On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 22:40:10 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
wrote:

In message , Ed Rasimus
writes
On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 19:00:14 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
wrote:

USAF to USN
comparisons offer some insight, but strict stats can lead to bad
conclusions. To compare sortie count/MiG engagement percentages you
would need to consider the various missions, the allocation of the
resource, the philosophy of engagement, etc.

I would argue that the numbers given have some utility, but there are
very clear questions.

With large composite strike packages, the AF tended toward lots of
specialization. Chaff droppers, SEAD, escorts (that often were used to
herd MiGs rather than engage them) and only a few dedicated shooters
on TEABALL frequency meant that the numbers could be skewed.

True, but if the end result was to triple the effectiveness of the
enemy's air defence then there appears to be a problem.

I'd say that the effectiveness of the enemy defenses greatly reduced
by the AF specialization and packages. The losses/sortie difference
between '66/'67 and '72 were significant. Let's not get too tightly
wrapped around the MiG axle. The core of the defense was integrated
AAA and SA-2. MiGs were a factor, but relatively a small one. In
Linebacker, if MiGs got airborne, they generally died. (Or, they never
engaged.)

However, I don't have the comparative loss figures for ground fire, or
any data for results; it's quite possible that the USAF's relative
vulnerability to MiGs was balanced by lower losses to SAMs/AAA, and/or
by greater effects achieved to the targets. To date this remains a
personal interest rather than a funded study

The "relative vulnerability" to MiGs isn't demonstrated by loss
ratios, because the mission wasn't to sweep the skies of enemy
aircraft. Our mission was to deliver iron on targets. The MiGs mission
was to prevent that. While we all wanted to get a MiG, there weren't
enough to go around. And while the MiG pilots had the more agile
aircraft, their mission was to deter the bomb droppers.

Yet they were twice as likely to be shot down and
barely half as likely to kill, as the gunless Navy fighters. (Only seven
of the forty-eight USAF Linebacker kills were achieved with guns,
despite the efforts made to fit them)

It would be helpful to consider the USN fighter-vs-attack philosophy
as well as the level of experience of the multiple tour carrier force.
The USAF "universal pilot" concept and the "no involuntary second
tour" policy impacted the competence level.

Not at all, Ed. The only problem is that the USAF didn't have guns in
its fighters! USAF policy was completely correct in every detail, apart
from the unfortunate imposition of a flawed naval aircraft by McNamara.

Sorry, not true. During the period of Rolling Thunder, the greater
number of sorties were flown into MiG country by gun-equipped F-105s
(and on the Navy side, A-4, A-7 and F-8). By the time of Linebacker,
there were more F-4Es involved in the Pack VI missions than D's. If
anyone was hampered by lack of guns in their fighters, it should have
been the USN, but the initial stats offered in this discussion,
indicate that the USN had better ratios in LB when they had no guns.

Seriously... if the USAF had accepted the political cost of maintaining
a similar core cadre of specialist pilots as the USN (the Navy had the
justifiable shibboleth of carrier landing, the USAF lacked that and
chose to spread the pain) then would their results have been better? I'd
certainly guess so. There was much, much more going on than "our
fighters don't have guns".

Personnel policies and the related errors in applying them, are
background to the tactics issues. Clearly the issue can be traced in
USAF all the way back to the decision in the late '50's to go with
single-track "all jet" pilot training and the assumption of a
universally assignable pilot. The Navy used prop aircraft for primary
training continually and multi-tracking to get dedicated F/A, heavy
and helo pilots. Check USAF today---introducing a prop for primary and
multi-tracking. Sco USN 1/USAF 0!!

The parenthetical conclusion is a poor one. With TEABALL, the 555th
TFW specialists, and the accompanying GCI support, it was possible for
the USAF fighters who DID engage, to use their longer range weapons
and negate the requirement to close to gun range.

Actually, I'd continue to claim it was correct. Why bother with Teaball,
Combat Tree, GCI, et al in order to get more performance from those
nasty useless missiles, when gun-armed F-4Es are arriving? If "lack of
guns" is the real problem, surely gun-armed fighters are a complete and
satisfactory answer?

I argue that "lack of guns" is not the reason for poor kill ratios.
The F-4E "arrived" in 1968--nearly four full years before Linebacker
commenced. In 150 missions into North Vietnam, I only went twice
without a gun (flying a deployed F-4D from the 35th TFS in Korea
during September of '72.) Every other time I had a gun, either in the
F-105D or F-4E. I should note that in all of those sorties, I never
once had an occasion to fire the gun at another aircraft. Never came
close. Never dispatched an A/A missile either. Several times came
close.

The reality seems to me to be a damn sight more complex, and while
having a gun makes for a nice-to-have for the pilot (I'd want one if I
were flying...) it doesn't seem to be too significant in terms of
results achieved, compared to the other variables..

Ahh, total agreement at last. The issue is complex. It extends well
beyond stats and kill rates or calibers and fire rate. I still argue
for guns on fighters.