"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
In message , Kevin
Brooks writes
"Jake McGuire" wrote in message
. com...
It points out the value that the ground troops placed on AC-130
support. Which is naturally much more effective than fighter strafing
support, as the AC-130 has more, larger guns, on trainable mounts,
with dedicated gunners, and a very long loiter capability. This is
not the same as a fighter that can make two or three 20mm strafing
passes before he's out of ammunition.

Well, you kind of snipped away the related bit about the scenario where
you
are well within danger-close and under a significant MANPADS threat
during
daytime, which sort of eliminates the AC-130 from the running. The point
was that the groundpounders found the guns a better starting point for
CAS
during that operation than PGM's. Are you claiming that the 10th LID and
101st AASLT DIV folks did not like getting that 20mm strafe support they
received from the F-15E's and F-16's that day?

It didn't do them much good, compared to the numerous bombs they called
in. Read SSgt Vance's testimony: where the al-Qaeda troops kept firing
despite the strafing, their position was destroyed with bombs, and lack
of bombs (not guns) was cited as a significant delay in their
extraction, which contributed to at least one death (SrA Jason D.
Cunningham, who was badly wounded and died before being evacuated)

More likely they still enjoyed getting that strafe support for suppression
purposes. I note one CCT member's description of the change in situation
that finally required sucking up doing the danger-close bomb work:

"If we couldn't kill the bunker, we were going to be surrounded," said
Brown. "We knew that we had enemy soldiers hiding in the terrain to our
(right). Effectively, they were moving in on us and we had nowhere to go."
www.af.mil/news/May2002/n20020529_0868.shtml

So they only used the bombs when it was a factor of outright
survival--understandable IMO.

And that site indicates the controller's name was SSG Gabe Brown, not
"Vance"--being as it is a USAF source I'd trust it.


Your mistake is to assume
that this is always going to be the case. The Small Diameter Bomb and
the Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System both address this issue,
and address it very well. And if they don't do a good enough job,
then it's always possible to develop something better.

Your mistake is drawing the wrong conclusions based upon different
platform
requirements, for starters. APKWS is a Hydra-based (or Hellfire based)
solution (neither is scheduled for USAF use)

Is it forever impossible for the USAF to use those weapons, or are they
just not in the current plan?

APKWS is currently planned for use only on rotary assets, beginning in 2006
IIRC.


, and just like the option of
using a gun pod, requires specific load out.

You can carry plenty of APKWS with the weight freed up by deleting a
gun: so an aircraft tasked for CAS gains capability without losing
weapons or fuel.

Huh? Not if those weapons are not loaded out prior to departure. You do
realize the difference between preplanned and immediate CAS requests, right?
And what the timing cycle for the ATO is? And that in the end, regardless of
any specific loadout requested by the supported ground element, some gent in
the CAOC is actually going to decided what the external load is going to be
(been there--requested a mixed load including Gator to suppress OPFOR arty
assets (specifically the DAG) and was told, "We'll decide on the munitions
loadout, thank you very much")? So the idea that you can *depend* on the CAS
package to have these mythical USAF APKWS is highly questionable to say the
least.


In other words if your existing
CAS support package does not have it onboard when they show up, or are
routed in based upon urgent need, and the separation between forces
precludes use of larger PGM's, the ground guys are out of luck.

So where CAS is a likely diversion, then standard loadout includes a
seven-round APKWS launcher (just as sorties over parts of the FRY used
to require an anti-radar missile either per aircraft or per flight,
IIRC). When you've freed up a thousand pounds, using a quarter of that
for contingency CAS isn't a large problem.

FYI, that little seven load RL still takes up a hardpoint, which is why no,
you *can't* plan on it being included as standard.


OTOH, if
they have their trusty internal cannon the ground guys will get at least
some form of support.

With very marginal effect, however.

Again, since there were repeated requests for just that level of support
during Anaconda, and given that it is a common sense starting point to use
the safest (to your own force) option before moving up the risk category,
the gun provides that additional level of flexibility. I seriously doubt
were you in the position of calling in that "oh, ****" mission with the bad
guys well within the danger close margin for bombs that you'd have leaped
immediately to that riskiest of options. You seem to forget that the min
separation factor for 20mm is *25 meters*, while for bombs that minimum
jumps to between 145 and 500 meters (depending upon whether you are in a
protected or open position). Big gap between those figures, and elevating
yourself to the higher danger close risk category from the outset seems a
bit ridiculous to me.

Brooks