nevile Henderson repeated the affirmation already made by His Majesty's
Government that, in the event of German aggression, Great Britain would
support Poland in resisting force by force

And what did HMG do in the interval to acquire the capability to
support Poland in resisting by force? Hitler saw no such actions or
preparations. Hence, he discounted the threat.

Hitler's wish-fulfillment isn't the issue at hand. What he was told
about British intentions and what the British had established as their
intentions are.

And he was little impressed with British efforts to back those
intentions with forceful military action.

Ribbentrop was claiming to Ciano that the British
wouldn't fight over Poland on 11 August, and Hitler similarly on 12
August. Clearly, Ribbentrop at least knew of Dirksen's report by
then, which contradicted this. [page 98 again] So much for the value
of that report to the decision-making process in the Nazi hierarchy.

I personally suspect, as usual, that the Nazis selectively chose to
believe whatever bits of that report which fit in with Hitler's
perceived plan and their exisiting prejudices, and discarded the rest.
That would seem to have some parallel in this thread, at least.

No he was a realist,

A realist... who retained a touching faith in Hitler's "sincerity"
right up until the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. ROTFL!!

Unlike Stalin, who's sense of realism managed to believe with touching
faith in Hitler's "sincerity" after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and up
until the panzers rolled across his borders.

No. Before agreeing to Ribbentrop's visit, Stalin had agent
information, backed by decrypts of German diplomatic cables, that
showed that the Germans intended good relations to last about two
years.

He understood that he was merely buying time and depth. Which was
more than the British were offering him...

He had the news of Hitler signing the Barbarossa Directive within the
week of Hitler signing it.

In April 1941 he decared a "Special Period of Military Threat",
mobilized several Military Districts in the far East, and covertly
transferred forces from these Districts to the west. This initated
the process of "creeping up to war".

In May, he ordered a 99-division strategic reserve formed on the
Dneipr.

Seems a very modified
form of 'realism' in regard to the "sincerity" of Hitler's treaty
undertakings to me. Are you rolling about laughing at _that_
ridiculous faith in Hitler's word, I wonder?

No, because I know that Stalin had no faith in Hitler's word.

It shows that as long as the merest, threadbare shred of a hope of a
possibility of a chance that maybe, someday, in the course of time,
Hitler will join HMG in an anti-Soviet agreement, it is sufficient
reason to trust Hitler's sincerity and continue to judge him as better
than his actions.

Not what Chamberlain was saying to his sisters on 23rd July, was it?

As long as you bring up his sisters, why was he telling them in
mid-September 1939 that
And the British offered to end those talks.

Molotov ended those talks.

Once they were clearly going nowhere. After all, nobody on the
British delegation he was talking to had any authority to agree to
anything.

And he gave them how long to alter their stance before initiating the
conclusion of a non-aggression pact which carved up Poland and the
rest of Eastern Europe into spheres of interest?

About four months, since the Soviet alliance offer to Great Britain
and France of 17 April 1939. But since Dirksen's 24 July cable
circulated through the insecure German embassy in Moscow on 11 August
1939, he may have thought he had reason for alacrity.

I note this kind of
deal seems to excite your criticism when Chamberlain might be
interpreted as trying it, but not when Stalin actually _does_ it.

Shore shows that the British were informed how to stop Hitler - Agree
to the Soviet alliance offer. Chamberlain didn't want to.

To refer to the source you quote once more, Shore makes it clear that
Stalin was soliciting a deal with Hitler in March 1939.

Is he to leave the field entirely to the British?

Stuart Wilkes