Larry Dighera wrote:

Below are excerpts of comments of some of the key players. It appears
to me, that DoD sees ADS-B as a means to surveil aircraft operations,
and because of the sensitivity of their missions and costs to
implement, they desire noncompliance. Boeing is interested in
assuring that the NPRM is compatible with their grand ATC system. The
air carriers are hoping that ADS-B will provide enhanced NAS capacity
through reduced separation standards and additional routes. And
everyone is concerned about the cost and marginal benefits.


Here's what the DoD has to say:


http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspubli...ontentType=pdf
As a user, DoD requires access to all elements of the NAS and
requires Special Use Airspace (SUA) for conducting missions in
support of the National Security Strategy and the National
Military Strategy. Under various circumstances, e.g. age of
aircraft fleet, funding requirements, etc., some DoD aircraft may
not meet equipage requirements and will need accommodation from
the FAA to operate in the designated ADS-B Out airspace....

5) Comment: The FAA needs to continue to work with the DoD and
DHS to ensure that concerns about ADS-B security are adequately
addressed prior to the issuance of the final ADS-B rule.

Rationale: ADS_B is a new standard adopted by many aviation
authorities worldwide which offers a great leap forward in
aircraft surveillance capabilities. More information is made
available than before with conventional primary and secondary
radar technologies. Because AES_B does not require major
conventional radar ground infrastructure, by its nature, it makes
the position of aircraft in flight and intent generally available
to everyone. In this regard, DoD believes there are some
potential security vulnerabilities which need to [be] addressed.
There are several specific concerns noted in FAA planning
documents, including unauthorized use of ADS-B information for
introducing false targets/aircraft spoofing into the system. A
through security assessment involving DoD and DHS is needed to
determine ADS-B risks and appropriate countermeasures.
Additionally, a technique for detecting ADS-B spoofing which is
independent of the ADS-B system is required. ...

6) Comment: The FAA, DHS, DOJ, NSA and DoD will need to develop
operational procedures for special USG flights (such as low
observable surveillance aircraft, combat air patrol missions,
counter=drug missions, counter-terrorism missions, VIP transport,
law enforcement surveillance, etc.), that are inconsistent with
broadcasting their position over a link that can be easily
received and resolved. State aircraft, due to national security
issues, will require special accommodations in ADS-B assigned
airspace.



Of course the DoD is going to want the "take" from any surveillance
system that is in place and they should get it. But from reading the
above it seems they are much more concerned that the system as currently
conceived has some security holes that they are worried about. Overall
it looks like they don't like the plan.