In message , Ed Rasimus
writes
On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 19:00:14 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
wrote:
It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]

While numbers tell a story, they can occasionally mislead.

Of course - these are broad strokes, and I know enough to know there's a
lot of detail I've missed.

USAF to USN
comparisons offer some insight, but strict stats can lead to bad
conclusions. To compare sortie count/MiG engagement percentages you
would need to consider the various missions, the allocation of the
resource, the philosophy of engagement, etc.

I would argue that the numbers given have some utility, but there are
very clear questions.

With large composite strike packages, the AF tended toward lots of
specialization. Chaff droppers, SEAD, escorts (that often were used to
herd MiGs rather than engage them) and only a few dedicated shooters
on TEABALL frequency meant that the numbers could be skewed.

True, but if the end result was to triple the effectiveness of the
enemy's air defence then there appears to be a problem.

However, I don't have the comparative loss figures for ground fire, or
any data for results; it's quite possible that the USAF's relative
vulnerability to MiGs was balanced by lower losses to SAMs/AAA, and/or
by greater effects achieved to the targets. To date this remains a
personal interest rather than a funded study

Yet they were twice as likely to be shot down and
barely half as likely to kill, as the gunless Navy fighters. (Only seven
of the forty-eight USAF Linebacker kills were achieved with guns,
despite the efforts made to fit them)

It would be helpful to consider the USN fighter-vs-attack philosophy
as well as the level of experience of the multiple tour carrier force.
The USAF "universal pilot" concept and the "no involuntary second
tour" policy impacted the competence level.

Not at all, Ed. The only problem is that the USAF didn't have guns in
its fighters! USAF policy was completely correct in every detail, apart
from the unfortunate imposition of a flawed naval aircraft by McNamara.

(Smiley for the humour impaired)

Seriously... if the USAF had accepted the political cost of maintaining
a similar core cadre of specialist pilots as the USN (the Navy had the
justifiable shibboleth of carrier landing, the USAF lacked that and
chose to spread the pain) then would their results have been better? I'd
certainly guess so. There was much, much more going on than "our
fighters don't have guns".

The parenthetical conclusion is a poor one. With TEABALL, the 555th
TFW specialists, and the accompanying GCI support, it was possible for
the USAF fighters who DID engage, to use their longer range weapons
and negate the requirement to close to gun range.

Actually, I'd continue to claim it was correct. Why bother with Teaball,
Combat Tree, GCI, et al in order to get more performance from those
nasty useless missiles, when gun-armed F-4Es are arriving? If "lack of
guns" is the real problem, surely gun-armed fighters are a complete and
satisfactory answer?

The reality seems to me to be a damn sight more complex, and while
having a gun makes for a nice-to-have for the pilot (I'd want one if I
were flying...) it doesn't seem to be too significant in terms of
results achieved, compared to the other variables..


--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk