In article ,
"Paul J. Adam" wrote:

In message , Chad Irby
writes

It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]

Sounds abstract? The services were using the same aircraft,
near-identical missiles (Sparrows and different models of Sidewinder),
but the USAF's F-4Ds and F-4Es had guns (pods for the Ds, internal for
the Es) supposedly as a solution to the problems encountered during
Rolling Thunder. Yet they were twice as likely to be shot down and
barely half as likely to kill, as the gunless Navy fighters. (Only seven
of the forty-eight USAF Linebacker kills were achieved with guns,
despite the efforts made to fit them)

Yep, McNamara is still influencing military thought. I was sure we'd
gotten over that, but what goes around, comes around.

....and you're quoting the same sort of logic they used back then.
You're comparing planes and equipment, but not *missions*.

For example, the Navy planes flew sorties against coastal areas, which
meant that they were flying over relatively undefended airspace on the
run in, as compared to the large number of SAMs that the Air Force
fighters and bombers went over.

One other note: of the 21 MiG kills by the F-4E during Vietnam, five
were gun kills... pretty good for something so useless.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.