"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 17:49:17 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote:


"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
.. .


The more things change, the more they remain the same. I've only
opined once in this long thread, but thought I'd jump in again after
this.

Some points:

snip good info


3. The final insert by Brooks is irrelevant to the discussion.

When the comment is made quite emphatically that no gun should be
included
in the newer aircraft, by more than one poster, I disagree with your
conclusion of irrelevance.

The thread title is "Best Dogfight Gun". The relevance of the comment
is to tactical aircraft employment in support of ground forces, and I
freely conceded the importance in follow-on comments.

Threads drift. FYI, the introduction of the air-to-ground issue was from
another poster.


The
question has been about guns and air/air. The question of optimum CAS
weapon isn't trivial and my reply shouldn't be taken as one more
evidence of the AF aversion to support of ground troops. There is
NOTHING more important. But:

A.) First, support of ground troops involves keeping enemy
aircraft from being a player. We've done that successfully in every
conflict since WW II.

That is only one aspect of support of ground troops. And if anything an
increasingly *less* important one at that--note that we have not faced a
significant air threat to our ground troops since WWII, Ed.

The prosecution should rest with that acknowledgement. It is my point
exactly. The historic result should not be attributed to wishing and
hoping. It's a result of proper allocation of resources.

Uhmmm...do you or do you not agree that the air-to-ground role has consumed
the vast majority of USAF (and for that matter USN aviation) missions since
WWII?



B.) CAS does not have to be fifty feet overhead with
snake/nape on "enemy in the wire". It can evolve to that scenario but
doesn't happen as often as common perception would think.

But it does happen, period. Did it happen during Anaconda or not? The
reports I read said it did--feel free to correct that representation.

It happened. But, anecdotal evidence does not necessarily lead to good
conclusions.

I'd consider disparate and repeated "anecdotal evidence" of the sort
provided below to be rather compelling. According to what our resident
current Strike eagle driver has posted in a similar thread, the USAF
apparently agrees.



C.) Modern stand-off weapons provide equal or greater
accuracy than close-in laydown and without either jeopardizing the
delivery aircraft or warning the target to hunker down.

And what about when the threat you are engaging is well within the danger
close margin? If it comes down to the gun as the best available support
option versus having the CAS folks say, "Sorry, we can't do anything
since
we don't have guns, but we wish you the best of luck and will be thinking
kind thoughts of you...", I'd take the former, thank you. Luckily, the
USAF
seems to share that view.

Modern warfare is a mix of sophistication and crudity. Can you say
"Claymore"? Seriously, I'm not belittling nor minimizing. There's a
mix of weapons. Some you have available, some you don't. Some are
better than others. CAS strafe is exhilarating to say the least. But,
it isn't the only weapon for danger close situations. Mortars, proper
fortifications, Army aviation assets, etc. all can be considered in
the right time and the right place.

Mortars have to have a dedicated logistics effort behind them--during
Anaconda that feature was somewhat stretched, from what I have read.
Fortifications in an offensive operation? Hey, survivability enhancement was
one of our primary considerations as combat engineers, but we rarely plan
for such near the LC during an offensive operation--that sort of went out
with the days of scientific seige warfare with its "circumvalation" and what
not. Army aviation assets are great, but as we saw in Anaconda (and during
OIF as well) there are environments where its capabilities are challenged
such that fixed wing CAS provides a better alternative. Yes, we plan for the
use of all of these whenever possible--but maintaining the strafe capability
in the collective bag of tricks can still come in handy.


I'm a believer in guns in airplanes. But, I'll freely acknowledge that
the gun isn't the best choice in a lot of scenarios.

Agreed. My argument is not that the gun is the paramount, or in most cases
even an "equally important" component of the overall weapons suite, but that
it can be of valuable use in the CAS arena in some circumstances, and that
deletion of gun armament accomplishes little for the loss of some valuable
flexibility.

I'm not willing
to forego the gun in current or future tactical aircraft. However,
I've seen a lot of airplanes lost while shooting trucks. Modern jets
cost a lot more than trucks. Going nose to nose with superior weapons
with a pea-shooter isn't always prudent. It may be necessary, but not
wise.

Agreed again. Taking the fight into the other guy's "backyard", so to speak,
should only be done when the gain is assessed as being worth the additional
risk. During Anaconda that was a no brainer--the Taliban/AQ folks had not
demonstrated any capability with MANPADS (and there had always been
significant doubt as to the viability of those Stingers we heard so much
about due to the storage limits on their batteries, not to mention their
cooling system for the seeker), so the additional risk was marginal, while
the payoff was reportedly quite valuable, in terms of actual target effects
and, likely just as important, I'd imagine the morale of those guys pinned
down in some shallow wadi under close engagement proabably improved every
time one of the fast movers passed overhead.



D.) While no one can put a value on the life of one American
soldier, a cost/benefit analysis of what strafe can do compared to the
risk involved usually mitigates against strafe being a primary tactic.

Nobody has said it should be a *primary* tactic.

Prosecution rest time again.


E.) While the guy on the ground may be firmly (and rightly)
convinced that his battle is the most important, the commanders must
allocate resources based on priorities which often don't have as much
emotion attached. Getting strafe to the troops in Anaconda wasn't a
readily available option.

It wasn't?! Reports I read indicated it actually occurred, so I wonder
how
you determine it "wasn't a readily available option"?

It wasn't a readily available option when initially called for.
Remember that Afghanistan is a long way from anywhere. At the time of
Anaconda, the primary tactical assets were carrier based and flying
extremely long duration, multiple refueling sorties. The flexibility
for immediate on-call CAS was not available.

I have not gotten that impression. Yeah, there was a distance to be covered
(not sure it applied to all CAS assets, as IIRC there were A-10's forward
based in Afghanistan proper rather early, and a couple of airfields located
just north of Afghanistan in one of the other -stans). But there was
apparently a CAS stack of sorts available, which is why these examples of
timely support are evident. I'd be careful about using MG Hagenbach's after
action criticisms of CAS in such a vein.



"I had an aircraft overhead carrying 500-pound bombs, but the 'bad guys'
were too close to our position to drop that much ammo without risking our
lives. I waved the pilot off the bomb run. I had him come around and
strafe
the area with guns," said the sergeant.
(www.af.mil/news/May2002/n20020529_0868.shtml )

The sergeant has an extremely optimistic view of the strafing accuracy
of the average F-15/16/18 operator, and extremely pessimistic one of
the reliability of PGMs.

Interestingly, the report you cite says the fighters fired til
"winchester" but the enemy continued to operate and then...drum roll,
please...he targeted the bunker with the 500 pound bombs. Which took
out the bunker.

Might I suggest that the sergeant's account might be sensationalized
for effect and that he was not an experienced forward air controller.
I don't know.

From reading the full account (see
http://www.robins.af.mil/pa/revup-on...y31-02-all.pdf ), it
is apparent that they went to a rather nasty danger-close bomb effort only
when things were even worse in terms of their situation. What about the
other account? Can you discount it as readily? Or...

"According to the citation, Captain Russell's flight, call sign Twister 52,
made contact with an American ground forward air controlling team that was
taking fire from enemy troops 75 meters away. The ground team restricted
Twister flight to strafe passes due to a "danger close" condition. This
condition meant friendly troops were within minimal risk distances of injury
or death from friendly weapons on enemy locations...Twister flight made six
strafe passes while firing 20-mm rounds from an altitude of 1,500 feet over
the target area. This was well within the threat zone of small arms fire and
surface to air missiles. The ground team reported enemy fire was suppressed
on each pass, but requested more passes to kill steadily increasing numbers
of reinforced Taliban and al Qaeda forces. Out of 20-mm ammunition, Twister
51, the aircraft manned by Maj. Chris Short and Lt. Col. Jim Fairchild,
became the airborne forward air controller and targeted Captain Russell's
jet on four additional low-altitude strafe passes. Due to radio failure,
Twister 51 then passed the tactical lead to Captain Russell's aircraft. With
the ground team's concurrence, Twister flight began employing laser-guided
bombs. The two aircrews attempted to guide each successive bomb closer to
enemy forces without injuring American service members. The aircrews were
able to drop bombs as close as 200 meters from friendly forces."

www2.acc.af.mil/accnews/dec02/02414.ht


Then there is the following from an F-16 pilot who flew some of these
missions during Anaconda:

"When Burt and his wingman arrived, the first words they heard from Slick
01, the ground controller on the scene, were "Danger close, seventy-five
meters." The words sent a chill down Burt's spine. The ground controller
relayed they had two casualties and two critically wounded. Burt made two
passes over the enemy position and emptied all 500 rounds. His wingman then
came in and emptied all his 500 rounds. "We realized how close we were
firing to the helicopter on the ground when we reviewed the cockpit tapes,"
Burt said. Though the F-16 pilots couldn't see exactly where their rounds
were hitting, the troops on the ground indicated that they were getting good
results. With their ammunition spent and the soldiers on the ground still
coming under enemy fire, Burt talked to Slick 01 about bringing in some
heavy ordnance. The enemy's close proximity, however, made a strike
dangerous, even with laser-guided munitions. Burt had to be extremely
careful not to drop his 500-pound bombs too close to the ground troops." [It
goes on to describe how they did subsequently bring the bombs in by walking
them ever closer, but not without at least one close call that caused the
CCT to admonish them for having almost hit their own location]

http://www.codeonemagazine.com/archi.../jul_02/354th/

So it appears there were numerous occasions of strafe missions being
requested from the ground folks.



F.) Good Forward Observers (FACs or AOs) should be calling
early for support. Good FOs should be GPS and Laser equipped and
getting the job done well before the more spectacular troops in the
wire scenario occurs. JDAMs et. al. are a much better choice. Bigger
payload, greater effect, better accuracy than strafe, more economical,
etc.

That is all great and is what we'd *like* to see happen--but as we saw in
Anaconda, it doesn't always flesh out that way. One of the best qualities
of
a first-class military is recognition of the importance of
flexibility--taking the strafe capability away from the aircraft that
perform most of the CAS does little to enhance that quality. I hope you
are
not arguing that would be the way to go.

Not at all, but I argue regularly that strafe is a weapon of last
resort in modern aircraft.

No disagreement there.

Brooks