In message , Kevin
Brooks writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]

Ugh! That all sounds dangerously like the "operations research", or systems
analysis, kind of numeric mumbo-jumbo so characteristic of the McNamara
era---PLEASSSE don't go there!

What do you think my day job is? _Someone_ has to try to work out the
best way to use what we've got, and while the Services take the lead
they also hire some civilian help.


Ed raises some valid criticism of the data as raw numbers, but he agrees
with the main thrust: guns on or off fighters were a trivial factor in
air-to-air combat effectiveness; at least when compared to training,
tactics, doctrine, personnel deployments, maintenance, technology...

Trouble is, the "we did badly because we didn't have guns" mantra is
attractive, seductive... and wrong.


It took us a generation to rid ourselves of
the most of the "mantle of the number crunchers" (and we were only partially
succesful--witness the continued use of the POM process in budgeting) as it
was...

Too little analysis is as bad as too much.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk