On Fri, 12 Dec 2003 08:15:44 -0800, Mary Shafer
wrote:

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 22:36:54 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
wrote:

In message , Chad Irby
writes

Mary adds some info and makes some big errors:

Okay, so let's get to the bottom line: how many F-4 sorties were *not*
intended to kill the enemy and break his stuff or directly support that
aim?

(Or to photograph it before and after being broken, or to keep fighters
off the breakers, or to stop his SAMs and AAA interfering, or...)

Or to strafe or nape his troops in contact. When all you have is a
Phantom, every problem has a Phantom solution.

But USAF and USN didn't only have Phantoms. Regardless of whether you
are talking about Rolling Thunder or Linebacker, both services fielded
an array of aircraft including F-105, F-100, F-5, F-8, A-4, A-7, A-6,
A-37, A-1, B-57, etc. etc. etc.


Because of this, you can't lump all F-4 sorties together. Ethel and
Price don't, for example. They differentiate by role, which is how it
has to be done. Bomber and attack and recce F-4s aren't fighter F-4s,
any more than A-7s are. The F/A-18, that could fight its way to the
target, wasn't invented yet.

Sorry, but the F-105 could fight its way to the target and so could
the F-4. The F/A-18 isn't going to engage any current generation
fighter enroute to the target successfully with retained iron. In
fact, the current generation of interdiction aircraft doesn't even go
to the target. That's the big advantage of stand-off PGMs.

If your chosen tactic hauls sixty aircraft in rigid formation along a
predictable course and is vulnerable to a slashing attack by one or two
MiGs on a vulnerable element, then that's bad... unless it gets two
dozen strikers on-target and stops you losing half-a-dozen aircraft to
SAMs.

Shades of Bomber Command? Remember that the Vietnam War was only a
little more than twenty years after WW II and there were pilots flying
in SEA who had flown in WW II. When you talk about strategy and
tactics, you have to keep that in mind.

There weren't many, although there were a few. Robin Olds being a
primary example. But you certainly wouldn't hang the charge of
stereotyped or obsolete tactical thinking on Robin. There were a few
more Korean era vets, but in large numbers the Vietnam War, even
during Rolling Thunder was folks on their first combat.

The weapons and tactics were developing and being fielded as quickly
as possible. In '65, at Nellis, the instructor cadre in F-105s got
trained in pop-up ground attack tactics while we were in the course
and trained us the following week. The syllabus changed almost daily
to incorporate new formation, new concepts, new weapons, etc.

One other note: of the 21 MiG kills by the F-4E during Vietnam, five
were gun kills... pretty good for something so useless.

This aircraft has Sparrow and Sidewinder, and by the time the F-4E is
flying they're demonstrating performance (the Sidewinder was up to 50%
Pk in its AIM-9G form). Yet it's making a quarter of its kills with
guns? Where did that battery of AAMs go in those engagements?

They were back at base. Bomber and attack and SEAD F-4Es only have
guns to defend themselves.

Absolutely incorrect! All, repeat ALL F-4s always carried Sparrows. We
didn't always have room for AIM-9s, but I never saw a combat sortie
flown by an F-4 when I was there without Sparrows.

They left the AAM at home to carry bombs.

Sparrow wells don't hold bombs.

Fewer than half the USAF F-4 were fighters with AAM. Since the
non-fighter F-4s would have been carrying their ordnance during the
inbound half of the flight and only been able to get into the fur ball
outgoing, I'd say guns were under-represented in kills. This probably
proves that the escort F-4s had more chances at MiGs than the
home-going non-fighters.

The reason that A/A loaded F-4s got more kills is more subtle. It has
to do with the politics of "ace-building" between the USN and USAF and
the mis-guided over-classification of TEABALL. See Michel's Clashes or
Thompson's "To Hanoi and Back".

Escorts didn't even get many shots as they were often used to provide
blocking or herding of MiGs to direct them to a kill zone where the
555th was being vectored on a discrete frequency to do the shooting.